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l. Concepts 
The last years of the twentieth century have been witness to three mo-
ments of far-reaching consequences and great symbolic significance: 
in the political arena, the fall of the Berlin Wall spelt the end of the di-
vision of the world into two antagonistic blocs; in technology, the de-
velopment of the Internet meant that information could be transmitted 
and interpersonal communication could be conducted instantaneously 
and cheaply between people of different countries and continents; and, 
from the economic viewpoint, the birth of the World Trade Organiza-
tion heralded the arrival of a globalised world, with increasingly few-
er economic barriers. 
The communications industry has been no stranger to that phenome-
non, characterised by the creation of greater links between people who 
are not geographically close and by the competition of corporations in 
a global marketplace. For instance, in the year 2000, 40% of the merg-
ers and takeovers of companies on a global scale -whose value 
reached the record figure of 3.5 trillion dollars- took place in the 
telecommunications, new technologies and communications compa-
nies sector 1• That year, two of the largest concentration operations 
were carried out by communications groups: AOL acquired Time-
Warner and Vivendi gained control of Universal. 
The globalisation phenomenon has re-opened the debate on the con-
centration of communications companies. Sorne of the controversia! 
issues remain the same as those raised in earlier decades: Do citizens 
have access to differentiated sources which are really accessible so as 
to be able to compare information and make informed decisions? Do 
market conditions provide favourable conditions for the entry of new 
1 Teresa La Porte et al. (VI.2001 ), Globalisaticm of the Media lndustry and Possib/e 
Threats to Cultural Dfrersity, report prepared for the European Parliament. University 
of Navarre, Pamplona. 
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contents providers? To what extent should a communications compa-
ny be allowed to grow in a market? How and by whom should the con-
centration processes of communications companies be regulated? 
However, today new challenges and voices of alarm have been raised. 
fuelled by irrefutable figures as well as groundless fears. In the first 
section of this chapter we will study the main theories and concems on 
media concentration; we will then go on to analyse conceptual aspects 
which wiH allow us to identify the scope and real nature of this phe-
nomenon: Where does the difference lie between industrial concentra-
tion and market concentration? When can it be affirmed that a physi-
cal or judicial figure controls a company? Which markets are relevant 
for the study of concentration processes (local, regional. national, in-
1 temational)? How do concentration processes come about; and what 
': kind of communications groups emerge as a result of the mergers, ~ ~ takeovers and Jaunching of new media? 
111 
1.1. Main Hypotheses in Recent Research 
Thucydides provides us with the first surviving written testimony on 
the effects of the concentration of power. This Greek historian fought 
in the Peleponnesian war in the fifth century B.C.; pondering on the 
causes of the defeat of powerful Athens by Sparta. Thucydides Jeft for 
posterity his pithy vision of the mechanisms of politics and govern-
ment: "hegemony annihilates itself"2• 
So, the Athenian historian considered that any attempt to control mas-
sive power over a long period of time was destined to failure: just as 
in the myth of Sisyphus, reaching the goal was easy. but he would in-
exorably fall down the slope again just as the desired end was on the 
point of being attained. 
2 See Simon Homblower ( 1991 ), A Commemary 011 Tlwc.vdides, Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
In the business arena, history also shows that unfettered growth pro-
duces paralysis, a loss in tlexibility, excessive bureaucracy and a 
weakening of the corporate culture: indeed, the rankings of the largest 
companies show constant tluctuations and few hegemonic positions 
sustained over time. 
Despite this, the awareness of this fact does not help to reassure many 
writers. Marx, will say, for example, that without the coordinated ac-
tion of the weakest (the proletariat), the strongest (the owners of capi-
tal) -even though they may not always be the same- will tend to ex-
ploit the rest. 
Even though hegemonic positions do not tend to last for long, and al-
though in today's society there does not appear to exista class strug-
gle, there are risks of dominant positions in any market: at least in the 
"transitional periods" -when a company has achieved a good growth 
rate but has not yet felt the negative effects of its inordinate size- the 
concentration of power can prove to be an obstacle to free competition. 
In the area of communications, situations of hegemonic power are par-
ticularly serious: as well as obstructing the entry of new competitors 
into the market, they hinder the exchange of ideas and imply that one 
business group may exert undue influence over political decisions and 
public opinion. 
For this reason it is not surprising that the first systematic reflections 
on the effects of the concentration of communications companies go 
back to the Second World War: in 1942, H. Luce, founder of Time 
magazine promoted the work of the Hutchins commission, which after 
several years of investigation published the celebrated report .. Free-
dom of the Press". Already then, the Hutchens report identified the 
phenomenon of concentration as one of the three great dangers for the 
freedom of the press3. 
3 William E. Hocking (1947), Freedom of the Press. A Framework of Principie. A Re-
port from the Commissicm 011 Freedom of tite Press, The University of Chicago Press. 
Chicago, 142. 
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In Europe, in the sixties and seventi es, the governme nts of sorne coun-
tries, the European Counc il and the Commission of the European 
Community began to take an interest in the possible negative e ffects o f 
the growth of companies; in that contex t can be found the report d rawn 
up by M . Leynen in 1979 -which woul d be a working document fo r 
the Council-, the nationa l reports ordered by the Commission, espe-
cially fro m J 978 onwards, the report presented by E. Gunter to the 
German governme nl in 1967, the Rodgers report ( 1975) and the re port 
conducted by G. Vede! for the economic a nd social Council o f France 
( 1979). 
Also in those years the first work on the proble m o f the lack o f tran s-
parency in the capital of communications companies was produced 
(M.H. Se iden, 1974), and on the e ffects o f concentrati on in the po liti -
cal system (H. Schiller, 1976) and on the homogeni zati o n o f conte nts 
(W. T. Gorml ey, J 976)~ . 
Concentration was a reality c learly bounded by nati o nal borders: in a l-
most every country, the presence o f foreign companies was ha rd ly s ig-
ni ficant, so that the studi es were decidedly nati ona l in na turc. In Eu-
rope, with the exception of Great Brita in , Finl and a nd Lu xembourg, 
the audi ovisual sector was do minated unt il the mi d-seventies by pub-
lic monopolies, w hich - at least in theory- had been conce ived, a mo ng 
other reasons, to g uarantee in forma tio n plurali sm . The re fore, until the 
nineteen e ighti es, research on medi a co ncentratio n in the o ld contine nt 
tended to be limited to a nalys ing the degree of press conce ntratio n 111 
each country. 
From the nineteen e ighties onwards, work was publi shed on the co n-
centration of the print and a ud iovisua l med ia, but a lmost a lways from 
a "nationa l" perspecti ve. In so rne cases, suc h as in the work published 
4 On those first works referring to concentration. see Caries Llorens-Maluquer (200 1 ). 
Conce111raci611 de empresas de cm11w1icaciún y el p/11rali.rn10: la acci<Í11 de la U E. doc-
toral thesis, Uni versidad Autónoma de Barce lona, Rarcl!lona . 
by G. Wedell and G. M. Luykens or J. P. Jeandon6, the European mar-
ket was analysed but only as a mere account of the situation of various 
national markets; it would still take sorne time before the first quanti-
tati ve analyses exploring the problems and challenges posed by the 
concentration of communications media in the European market would 
make their appearance. 
Another line of work -particularly prolific in the eighties- refers to the 
so-called "critica! theory"7• This academic school, quite broadly de-
fined, is made up of researchers who assume sorne historical and eco-
nomic postulates of Marxism and a great many of them have been 
trained in the area of political economy. Of the most well-known work 
of this period are the studies of J. Curran and J. Seaton8, A. and M. 
Mattelart9 and B. Bagdikianio. In Spain, the works of E. Bustamante 
and R. Zallo11 and J. C. Migue112 stand out. Those books refer, above 
ali, to the hypothetical negative effects of concentration; however, not 
one of them is based on quantitative analyses of the market. 
Other research makes an analysis of the legal aspects of concentration, 
5 George Wedell and Georg-Michael Luyken (1986), Media in Competition, The Euro-
pean Institute for the Media, Manchester. 
6 J. P. Jeandon (1988), Impact des nouvel/es technologies sur la concurrence dans /'in 
dustrie de la télévisio11 en Europe, CEE, Luxembourg. 
7 See Hanno Hardt ( 1998), /nteractions: Critica/ Studies in Communications, Media & 
Joumalism, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham. 
8 James Curran and Jean Seaton ( 1981 ), Power without Responsibility: The Press and 
Broadcasting in Britain, Fontana, London. 
9 Armand and Michelle Mattelart ( 1986), Penser les media, Editions La Decouverte, 
Paris. 
10 Ben Bagdikian (1990), The Media Monopoly, 3rd ed., Bacon Press, Boston. 
11 Enrique Bustamante and Ramón Zallo (coord.) (1988), Las industrias culturales en 
España, grupos multimedia y tra11s11acio11ales, Akal, Madrid. 
12 Juan Carlos de Miguel ( 1993). Los grupos multimedia. Estructuras y estrategias en los 
medios europeos, Bosch, Barcelona. 
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s uch as the work of A. Van Loon and G. A. l. Schuijt13, or A. Lange and 
J. L. R enaud 14 • O n the other hand, B. Compaine15, B. Guillou 16, R. Pi -
card 17, A. Ni eto and J. M. Mora18 and F. Cabello19 are more interested 
in company s trategy and the typology of communications groups . 
In 1993, A. Sánchez-Tabernero, with the collaboratio n of severa! re-
searchers of the E uropean In stitute for the Media. publi shed the first 
s tudy on concentration in Europe based o n a detai led qua ntitati ve 
study of 17 countries. The In stitute itself has continued this line of 
work with partial reviews of the report or w ith the ana lys is of new 
problems. Other Institute researchers prepared severa! doc uments a t 
the request of the Commissio n of the E uropean Community. such as 
the "Transparency and M edia Control in E urope" report. publi shed m 
1995. 
In the nineties -especia lly towards the ir close- partial s tudies on con-
centrati on in Europe have been published w ith diverse approaches and 
contents : 
§ a) Analysis of an exclusive ly national scope; 
.., 
13 Ad van Loon and G. A. l. Schu ijt ( 1989) Cross media mrnersftip. Institut voor infor-
matierechl. A111ste rda111. 
14 André Lange and Jean Luc Renaud , Tite F/l/ure r41he A11dim•i.rnal /11d11.~1ry in t :um¡>e. 
The European Instilllte for the Media. Manchester. 
15 Benjamin M. Compaine ( 1982) Who mrns 1'1e media?. 2nd ed. Whitc Plains. New 
York. 
16 Bernard Guillou ( 1984) Les s1rarégies m11/ri111edia.1· des g mupes de co111m1111 ica1io11 . La 
Documentation Frarn;aise. Paris. 
17 Robert G. Picard ( 1989), Media Ecr1110111i cs. Sage. New York. 
18 Alfonso Nieto and Juan Manuel Mora ( 1989). Co11ce111racirí11 il(/Ím 11a1iva e n Es¡wiia. 
Prensa diara. S. P. Uni versidad de Navarra. Pamplona. 
19 Fernando Cabe llo ( 1999). El mercado de re1•is1as e11 Espaiia. Crmce111racirí11 i11j(imw-
1iva. Aricl , Barce lona. 
b) Compilations of legislation in the European arena, the most no-
table is the book by E. Machet and S. Robillard2º; 
e) Analysis of the "new world order" ofinformation and proposals on 
the need for limiting the power of the giant communications com-
panies: C. Hamelink21 , N. J. Woodhull and R. W. Snyder22, D. Al-
ger23; 
d) Reports on concentration or on the Iack of transparency in the ad-
vertising industry, both from the perspective of the advertisers as 
well as from the position of the advertising intermediaries: R. 
Rijkens24 and F. J. Pérez Latre25 ; 
e) Biographies of the principal company owners and studies on the 
communications groups: J. Tunstall and M. Palmer26, K. Maney27; 
t) Studies on the communications industry in Europe: A. Pilati and G 
Richeri28 and annual reports by agencies and media buying com-
panies (Zenith Media), investment banks (James Capel), research 
20 Emmanuelle Machet and Serge Robillard (1998), Television & Culture: Polirics & 
Regulation in Europe, The European Institute for the Media, Düsseldorf. 
21 Cees J. Hamelink ( 1994 ). The polirics of wor/d communicarion: a human righrs per-
spectfre, Sage London. 
22 Nancy J. Woodhull and Roben W. Snyder (eds.) (1998), Media Mergers, Transaction 
Publishers. New Brunswick. 
23 Dean Alger ( 1998), Megamedia: lww giallt corporations dominare mass media, distort 
competition mu/ endanger democracy, Rowman & Littlefield Publications. Lonham. 
24 Rein Rijkens ( 1992), European advertising strategies: rhe profiles and policies of 
multinational companies operating in Europe. Cassell, London. 
25 Francisco J. Pércz Latre ( 1995). Ce11trales de compra de medios, EUNSA, Pamplona. 
26 Jeremy Tunstall and Michael Palmcr ( 1991 ). Media Moguls. Routledge. London. 
27 Kevin Maney ( 1995) Megamt?dia Slwk<'<>ut: rhe inside /ook ar rhe leaders and the los-
ers in the <'Xploding comm1micario11s imfustry. Wiley & Sons, New York. 
28 Antonio Pilati and Guiseppe Richeri (2000), Lafabbrica de/le idee, Baskcrville, Bolo-
nia. See also, Antonio Pilati (ed) ( 1993), MIND Media /11d11stry in Europe. J. Libbey, 
London. 
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institutes (IDATE, The European Instilute far the Media) and pub-
lic institutions (the European Audiovisual Observatory). 
However, no up to date analysis of the phenomenon of the concentra-
tion of communications corporations in Europe has been carried out in 
the las t few years. This study takes into accounl certain fac ts which 
were barely conceived of or had not become su ffi ciently important at 
the beginning of the last decade: 
a) The g lobalisation of markets and the emergence of new media 
ha ve changed the notion of "relevant markets": they can no longer 
only be linked to geographical areas bounded by national borders. 
b) 
c ) 
The development of ne w techn ologies necessitates the establi sh-
ment of two types of mechani sms ensuring free compelition: somc 
refer to distribution (systems preventing di scrimination in access 
to the "highways") and others to content (medi a owne rship and 
market shares). 
Conce ntration in the advertis ing sector has provided adveni sing 
agencies and media buying companies wi th enormous negotiating 
power; far this reason, proposa ls on a poss ible rev iew of the legal 
framework must be formulated without excessively weaken ing the 
medi a's position with regard lo the adverti s ing inlermediaries~9 . 
Le t us now go on to examine the cases where company growlh results 
in a market concentration ; we will a lso examine the mechani sms - as 
well as industria l g rowth- w hich can cause the appearance of hege-
monic groups. 
29 A derailed aspecr of Lhis phenornenon can be seen in Francisco Pére1: La1rc and Serg io 
Puertollano (2000), P/a11ijicaciú11 d e medios en mercados locales: si111acicí11. pmble-
mas y oporlllnidades, in VV.AA .. "Estudios de Empresa In format iva. Homenaje al 
Profesor José Tallón", U. Complutense. Madrid . 529-5.15 . 
1.2. Industrial Concentration and Market Concen-
tration 
Concentration can be analysed from the market viewpoint or from the 
perspecti ve of the companies. In the first case, concentration increases 
when the position of dominance or influence of the main companies 
becomes stronger, the public's power of choice is reduced and when 
sorne .. independent voices" disappear. From the business point of 
view, concentration implies industrial growth of the communications 
groups. 
Sorne processes of industrial concentration do not generate market 
concentration: for example, if a company which owns radio stations in 
Greece and is not present in the Swedish market sets up a new radio 
station in Stockholm its industrial concentration will be increased but 
it will also cause a fragmentation of the radio broadcasting market of 
that capital city. 
On the other hand, rnarket concentration may not be the result of the 
growth of a company: in rnany European cities and especially in the 
United States, newspaper closures have given rise to their competitors 
becoming local monopolies. 
As Compaine and Gomery warn, monopolies and oligopolies are won-
derful for the owners of the companies which find themselves in a 
privileged position, but are seriously harmful both for the companies 
attempting to penetrate the market as well as for consumers30• For this 
reason, there is general consensus on the need to avoid positions of ex-
cessive domination which may imply a likely risk for free competition. 
But controversy does not arise in the field of general principies but 
when practical applications are put forward. For example, what is a 
30 Benjamin M. Compaine and Douglas Gomery (2000). W/10 ow11s the media? Compe-
tition a11d co11ce11tratio11 in the mass media industrv. Erlbaum, 3rd ed .. Mahwah. N .J .. 
511-520. . 
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" reasonable" marke t share? Should the same max imum share be es-
tablished fo r each type o f medi a: newspapers, magazines. rad io sla-
tions e tc.? What is a meaningful geographica l area: local. regional. na-
tiona l, European? Do there exist other ways of gaining do minant pos i-
ti ons which do not involve market percentages: for example. the con-
trol of "bott!enecks" in production or distribution'! Whe n ca n it be de-
termined tha t an owner or g roup of s hareholders ·'control" a co mpa ny? 
So me of these questions do nor a llow for a ' 'scientific" reply: the rc is 
no easy way to disting uish whether il is bette r, for example . that a 
communi cations group reach 25% of the marke t share in daily press. 
radio a nd te lev ision or that it possess 50% of dail y press c ircula ti o n. 
but is no t present in the othe r two produc t markets. lt is not even pos-
sible to formula te c rireria applicable ro heterogeneous marke ts: legis-
la tion could ban a te levision company from ho lding 40% of subscrip-
ti ons to pay te levis io n c hannels in rhe Unitcd S tates with the a im o r 
avoiding a situa ti on o f dom ina ri on: howevcr. in much sma ll e r mar-
ke ts. a Jower percentage could present d iffi c ulti es for thc crnn pany·s 
econo mi c viability. 
In orde r to avoid these cases. the reg ul atory and cont rol bodies tc nd to 
conce ntra te their ac ti vity on externa! growth processes: they exa mine 
if mergers o r company ta keovers g ive ri sc to situa ti o ns whe re therc is 
a ri sk o f abuse of a do minan! pos iti o n. In contras!. thcy usua ll y place 
Jess emphasis o n thc ana lysis o f the inte rna! growth proccsses ( launch-
ing of new med ia) and o n o ther ractors whi ch favour market conccn-
tratio n (s uc h as the di sappea ran ce o í competito rs)11 . 
The regul a ri on of externa! growth has the ad vantage o r bein g a bk to 
be carri ed o ut "ad casum'': each conce ntratio n o pcra ti o n is studied and 
it is dec ided if it sho ulcJ be approved. ba nncd or permittccl. but o n con-
ditio n o f fulfilling sorne requireme nts (suc h as carry ing out cli vcst-
3 1 Sec Pierre Larouc he (2000). Co111¡u•1i1i rm. /011· all(/ ref.i11/a1i n11 i 11 L11m¡wm1 1elecn111-
1111111Ícati ons. Harl Publishing. O xford. 
ments or making the commitment not to hinder competitors' access to 
distribution channels). 
On the other hand, interna) growth is more difficult to deter, for at Ieast 
three reasons: 
a) Firstly, because -in those cases- one or severa! companies' in-
creased presence in the market is a consequence of their capacity 
to innovate and their favourable reception by the public: anti-con-
centration measures would mean that a company in a dominant po-
sition would be prevented from Iaunching new media in the same 
market or from increasing the transmission or audience size of the 
media it owns. That is to say, restricting the possibilities of inter-
na} growth would be tantamount to penalising innovation, the 
search for higher quality and the decision to take on business risks. 
b) Also, the increase in a communications group's market share could 
be compatible with increased offer available to the public; this has 
been the case, for instance, in many countries around the world in 
the last twenty years with the proliferation of television channels: 
in sorne markets, the leading television company has set up new 
channels and has even increased its market share, but the public 
has many more options at their disposal, even though several share 
the same ownership. 
e) Finally, it is certainly not easy to determine on a hard and fast rule 
on what should be the maximum Ievels of market concentration 
not to be exceeded under any circumstance. Those market shares 
should be established for each type of media (newspapers, maga-
zines, radio, television .... ) and for each type of market (with regard 
to its population). They should also include provisions for .. cross 
ownership" for multimedia corporations. On the other hand, mar-
ket share could be calculated based on the time the media are con-
sumed by the public, on the total turnover figures of the companies 
in the sector or on the advertising market. 
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The re are severa] procedures for the calculation of the deoree of mar-
e 
ke t concentration: sorne - such as the Index of relati ve entropy- are not 
widely used, owing to their excessive complcxity-12 . Others. such as the 
Curve of Lorenz. permit a graphic approximation to the problcm of 
concentration, but are not parti cula.rly appropriate in enab ling rcgula-
tory bodies to reach decisions. 
The Curve of Lorenz compares the real si tuation of conccntrati on wi th 
a hypothetical case in whi ch concentrati on wou ld eq ual zero. The ver-
tical ax is indicates the number of companies expressed cumul ati vely 
and as a percentage. fro m lower to grcater; the horizontal ax is shows 
the chosen variable (turnover. market sharc, etc. ). al so expressed by a 
c umul ati ve perce ntage. If the s ize of the compan ics -refcrring to the 
variable chosen in order to measure the degree of concentrat ion- is the 
same, the Curve of Lorenz will be where the graph is bi sected: and the 
further away the line is from the diagonal , the n greatcr will be the de-
gree of marke t concentrati on.1.1 . 
Other measuremenl systems are not precise cnough : for cxamplc. the 
Gini lndex merely expresses in mathcmatical form wha t the C urve or 
Lorenz shows graphically: it takes the rate of the numeri cal di stance 
between the bisector of the a ngle and the real c urve o f Lore nz. Wi th re-
gard to the "Four firm concentration rat io" (CR4). thi s is limi tcd to 
adding up the market shares of thc four lcading com panies in a markct. 
So, in a marke t A where o ne company has a 77% share and another 
three have a share o f 1 % each one . then it wi ll ha ve a C R4 or 80. Mar-
ket B where the four Jarges t companies ha ve 20o/é each w i 11 havc thc 
same CR4; however, in this second case. the chances o f a company 
abusing its dominant position are fewer. 
One of the procedures most applied fo r mcasurin g the intc ns ity u f 
32 Sce. e.g. Jong. H. W. from ( 1989). D_1·1w111isclw Mark11heoril' . Lcitkn. S1c nfcn Kroc,c . 
33 Sce Alfo nso Nielo and Juan Manuel Mora ( 1989). Co11cl!11flvcirí11 i1(/ii r111111irn e 11 /:".1-
pa1ia: pre11sa diaria, Servicio de Publicacionc~ de la Univer~idad de Nm·arra . Pa m-
plona. 59. 
competition or the degree of concentration in a market is the Herfind-
ahl-Hirschman Index (IHH); it is a simple formula and expresses more 
than the CR4; it is calculated by adding together the squared market 
shares of the companies of a certain sector. 
We will look at two cases. In market A there are only four radio com-
panies with the following audience shares: 70%, 20%, 5% and 5%. 
The IHH of this radio station market would be 5.350 (the added 
squared figures of 70, 20, 5 and 5). In market B there are also only four 
radio stations, but each one of them has an audience share of 25%; in 
this case, the IHH would be 2.480, which is the sum of adding four 
times squared 25. A higher IHH means a higher level of market con-
centration and a lower intensity of competition. 
The IHH is useful for comparing situations of concentration in differ-
ent markets and for viewing over a period of time the evolution of the 
intensity of competition in a market. However, it is impossible to es-
tablish an IHH from which it can be said the degree of concentration 
is "excessive" or .. not tolerable" for the regulatory authorities: that fig-
ure depends on the characteristics of each market, the type of business, 
and, in the last analysis, on the decision taken by the public through 
their political representatives. 
For instance, in sorne countries, people may be more concerned by the 
risk of cultural colonialism than by the growth of home-grown com-
munications corporations; this has traditionally been the case in Aus-
tria, Ireland and the French-speaking area of Belgium, as they are the 
natural areas for expansion for companies from Germany, Great 
Britain and France respectively. This circumstance explains why the 
legal frameworks of the first three countries mentioned permit a high 
degree of concentration, favouring the development of Austrian, lrish 
and Belgian communications companies. 
Market dominance has been calculated up till now with regard to two 
possible realities; the total company turnover and audience share or 
(distribution) reached. However, it would be more significant to 
analyse the share reached of the public's time: this system would not 
CONCEPTS 
-
A LRJNSO 1 M EDIA COSCE:-0,.R,UION IN 
SA."\'Cl lEZ.-T,,BER.NERO T H E E u ROPE1\N M ARKET. 
M IGUEL CARVNAL NEW T RF.1'DS ,\SD CJ1,\Ll.E1'GES 
N g 
N 
o 
e: 
" 
.., 
onl y enable a jo int measurement to be made o f ali the media 's presence 
in the market - print, audiovisual and interactive- but it would also 
more c learly refl ect the capac ity of each company to modify public 
opinion; a monthly magazine read for half an hour would not have the 
same influe nce as a te levision channe l with a viewing time of two 
ho urs per person, even though the number of readers a nd viewers were 
the same . 
Having said ali chis, regul ators should establi sh measure me nt and con-
trol systems of the degree of concentrati on which can be pul into prac-
ti ce; because to attem pt to establish the "perfect syste m" would mea n 
also having to analyse the degree of publi c attenti on. the place of con-
sumpti on, the type of contents offered by each mediu m, e tc. A nd those 
realities are of such complexity that to measure the m is im possible o r 
would require too disproporti onate a cost. 
There also exist o ther possible ways of abusing a position o f clomi-
nance in a market which do no t orig inale in achieving a particu larly 
high turnover or share of the audi ence: vertical integration impli es that 
one or severa) companies can control some " bottle necks" in the 
process o f the preparation or dis tributio n of conte nts and can acqui re a 
position of "gatekeeper" which means they can preve nt the appearance 
of competitors and impose conditio ns. 
In la tter years the most wide ly known case in the world o f poss ible 
abuse of its dominan! position through a strong verti cal integra ti on has 
been that of M icrosoft: in the US and EU the o rga nisms c ha rged with 
de fending competi tion examined if the link between the o perati ve sys-
tem (Windows) and the browser (Explorer) implied di s loya l compet i-
tion for other compani es (suc h as Netscape) and re presented a mid-
term ri sk for consumers both w ith regard to price polic ies as we ll a s a 
loss in incenti ves for innovation. 
In the area of audiovisual media , there a re a numbe r of types o f poss i-
ble " bottlenecks": exclusive broadcasting rig hts o f sorne programmes. 
conditi onal access syste ms (decoders , browse rs, g uides of e lectro ni c 
prograrnrning and operative systerns), and telecommunications sys-
terns (cable and terrestrial or satellite digital television platforms)34• 
Occasionally, attractive programmes can encounter insurmountable 
difficulties in reaching the public when no access is available to the ap-
propriate distribution channels. And, in the opposite sense, the eco-
nornic viability of sorne distributors may depend on their being able to 
acquire certain contents (especially rights to broadcasting sporting 
events and to the most popular filrns). On the other hand, in the print 
sector competition is rarely distorted by a process of vertical integra-
tion. 
In this study sorne systems are used to analyse the degree of concen-
tration which, despite their drawbacks -as we have already mentioned, 
all measurement processes are necessarily limited-, allow for the iden-
tification of the fundamental problems of concentration of communi-
cations companies in Europe. In the quantitative analysis in chapter 11 
the rnarket share of the leading companies in each sector is indicated 
and their evolution between 1990 and 2000 is analysed. Other prob-
lems referring to the possible distortion of free competition are 
analysed with the study of particularly significant cases. 
In the following section of this chapter we will deal with a controver-
sial issue: how can we determine that a certain physical or legal figure 
has gained control of a communications company? 
1.3. The "Control" of Companies 
Since 1776 when Adam Smith published his ··1nquiry into the Nature 
and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations" the idea that rivalry between 
different companies in a market generates products. and services of 
34 Alberto Pérez Gómez (111.2000), Las co11centracio11es de medios de comunicació11, 
"Cuadernos del CAC", 85. 
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hig her quality at the lowest possible price has had huge c urrency. M ost 
researchers and policy-makers consider that competi tio n no t o nly 
g uarantees those advantages for the consumer, but also favours entre-
preneurial innovation and plurality in informat io nJ5_ 
Even s till , sorne writers arg ue tha t the main incenti ve fo r a company to 
innovate Jíes in being able to domínate a market a nd bencfit from its 
hegemonic pos itio n: without those prospects companies would reduce 
investment in R+D; according to this theory an imperfect m arke t is . to 
a certa in extent, des irable so that innovators can recoup thei r addition-
a l investments; therefore , the key to po li cy o n free compe tition shou ld 
not be what pe rcentage is reached by the market leaders. but if the re 
ex is ts an abuse of the ir do min ant position over a long period of time 
with the res ult that competitors are prevented fro m inno va ting . 
This way of thinking is largely based on the principi e o f .. c reati ve de-
s truction" formulated by Joseph Schumpete r. This celebrated econo-
mist fro m the beginning of the twe ntie th century was one of the firs t to 
suooest tha t temporary monopo lies s timulated innovation and eco-
ºº 
no mic growth. Those dominant positio ns te nd to havc re we r negative 
effects - according to Schumpeter- th an positive o nes : m o nopo lies 
that are not based o n legal concessions undergo ·'eco no mic Darw in-
is m" : the maj ority disappear and o nly the be tlc r pre parcd. thosc mo re 
adaptable to change s urvi ve 36 . 
T he m ain pl ayers of "m arket control" a re the firms . But these. at the 
same time, are controlle d by perso ns o r by o the r companies w ho make 
the business dec isio ns: they choose in which ma rke ts to be present and 
w ith which produc ts, they se lect man age rs a nd o the r staff, the y ap-
35 Jan van Cui lenburg. 011 Meas11ri11¡.: Media Co111petitirm m u/ M edia / )il ·a sity: Con-
cepts. Theories and Methods. in Robcrt G. Picarcl. op. ci t. 
36 " Even in the worlcl of giant firm~ - affirmecl thc Harvard profes,or - ncw ones ri~c and 
fa ll into the background. lnnovations sti ll emerge primarily w ith the ··young" oncs and 
the "old" ones display as a ru le symptoms of what is cuphcmi.,ti<.:al l y cal led con,er-
vatism" . Joseph A. Shumpeter ( 1939). Business Cycles. A Theoretical. /-lis1ori1'al aJI(/ 
Su11is1ical A11alysi.1· of rhe Capiralisr Pm l'ess . McGraw -Hill. Ncw York . 97. 
prove marketing and investment plans and, in short, it is they who de-
termine how corporations wi ll compete. 
In the past, most communications companies were in the hands of in-
div idua ls or fami lies; also, in previous centuries in sorne countries 
many newspapers and magazines belonged to política! parties or fac-
tions of those political parti es. Even today, in many places - for exam-
ple, Lati n America- a great part of the main communications groups is 
still control led by a few families. 
In states w ith planned economies and no free market, the mass media 
are usually the property of the respective governments or of other pub-
li c entities . It is also evident in those cases who owns the communica-
tions companies. 
However, the number of companies joining the world of free competi-
tion is continually on the increase; and in this economic environment, 
company capita l is more di spersed and in the hands of a greater num-
ber of shareholders. 
Until a few years ago. it was considered that with possession of over 
50% o f the capital total control of the company could be exercised. 
Sorne writers suggested that participation o f between 20% and 50% of 
the capital gave " parti al control" 37• This was also established as such 
in sorne legal tex ts38 . 
The frag mentation of company capital has rendered those legal provi-
s ions, to a great extent. obsolete; control is now usually exercised with 
less partic ipation in firm s' capital. There are severa! reasons to explain 
why the co mmunications groups ha ve a greater number of owners and, 
in ma ny cases, none o f them has a majority percentage of capital. 
37 Sec Loreto Corredoira and Alfonso S<inchez.-Tabernero ( 1994). Transparencia y co11 -
1ro/ ele los medios i11fomwti rns. Fundación de la Comunicación Social. Madrid, 9-10. 
38 Sce e. g. the Rcgulat ion on foreign investment in Spain (RD 207711986. of Scptembcr 
25). which in section l .:l. stated ··it is considered that a foreiun invcstor can cxcrt an 
elTective inlluence on the management or control of the Societ-y when his participation 
is equal to or greatcr than 20 '7r of the capital"". 
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a) In the first place, ownership in fa mily companies has al ready 
reached the fifth or sixth generation, with a subsequent d ispersion 
of capita l a mong re lati ves; moreover, sorne of them ha ve sold thei r 
shares for capital gain or beca use they ha ve lost manageme nt con-
trol. 
b) A lso, one way of guaranteeing the permanence o f the most va lu-
able employees has been by o ffering them a s hare in capita l, which 
has meant the incorporation of new shareho lders into compa ni es. 
e) The proli ferat ion o f rnergers and takeovers in the cornrnunications 
sector has generated share gains arnong the form er ow nc rs of thc 
cornpanies which took part in those concentra ti on opera ti ons. 
d) In the aud iov isual area, comrnunications groups have forrned al-
Jiances -both for econornic reasons (capita l build-up) as we ll as 
po litical reasons (greater power o f influence)- w ith the aim o r 
strengthening their position with regard to radio, te lev ision and 
rnobile telephone licencc concessions. 
e) The necessary capital to pe ne trate sorne sectors -such as te lcpho ne 
and cable and satelli te te levis ion- and the possibilities of interna-
tional expa ns ion have caused rnany companies Lo go p ublic in a r-
der to fin ance those in vestrnents. In thi s way, s ma ll investors have 
begun to buy up rnino rity shares in comrnun icati ons companies . 
The di spersion o r capital o f co rnpanies makes it diffi c ult to evalua te 
the effects of capital trans fer in the cornmunications marke t: the merg-
ers and takeovers can be interpre ted in d iffe rent ways. based o n di ffer-
ent ways of understandi ng who ma kes thc bus iness dec is ions or w ho 
has a dec is ive influence on the m . 
This fact was clearly shown w he n the Fre nch company Vivendi , chief 
share-ho lder of Canal + and one of the foremost pay te lev is io n o pera-
tors in Europe, acquired Uni versal, one of thc rnain film produc ti o n 
cornpanies in Hollywood and world leade r in the rnus ic inclus try. 
For so rne analysts, w ith the international ex pa ns ion of Vi vendi . Europc 
was beginning to clase the gap with the North American cultural pre-
dominance in the audiovisual industry. However. an article published 
in Le Monde claimed precisely the opposite; Professor Musso. after re-
minding us that 54% of Vivendi's capital was in foreign hands. espe-
cially in Anglo-Saxon pcnsion funds. concluded: if the takeover is suc-
cessful, ''a hostile takeover bid of Vivendi will always be possible, 
which will return the ··champion .. to its land of birth and tum it into a 
supplier of American products via European distribution networks ( ... ). 
In case of failure. the industrial disaster for the European audiovisual 
sector will be such that there will be nothing left for us to do but pros-
trate ourselves for ever befare the Hollywood dream factory to supply 
the innumerable European audiovisual distribution channels. Whatev-
er happens. America will win"w. 
It is not possible -nor perhaps convenient- to avoid argument on the 
interpretation of the effects of concentration operations; but there is a 
need to establish widely accepted criteria which permit a definition of 
who controls a company. 
In the first place. it is important to clarify if business control is equiv-
alent to editorial control. In the EU's legal system, the owner of each 
company has almost complete decision-making power over contents: 
he names management. determines the competitive strategy, chooses 
the business plan, approves staff recruitment, etc. Neither the Euro-
pean Community's legislation nor that of the Member States establish-
es real areas of autonomy for media managers. 
CONCEPTS 
Managers' room far manoeuvre in setting out the editorial line depends 
on the "internal rules" of each company: institutional culture. degree 
of owner's involvement -or. by their delegation, of the senior man-
agers- in the contents of the media, newsroom statutes, behaviour 
codes, managers' negotiating capacity and other unwritten codes. 
39 Pierre Musso <7.Xll.2000). Vfrl'luli-U11frersal: /'Amériq11e Ra¡:nante. "Le Monde". 
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In second place, it is important to de termine with what share of Lhe 
capital can control be exercised over a company. The Regulalio n on 
concentrations of the EU40 defines in its articles 3.3 and 3-4 Lhe con-
cept of control currenLly in force in the legal framework o f the Euro-
pean Union: 
"Control resul ts from the rights, contracts or other means that, in them-
selves oras a who le, and taking into account the circ umstances de fac-
Lo and de jure, con fer the possibiliLy of exerling a dec isive influence on 
the acti vi ties of the company, in particular a) ow nership rights o f the 
use of the totality ora parl of the assets of the company; b) rights or 
contracts which permita decisive influence on the composition , delib-
era tions or decisions of the organis ms of Lhe company. 
The person or persons or companies will be said to ha ve acq uired con-
tro l: a) being holders of said rights or beneficiaries of said contracts, or 
b) that, without being ho lders of said righLs or benefici aries of said 
contracts, they can exercise ri ghts inherent in the same''. 
According Lo thi s legal tex t, con trol is equivalent to th c capacity to 
"have a dec isive influence" on the most relevant decis ions o f the com-
pany. The Regulation of the EU di scards, thcrefore, Lhe idea of lin kin g 
che concept of conlrol to Lhe possession of a cerla in percentage of Lhe 
capita l. When judging concenlrati on operations, Lhc Co mmiss ion must 
appraise if Lhere is a "decisive influence" on the parl o f a ph ysica l or 
legal person on the capital of a company. As we sha ll see in c hapter IV. 
the flexibi lity of Lhi s assessmenl system means il is eas ier to make an 
adequate appraisal of the degree o f real concentration prod uced in each 
market. 
A more recent legal docume nt4 1 di sting ui shes belween "so le control" ' 
40 Rcgulat ion (EECJ No. 4064/89 of thc Council of 2 1.X ll . 1989 0 11 thc control of con-
cenLration operations betwcen companics. 
41 Commission Notice on the notion of a conccntration under the Council Rcgulation 
(EEC) No. 4064/89. (OJ 1994 C 385110). 
and ••joint control": .. sole control" implies that one or several physical 
or legal persons own the majority of the shares with a voting option of 
a company. However. a concentration operation brought about by a 
.. qualified minority•• can also result in a .. sale control" situation; it hap-
pens in this way a) when specific rights are attached to the minority 
shareholdings, enabling them to determine the strategic commercial 
behaviour of the target company ( .. legal basis") or b) where the share-
holder is highly likely to achieve a majority in the shareholders' meet-
ing given that the remaining shares are widely dispersed ( .. de facto ba-
sis"). 
In accordance with the Notice of 1994, Baches Opi lists seven situa-
tions where .. joint control" occurs: 
a) When two companies share between themselves the voting rights 
of the .. joint venture". 
b) When two companies have the right to name the same number of 
members on the board of directors of the .. joint venture". 
e) When there is a situation of inequality between two or more com-
panies with voting right ownership of a third company, and sever-
al owners can veto decisions referring to essential aspects of the 
.. joint venture". 
d) When there is a common exercise of voting rights. Even in the ab-
sence of veto rights, two or more companies acquiring minority 
shareholdings in another company may obtain joint control: i.e. the 
minority shareholders together ha ve a majority of the voting rights 
and act together in exercising those voting rights. 
e) lf one of the parent companies has a casting vote. joint control 
does not exist. However. it can arise when this casting vote is ex-
ercised only after arbitration and attempts at reconciliation or in a 
very limited field. 
f) If each of the parent companies has the casting vote for one year 
alternatively. 
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g) W here in a 50150 joint venture one of lhe parenl companies has a 
call option w hich can be used under certain condilions, ora pul op-
tion~ 2 . 
H aving oullined the concept of con trol of a company wc shall ad vanee 
further in the srudy of concenrration situat ions w ith the identificalio11 
of " relevanl markets"'. In the fo llowing secti on we shall see how lhis 
concept is def"ined by the European Union and we shall sludy how it 
can be applied to the cornmunicalions i11dustry. 
1.4. Notion of "Relevant Market" 
The protesls. demonstrat io11s and allempts to boycoll i11ternational 
meelings on globalisarion have been one of the most surprising poli t i -
cal and social phenomena of the beginn ings of the twenty-first centu-
ry. In years of few ideological balllcs -al Ieast in lhe more prosperous 
countries- an antagonistic fight has arisen ( that 011 occasions has go11e 
beyond a dialectic discussio11 ) betwee11 those in favour or economic in-
tegralio11 011 a world wide scale a11d those who demancl protec tion for 
the Iess deve loped economies. 
The defe11ders of globalisation believe that economic integrati on. 
causecl both by techno logical progress and the general increase in free-
dom. generales long term prosperity far eve ryone~ 1 . In contrast. thosc 
who oppose globalisation see in lh is phenomcnon lhe potcntial ex-
ploi talion of lhe poorer counlries by lhe richer ones. 
In any case_ globa li sat ion appears to be an inexorable rcalit y. w hich 
panicularly affects the communications inclustry: thi s sec tor is tech-
42 Sergio Baches Opi ( 1997). US/EU MerNN Ct1111ml: Hmr .1/11111/d rh<' US erperie11cc· i11 -
j711e11ce 1111' e11force111e111 of Co1111cil Neg11/arirm ./06.//8911111/w c11111ml 1f c1111ce111mri1111 
/Je111't' l!ll 1111der1aki11gs! Leuvcn Univen,ity Pres, . Lc.:uvcn 29-.1 1. 
43 For examplc. Thc Economist (2.1. IX.2000) wrotc in ir' lcatling arriclc fol lmving thc.: 
famuu~ anticapiralist prntc~ IS al thc Scalll l! !> l lllllll Íl : Glohali, <J tion ¡, 011 ly .. the bcst o r 
man y po"iblc f ururcs far rhe world economy ... 
nology .... nt · ,, . d -\1eaper espe-
. . ens1ve ; contents transporl is qu1cker an e · · . 
cially 10 audiovisual and interactive media, but also in the print i:iedia: 
and ª large part of the products attracts olobal audiences. in particular 
entert · e amment, but also specialised information. for example. economy 
and finance, computing or automobiles. 
The breaking down of national borders makes it necessary to re-define 
the context of the markets where problems of concentration and lack 
of competition are raised. The bigger the size of the market analysedi 
the less the degree of concentration tends to be: there are more loca 
and regional situations of monopoly than on a worldwide scale. among 
other reasons -because some markets- owing to low levels of con-
sumption cannot allow more than one company to survive. 
In this context. when studying situations of dominant positions in e~ch 
market, the question is raised as to how far .. down .. should the pohcy 
of defence of competition go: Is it enough, for instance, just to guar-
antee the public's choice between several newspapers, radio stations 
and television channels on a national level or should a diversity of of-
fers also be promoted in each region and city'? 
In order to address this issue, it is necessary to understand that the po-
r. . lllcal, economic and media structure of each country deternunes 
Which competition policy is the most appropriate~ for Spain. where 
each region has its own parliament with legislative power and govern-
ments with widespread powers, the political debate -and. therefore, 
media diversity- at a regional level is of greater importance than in 
Sweden; and in Great Britain where the London press has a strong pen-
etration nationwide. the local press monopolies are less important than 
in France, where the Parisian newspapers are usually marginally pres-
ent outside the capital. 
Policies on free competition should be aimed towards what is possible 
and set aside Utopian situations of perfect competition and maximum 
balance between companies present in each market. In this context, the 
growing number of places -in Europe and, especially the United States-
with newspapers in a situation of monopoly can be understood as a 
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negative but inevitable fact, which is partly compensated for by the ap-
pearance and development of many other ways of distributing local in-
formation: free publications. radio stations, television channels and In-
ternet. 
The European Commission has established two basic criteria in order 
to determine the markets of reference in which situations of concen-
tration should be measured.w: contents of the offer (productor service) 
and geographical area ... The product market of reference includes ali 
products and services that consumers consider interchangeable or re-
placeable by virtue of their characteristics. price or anticipated use 
made of them" (art. 7). 
The geographical market is defined as "the zone in which the affected 
companies carry out activities of supplying products and rendering of 
services of reference, in which the conditions of competition are suffi-
ciently homogeneous and can be distinguished from other neighbour-
ing geographical zones owing, in particular, to that the prevailing con-
ditions of competition there are markedly different to the former" (art. 8). 
Therefore, when examining concentration issues. the Commission 
combines the notions of "product market" and ""geographical market"; 
and identifies as an .. unwanted" situation the dominance of one com-
pany in the market which means it can conduct itself with relative in-
dependence from its competitors. because no replaceable products ex-
ist. 
The Commission uses the soft drink business as an example of a pos-
sible "substitution" (art. 18). In order to determine if the drinks of two 
different flavours -A and B- belong to the same market, consumer be-
haviour with relation to a price rise is analysed: if the price of the 
drinks of flavour A were raised between 5% and 10% anda significant 
number of consumers passed over to flavour B. then both drinks would 
1 44 Comunicación de la Comisión, relativa a la dt~fi11iciá11 de mercado de n'{erencia, a 
efectos de la non11ativa com1111itaria en materia de competencia (97/C 372i03), Diario 
Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas, 9 .XII. 1997. 
belong to the same reference market; indeed, the price policy of the 
flavour A drinks would be dependent on that of flavour B. 
In order to apply the concept of market of reference defined by the 
Commission to the communications industry it is necessary to deter-
mine which media are interchangeable for the public and which is the 
geographical area in which the messages are distributed: Does the sig-
nificant rise in the price of a financia! newspaper imply an increase in 
subscriptions to an on-line financial information service? Can the clo-
sure of a local newspaper be compensated by the appearance of a news 
channel in the same city? What degree of substitution exists between 
magazines and television theme channels or between music radio sta-
tions and the variety of adaptations of the model of television made 
popular by MTV? 
Cuilenburg suggests that "for a start, media markets serving the gener-
al public may be classified into news and information markets on the 
one hand, and entertainment markets on the other. As national lan-
guages usually bind the consumer markets, in many cases geographi-
cally, media markets correspond to national, regional or local mar-
kets"45. 
The appearance of hybrid genres between information and entertain-
ment, the convergence of technologies of information and communi-
cation and the development of media of intemational scope makes it 
difficult to define markets in terms of contents or products. As Cuilen-
burg himself wams, "in assessing media diversity in television pro-
gram supply, do we limit diversity measurement to broadcasting and 
cable only, or do we take webcasting into account at the same time?"46• 
Indeed, the communications markets are increasingly complex, muti-
media, intemational and difficult to define, because the very same con-
tents use severa! distribution platforms to reach the public: in practice, 
45 Jan van Cuilenburg, op. cit.. 59-60. 
46 Ibid .• 60. 
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the inhabitants of a local market connected to Internet in thei r homes_ 
have access not only to conventional offers - publi cati ons. rad io sta-
tions, local te levision - but a lso to a li mass med ia which have o n- line 
vers io ns on the Net. 
For this reason, some write rs have proposed a new concept to measure 
positions of dominance in a marke t: "ownership of time"4 7• No lo nger 
can concentration be regulated by esta bli shing li mits on ownership o f 
the media; that model re fen-ed to a system with a re la ti ve scarc ity or 
supply. Neither can a distincti on be made be tween media tha t in fo rm. 
educate or ente rtain. 
The use of the "ownership of time .. of the public has two aclvantages: 
a) it a llows the grouping together o f severa! medi a be long ing to the 
same owner; b) it makes it easie r to take into account the re la tive in-
fl uence of a medium with regarcl to its audi ence. As Wo ldt expla ins. 
" us ing audience shares brings the assessment o f media plurali sm c los-
er to the main issue behind media concentratio n, the pote ntia l influ-
ence of media on the mi neis and the behavio ur o f the c iti zens. A chan-
ne l with an average audience share o f 30 per cent in princ ipie has a 
greate r chance o f exerting in fluence ovcr thc aud ic ncc than a niche 
channe l with 2 per cent"4 x. 
fn order to gain greate r operati ve power fo r regul ating concentra tio n 
the "owners hip o f time" model m ust add ress certa in proble ms. In the 
firs t pl ace, it is not easy, on the face of it, to group together aud ie nces 
of d ifferent media, such as magazines, radi o stati on and webs: in sec-
o nd p lace, adding together a udiences o f heteroge neous p roducts. s uc h 
as a news cha nnel and o ne of films, implies confcrring the same pow-
er to iníluence public opinio n to two contents o f di fferc nt characte ris-
47 Sec Alfonso Nieto (2000). Time and 1hP /11for111(1fio11 Markn The C(/.\e o( Spai11. Me-
dia Markc1s Munographs. EUNSA. Pamplona. 
48 Runar Woldl. '"011'11er.1"hip of Ti111e ... A11die11C"e .1·hare.1· a11d 1he reg11/mio11 1if 111ed i11 p/11 -
ralis111. papcr prcscntcd for !he ln1ernat ional Confe rcncc "Time and Media Markct s ... 
School of Commun ications. Univcrsil y uf Navarra. Pamplona. 4-5. V.2000. 
tics; finally, audience rating measurement systems must be improved 
so they can more accurately reflect the real data on media consump-
tion. 
Market size is another aspect which is permanently under debate. In 
this study we ha ve chosen two types of geographical markets of refer-
ence: the European states and the European Union as a whole. In both 
cases regulatory bodies exist -national Govemments and the EU 
Commission- with power to prevent situations of abuse arising from 
dominant positions. A further reason for only studying those markets 
derives from a fact of political consideration: the most important deci-
sions in Europe are discussed and taken by the European Union insti-
tutions and national parliaments. 
Although there are situations where pluralism does not exist in local 
and regional markets, the development of Internet has partly alleviat-
ed those problems which, on the other hand, can only be analysed case 
for case and not with the panoramic vision used in this study. Also, as 
has been pointed out, in sorne local markets, owing to their small size 
and low level of consumption, it is inevitable that monopolies will ex-
ist such as in the daily press sector. 
In the final section of this chapter we will analyse the typology of com-
munications groups; as the main actors in the media markets, their di-
versification and growth strategies constantly present new challenges 
for the authorities charged with safeguarding free competition. 
1.5. Typology of Communications Groups 
The most successful and dynamic communications companies have 
not followed uniform paths in their expansion processes. Growth plans 
have been determined in all cases by the resources available, by the 
capacity of management to take on new business challenges and by the 
legal framework of each market. Those circumstances and the differ-
ent ways each company has of competing have generated a great vari-
ety of growth strategies. 
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Having said thi s, it is possible to distingu ish common te ndencies and 
severa! models wh ich group together the greate r part of the strategic 
decisions of the companies. In the fo llowing chapters we wi 11 di scuss 
those tendenci es and the causes behind them: for now. we will restric t 
ourselves to examining the typo logy of the communi cations groups 
and look at how the different crite ria of medi a accumulation affect 
concentration. 
It is important to remember that in the area of communications. to-
gether with the general objective re fe rring to concentrat ion - the deter-
mination to prevent any company from abusing its positio n of domi-
nance in the marke t and harming poss ible competito rs o r the ir c lients 
- there is another objective of a mo re specillc nature: tha t no body may 
exert undue influence o n public opin io nJ'1. 
With regard to this second aspect, more a ttentio n should be g iven, fo r 
instance, to a company with ownership of radio stations transmitcing 
news contents with a marke t share of 40%. than to another company 
with a s imilar share but whose statio ns exclus ively broadcast music. 
There fore, the result of showing the diffe re nt typologies of communi -
catio ns g roups can be high ly revealing with regard to a variety of c ri-
te ria, s uch as contents, geographica l area or dcgree o r integration . 
Table 1. 1 a llows us to ide ntify those varied typologies. 
49 Commission of the EEC (23.X ll.1 992), P/11ralis111 all(/ Media Co11ce111rario11 i11 rhe /11 -
rem a/ Marker, Green Paper, Brussels, 1. 
TABLE l. t. A Typoloey of Media Companics 
-local 
(;t.'• ·~aphical Scopl.' -regional 
-nauonal 
-intcrnational 
-print 
T\-pc of :\lc<lia Company -dccrronic 
-dcctronic and print 
-audim-isual 
-multiscctoral 
-information 
-general 
-spccialiscd 
c:ontl'nt -bnth 
-cntcrtainmcnt 
-cducation 
-Sl.'\"Cral kin<ls of contcnt 
-\·crtical intcgrntion 
1 ndustrial Proccss -horizontal intcgration 
-Ycrtical and horizontal intcgration 
-conl!lomcratcs 
-profit oricntcd 
Owncrs' Purposc -public scrvicc oricntcd 
-i<lcolocicalh· oricntc<l 
-public 
Typc of ( >wncrslup -pri\'atc 
-mixt.·d 
Sourcc: Adapted from The Europcan lnstitutc for the Media 
With regard to their geographical area, companies can be local, re-
gional, national or international. Insofar as they decide to widen their 
area of coverage, their relative position in the market tends to weaken; 
conversely, if they concentrate themselves in a limited geographical 
zone, they need a high market share to obtain high profit margins. 
From the point of view of the communications media available, com-
panies ca~ possess print, audiovisual or interactive media, or integrate 
severa! of those possibilities. When the activity of the companies is re-
duced to one type of media -newspapers, or radio stations, or news 
agencies, etc.- they try to domínate in that sector; in contrast, the mul-
timedia companies rarely occupy a leading position in several media at 
the same time. 
As far as the contents are concerned, communications groups can pro-
vide news, entertainment, educational contents or a mixture of these 
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possibiliti es. Although, as Wolf explai ns, almost a li the messages 
transmitted by the media include a certain dosage of e nte rtainme nt50. 
The diversity in contents means that it is difficu lt to reach a dominant 
position in ali the sectors. In contrast, sorne specialised compani es -for 
example in economic and financial information, the productio n of car-
toon feature films, the publication of academic and sc ie nti fi c boo ks 
and journals- ha ve reached large marke t shares in those secto rs world -
wide. 
With regard to the production process, companies can be venically or 
horizontally integrated . The first possibility he lps in the control of 
"bottlenecks" in the initial part of the process (elaboratio n of contents) 
or in the fin al part (distribution); horizontal integration o nly poses the 
problem of reaching a predominant position in a marke t thro ug h thc 
accumulation of medi a, as happens in many countries wi th newspaper 
chains or companies with ownership of magazines, radio statio ns or 
television channels. 
The owners' basic proposal dete rmines whethe r compa ni cs wi ll be di -
rected more at prov iding a public service, profit gain or the achieve-
ment of poli tical or ideological objecti ves. The diffe re ncc in mi ss io n 
has an influence on the choice between two possibl e priority crite ri a 
in companies: short term profit (which implies, amo ng o the r aspects. a 
strict cost contro l policy) or the c reation of entry barriers (which 
means more investment in research and developme nt, in s ta ff training 
and on-going search for higher quali ty). 
The owners' characteristics de te rmine whether the companics w i 11 be 
public, private or of mixed capita l. Public companies a lways ha ve s pe-
c ific obli gations, referring both to contents as we ll as thc fundin g sys-
tem. lndeed, in Europe, until the e ight ies and nine ties when techn o lo-
gy brought greater audiovisual offer, governmenls cons idcred that the 
best way to guarantee plura li sm lay in establ ishing public te levis ion 
SO Michacl J. Wolr ( 1999), The E11renai11111e111 Ecr1110111y. Penguin Book~. Ncw YorJ.. . 
monopolies - and, in so rne countries, also in the radio sector- , which 
would e nable a li social groups to ha ve access to those communications 
med ia' ' · 
The s ix criteria shown permi t multiple combinations; for instance, the 
typology o f a com munications group can be specified by the following 
characte ris tics : natio nal area. specialisation in e lectronic media, exclu-
s ively devoted .to enterta inment, integrated horizonta lly, profit driven 
and pri vate ly owned. As we have pointed out. each typology presents 
d iffe rent problems far the pl uralism of ideas and opin ions and for free 
competit ion in the market. 
O ften, the typo logy of groups is condi tioned by the growth systems 
chosen. Table 1.2 shows the di ffe rent form s of growth, identifies in 
which situa tions companies, faced with other possibilities, tend to 
choosc o ne procedure and what general effects each growth mode l has 
on competitors and the marke t. 
TABLE l. 2 f\lcdia Conccntr;u ion :m U Divcrsification Proccsscs 
Sys 1c m of M ed ia Concc111rntio n Genera l conditions rcq uirccl 
and divcrsifi c:u ion 
1 
Ac.:t1 u i s i litH1 ~ tin.mn.11. 1ndu ... 1n.1I .rnd 
E !Tcc<s (comp:m ic• oncl m.trkc1) 
J 1.:Cfl'l!-l' in ll·n·l 11f n1mpc.·111um m 
1lwmar'-.l.'1 
-more: fr1, rn1r.iblL' cumluiun.; for 
1 he .._., 1mn.1111l'" 
l¡u1d. gn 1\\1h ,,ftlu· Ctu11p:t1111.·-. 
1h.11 1t1\'t''' l:trµ<-· ... um' uf monn 
)<- ... , ., OICl '. In tl1l.º m.uJ.. .. :1 
romml.'íCl:ll 'upnu 1rll\ (Üun:r) 
1h:nl t11 1111pnl\1.' (11mpl'llll\1.' 
.1b1l111 1,,11,·rl 
/ Mcd ia E xpa_11_s,..i1-111 _____ _¡..:::n~1.:::M~~-",.,.::,.::.h.:..:1'.J..11 g-.1-n~-.,-I'-" ,'-"-".-~ -,,- -"-11,...h+--:,¡-, "_' _g_rt_J\_ll,..h-,-:,f:--1,...1<-· ,-.,-,,,-,J-l:t_n_i ----¡ 
1 l ncw n ut lc:1s \ 111.:\\ 110•'""'1lnl11u ·-. \ l . l '. lll''' 111nli.1 mtlf L 1.h\l·r ... ll\ 111 tl1t· 111.1d • ..:1 
D cals Bc t\\ccn Companü:s rn.11urt1\ nf 1ht· u1du,1n· ;llh.I c.l.mgt·rnu' rompun1on 111 tht.: 
c1111,1dc..' r:il1lt: c..·1t1n b.1rnl'r' 111.1rh.t·1 ,1\ '1hh:ll 
Suurcl·: T ht..· Eu ro¡n.·an 1 n~ 1 i t11tc fo r 1hc ~tcdi:1 
p11\\ l ' f .. h.lrllll.! 
As Moscon i cxp lains5~. the externa( procedurcs o f growth are more and 
5 1 Thi' aspee! can he rcau in more tlc1ai l in Jan \Vicien. Graham Munlod, and Pc1cr 
Dahlgrcn (cd>.) (2000). Te/el'isi1111 acm.u E11mpe. Sagc. London. 
52 Franco Mo~c.:uni (X ll.2000). L'ecmwmia dei q11111itlir111i Motlelli a C<mfro1110: tli111e11-
.1io11e e 1·0111 ·e111m:io11e di m1•rca10. "Prohlc111i dell'ini'nrma1ionc" . -D5-·D6. 
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more frequent in European communications companies. Thi s fact is 
partly due to the economic s ituation: on the one ha nd , the c ris is in 
sorne sectors -such as cable television and sate llite di g ita l televis io n 
platforms- have stimulated merger processes in those industries; in 
second p lace, the growth in the value of comrnunications a nd new 
technology companies present on the stock exchange g reatly enriched 
sorne companies allowing thern to finance takeovers: the most re levan! 
example o f this phenomenon was the purchase of Ti rne-Warne r by 
AOLsJ. 
In many communications companies a cultural change has a lso taken 
place which has favoured the proliferation of rnergers and takeovers: 
at the root of many of the externa( growth processes can be found a 
new desire to increase size as quickly as possible and a certai n obses-
sion wi th not losing ground to cornpetitors. 
"Natural" or " internal' ' growth consists in the launch ing of new media. 
This phenomenon comes about when the "garne rules·· in the ma rket 
change, either because of legal reasons (such as the deregulatio n of the 
European audiovisual rna.rket from the eighti es) o r because o f techno-
logical factors (such as the development of digital te levis io n and In-
ternet in the latter years of the twentie th century). 
Mergers and takeovers generate rapid growth in cornpan ies, at the 
same time as causing a decrease in the nurnber of "d iffe rent and inde-
pendent voices" in the market. Every takeover represents, rnoreover, 
lhe disappearance of a competi tor. In contrast, the launch of new me-
dia usually causes a slower growlh of cornpanies (they require severa! 
years to achieve the consolidation of new bus inesses) and impli es a 
certain fragmentation of the market (althoug h if the company lau nch-
53 A proposal for the classilication of cxtcrnal growth stratcgics can be found in Joseph 
L. Bower (111.2001 ), Not A/11/ie M&As Are Alike a11d 11wt Ma11ers, " Harvard Busincs!'-
Review", 93- 102. 
ing a new offer is the market leader it may reinforce its predominant 
position)54• 
Joint ventures between communications groups neither bring about 
change in ownership nor increase in size, but they can affect the com-
petitive situation of the market: in mature industries, with highly qual-
ified rival companies -able to build strong entry barriers with their re-
spective businesses and markets- management can discover that to 
pact is more profitable than confrontation; with those agreements, "rel-
ati ve concentration" is increased: several companies decide to share 
their spheres of influence and help each other to protect their respec-
tive positions of leadership in certain geographical zones, contents or 
types of media. 
The difficulty in regulating joint ventures and agreements between 
companies derives from the fact that these operations of "relative con-
centration" are not easy for the anti-monopoly commissions to analyse 
and are not covered by the legal provisions on free competition. 
The conceptual definition given in the first chapter serves as a basis for 
choosing sorne criteria appropriate for the study of the degree of con-
centration of the communications market in Europe. This study refers 
primarily to three types of media which have a particular power to in-
fluence public opinion; newspapers, radio stations and television chan-
nels; these media continue to have an undisputed prominent role in po-
litical and cultural debate and in the modification of the public's val-
ues and behaviour. 
The quantitative data refer to the European States: the variations in 
market percentages gained by leading companies in the last decade 
will be shown, both in order to compare the evolution of each State as 
well as for the identification of the differences regarding the current 
situation and the tendencies between sorne countries and others. The 
54 See Alfonso Sánchez-Tabernero et al. (1993 ). Media Co11ce11tratio11 in Europe. Com-
merc:ial E111erprise and rile Public lnreresr. The European lnstitute for the Media. Man-
chester. 
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study of each State enables us to present, at the same time, a general 
vision of the concentration of communications g ro ups in Europe. 
This work aims to suggest future lines of action both for companies as 
well as for regulatory bodies. Since legislation and the anti-mo nopoly 
commissions have national or European jurisdiction, it has seemed 
preferable not to deal with problems of abuse of a position of domi-
nance in sorne regions and cities. 
The distorti on of free competition can ari se, above ali , fro m the pre-
do minant position of a Ieading company in a market or fro m the ex is-
tence of a company with a strong vertical integratio n, controlling a 
" bottleneck" vita l for the survival o f its competitors . Because o f thi s 
last reason, special emphasis will be placed o n showing the sectors in 
which vertical integration can produce more negati ve e ffects both far 
the publicas well as for ri val firms. 
For a thorough analysis of concentration the unde rly ing eco no mic , 
technological and legal causes behind this pheno meno n must be ex-
hausti vely studied ; aspects which will be dealt with in the third and 
fourth chapters of thi s study ; the most important e ffects of mergers. 
takeovcrs and launching of new media must al so be looked at and wi ll 
be pursued in the fifth chapter. 
In any case , befare siding either with those who look on with trcpida-
ti on at the growth of communications groups or with those w ho take 
the Opposite viewpoint and see no cause far a larm, it would be appro-
priate to study the bas ic data with re ferencc to the concentrati on of the 
commun ications market in Europe. Only in this way - with the cle ta iled 
information o f the second chapter- wi ll we be abl e (as has already 
been suggested on othe r occasions55) to di sting uish fact fro m fi c tio n. 
SS Pierre Yvcs Lochon and Alfonso Sánchez-Tabe rncro (X-Xll.1 99 1 ). Co11ce11tm 1io11 de.1 
111édi11.1· e11ropée11s: le double visage. '"Médiaspouvoirs ... ) 1-:l9. 
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2. Trends in the European Market 
After studying the main concepts with reference to concentration. the 
mos t re levant statist ics on the mass media indusLry in Europe are 
shown. First, a comparison wi ll be made between curre nt statistics and 
those of 1990 and the n the ma in tendencies in the Jast decade of the 
twentie th century wi ll be described. 
As has bee n pointed out. there are very few comparative reports which 
draw togethe r information on the comm unications industry in the Eu-
ropean Uni on. Each country Mem ber has a partic ular political system 
with a concrete iníluence on the communications market. The versatil-
ity of Lhis market means the task of comparing data in order to draw 
general conclusions is not an easy one. We have atternpted to over-
come these obstacles by consu lting national experts. Each one of them 
has provided the most re levant in forrnation according to the measure-
me nt criteria a lready indicated. An in-depth ana lysis is made of the da-
ta re fe rring Lo the tradi tional media (press, radio and te levision) and 
so me interesti ng stati stics on the new sectors (pay te lev is ion and In-
te rnet) are inc luded. A brie f study is also rnade of the magazine. pub-
lish ing . fi lm distribution. record companies and advertis ing market 
sectors. 
T he evol ution o f rhe mass media in a market depends, in good meas-
ure, o n externa! c ircumstances. As we know, economic development 
promotes consumption which. in turn, generales an increase in adver-
tis ing cxpenditures. In a more obvious way. thc political and institu-
Liona l cvents o f a country bring about changes for the media, such as 
those causecl by thc deregulat ion of tc lecom munications. In a short 
time . a med ia space can be revolutioni sccl by technological innovat ion. 
rc-invcnting supply and c.:reating ncw dcmands. And. la. tly, the c ultur-
a l and lingui st ic.: environment conditions the expans ion of a type of 
product to its ncarcst markets . 
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Po litical events are decisive for the communications sector. T he o ut-
look of the Central and Eastem European countries radically c hanged 
at the beg inning of the nineties. Go-ahead entrepreneurs. mu ltination-
a ls and cit izens were enthused with the hope of s tarting a free po li tica l 
system. However, severa! decades of Communist regimes can rot the 
economic and socia l core of any country. The media market in Centra l 
and Eastern Europe has not had so much time Lo develop according to 
Lhe parameters of the rest of the Western counlries5(•. T hi s reporl, there-
fore, does not include information on this area o f Europe. Its particu-
lar genesis would, in justice, require its own spec ia l s tudy. 
The report refers, above ali , to the communications industri es or Aus -
tria, Belgium, (French-speaking and Flemish}, Germany. Denm ark. 
Spai n, Finland, France, Great Britain , Greece, Ireland, lta ly. Ho ll and. 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey57• Occasio na lly. in o rde r to 
demonstrate the global context of the European media. comparisons 
are established wi th the communications industries of Lhe United 
Scaces and Japan. 
The growing influence of economic g lobali sati on on cu ltural, polit ica l 
and social aspects makes it ad vi sable to identi fy the c h ie r move me nts 
of European companies in Lhe struggle for continenta l medi a leader-
ship. As we ll as analysing the basic data o f national rnarkets. thc prin-
c ipa l foreign capital investmenrs are also s tudied. The growi ng com -
rnercialisation of Lhe media means that proprie to rs intervcne in the ed-
itoria l control of the communications companies. lt appears that share-
holder control of a communicalions company in vol ves at least a r isk o f 
editorial control. Working with this hypothesis, we wi ll mcasure the 
presence of foreign capital in order to hig hli ghL the main advantages 
56 Sce Alfonso S{inchez-Tabernero (1993). Mi!dia Co11rmtratim1 in E11rope. EIM. Man-
ches1er. 
57 For 1hc iables, 1hc coun1ries will be idc111ilicd by 1hc fo llowing ini1 iab. respec1ivc ly: 
AT. BE (FI and Fr). DE, DK. ES, FI, FR. GB, GR. IR. IT. NL. NO. PT. SE. TR . 
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and threats of the global is ing process in the European communications 
industry. 
2.1. The Print Media 
The print med ia induslry is chiefly made up of the daily press, maga-
zines and books. These three sectors form the most traditionaJ eco-
no mic sphere of communications; from the mid nine teenth century on-
wards the prcss has become the benchmark o f that industrial environ-
mcnt. For a number of years. outspoken doom-mongers, radio and tel-
ev ision business magnates and renowned writers have sounded the 
death knell far newspaper companies and have forecast the progressive 
demi se of newspaper readers. Some of the main threats were found to 
be the expansion of commercial te levision, editors' inabi lity to attract 
a younger readership, Lhe antiquated structure of the newspaper indus-
lry, the re lati ve drop in advertising, the increase in fixed costs and the 
lack o f experience wilh the new media58. However, despite the drop in 
the total ci rculatio n of the press in Europe, the so-called "new media" 
have barely made inroads in Lhe public's reading time. In the lasl few 
years newspaper companies have been especially vigorous, reacting to 
new techno logical opportunities. 
lnternct's popu larisation since 1996 opened up another perspective far 
newspaper publishers and al most a li of the newspapers embarked on 
the aclventure o f the Web. Technolog ical improvements in the news-
rooms ancl the news product as an online version - interacti vi ty with 
the reader, persona li sed news, mu ltimedia adaptations59, etc.- remate 
printing sys tems ancl a more fl ex ible costs structure have rein forced 
newspapers. Many newspaper publishing companies have been the 
seed of Lhe present multimedia cong lomerares. 
58 Scc Paul Simpson ( 1994). E11ropet111 11e1rspaper i11dmtry. Pira lnternational, Surrey. 
59 Sce Alfonso H. Molina ( 1997). Nell'spapers: the sltJll' 1ralk to 11111/timedia. "Long 
Range Planning". Vo l. 30. No.2. (2 18-226). 
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Newspaper circulation in Europe is in excess of 90 million copies. In 
the United States, consumption is notably lower: 58 mi lli on issues60• 
The degree of penetration is s imilar in both areas, but the penetration 
of newspapers in sorne European countries - such as Great Britain . 
Norway, Sweden or Finland - is double that of the North American 
press. On the other hand, as far as prestige and the des ire to be inter-
national points of reference are concerned, The Times, Le M onde. 
Frankfurter Allge111ei11e Zeitung or the Financia! Times are as note-
worthy as any of the main North American titles. 
The market structure in many European countries remains in a com-
bined system of nat ional press and regional press. In so rne markets, in 
!alter years, companies distributing free newspapers have ílo uri shed in 
urban centres with a high popu lation densiry s uch as the popular 
Swedish Metro, owned by the Modern Times Group company, wh ich 
has been successfull y exported to sorne twenty European capita l c iti es. 
Man y of these newspapers seek to aLtrac t local and distric t advertis ing, 
being offered to commuters as they travel o n the unde rg ro und , bus or 
suburban trains. Newspaper publishers ha ve sho wn the ir concern a t the 
readership lost to these free publications61 • 
Each newspaper market finds itse lf in a d iffe rent s ituatio n. S ince 1990 
titles have disappeared in Austria, Belg ium, Germany, De nmari<. 
France, Ire land, Switzerland, Holland, Turkey, but the tota l numbe r o r 
newspapers has increased in Great Britain, G reece, Fin land. Ita ly, Nor-
way, Sweden and Spain (table 2 . 1 ). Newspaper c ircu lation fo llows 
diffe rent courses: the increase in Austri a, Germany, Finl and, Norway, 
Spain, Great Britain, Ho lland and Turkey, contn.1s ts w ith the fa ll in thc 
rest o f the countries (table 2.2). 
60 See ANPA (2001 ). Facts abo111 Nell'spapen. Wa~hington. 
61 Scc Noticia~ de la Comunicación (X ll.2001 ), Los diarios gratuitos f" ·eorn11w1 11 los edi-
tores, Nº 209. 
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TABLE2. I TABLE 2.2 
Numbcr ofNcwspa pcrs (Tille s) Ncws papcrs Circula<ion (in Mili. 
Countrv 1990 2000 of Co pies) 
AT 1' IC. Count:rv 1990 2000 
B E (0) 13 8 AT 2.- 2.5 
BE (fr) 13 ¡; BE (íl) 1.2 1.0 
DE 3')-l .189 DE lfr) tl.9 0.52 
DK 44 .ll') DE 24.- 28.5 
ES 128 1111 DK 3.2 2.'> 
FI 6(1 S6 ES 2.4) 4.0 
rR -;5 -1 r:J 2.8 , l,.l 
GB llJll 123 rR 8.(1 8..1 
GR l'J n GB :;o _:!(1 ,-
fil 8 (, GR 0.8 o.r. 
IT 82 I).¡ IR o.s 0.8 
NL 4- 3- IT 6,4 5,9 
NO - x -4 NL 4.(. 4.8 
PT 24 28 NO 2.5 _l,2 
SE 1 sr. 1 fol PT 0.5 o.-
TR l<.H J(¡O SE 4.') 4.2 
Sourcc: authors' 0\\1l rcsc:uch TR J.l 4.8 
Sourcc: auchors' own rcscarch 
As far as consumption leve! is concerned, the Scandinavian regions are 
s till worthy o f note for the ir extremely s trong press industry. with the 
highest rcade rship leve ls in thc world, only marched by Japan. In Swe-
den, fo r instance. 80% of the adu lt population read newspape rs, despite 
the fact that c irc ul ation has been in decline eve r s ince the seventies6~. 
In Norway 600 issues are so ld for eve ry thousand inhabitants and 91 % 
o f its c itizens are regular readers. Something s imilar occurs in Finland. 
In Denmark, newspape r reade rship has experienced a notable inc rease 
from 1985 but in the last few years the two national newspapers have 
suffered serio us losses. 
In Austria four million issues are di stributed in a population approach-
ing c ig hl mi Ilio n. ln o the r countries, newspapers are boughl up or dis-
appear becau sc of the fie rce compctition to attrac t advertis ing revenue. 
In Ho ll and , s ince 1990 the number of titles has dropped to 37. The re-
gional Dutch newspapcrs (29) have fa llen in the number of issues sold 
62 S..:e Ole Prchn (2000). /..o ""11n•111mrilí11 de e111¡1re.rns de 1"01111111irncirí11 e11 S11eci(I. Re-
pon for Ihe Europcan Parliam..:nt. An:hives from the Depanamc111n de Empresa Infor-
mativa de la Uni versidad de Navarra (from now on. DEIUN). 
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to the benefit of the national newspapers (8), which re present 45 pe r 
cent of the total circulation. There are morning and evening newspa-
pers and free local newspapers with a high percentage of advertis ing 
space which are deli vered door to door. 
The lowest circulation Ievels in the European Union correspond to the 
countries in the South of the continenl. In l ta ly, Spa in, Greece and Por-
tugal they do not reach 120 issues sold fa r each thousand inhab itants . 
These figures contrast w ith the high te levis ion audience fi gures. In 
Greece, since 1989 circulation has fa llen: however, the numbe r of ti-
tles has ri sen63. Fa r Portugal, the low lite racy levels compared to the 
European average represents an added d ifficu lty, since twenty per cent 
of the population do not benefit from schoo l education. Portug uese 
newspaper c irculation is the lowest in Europe. 
In countries with high literacy levels, newspapers s till a ttrac t g reater 
levels of advertising revenue. This is the case in Germany, which has 
a high number of tilles, with a high circulation rate of dail y press, and 
a s trong regional market with few national newspapers. 
[n !he United Kingdom, general news press has g rown re latively in the 
las t few years thanks especially to the so-called Sundoys. The Un ited 
Kingdom is the country where this format has the greatest repe rcuss ion 
in the world64 • In its neighbouring country, Ire land , s ix da ily newspa-
pers, fi ve morning newspapers and one eveni ng newspape r a re sold. 
C irculati on remains balanced and forty weekly newspapers are printed 
in regional markets. 
The fo llowing three tables provide a key for gaining an understand ing 
of the structure of the newspaper marke t showing the leader 's market 
share, that of the second competi tor and the total of bo th. As table 2 .3 
shows, in every country, except Denmark, Spain, Greece. Ho ll and and 
63 Sec Emm Hcrctaki s (2000), La co11ce111ració11 de e111presm de co1111111icació11 en Gre-
cia, DEIUN'S Archi ves. 
64 See Peter Humphreys (1999), U11ited Ki11gdom :f report • .. Thc Bullctin ... vol. 16. No. l. 
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Turkey, the leading company has been the sarne since 1990. These fig-
ures show the sector 's stabi lity and the control that sorne groups exert 
in certai n rnarkets. In sorne cases, the leading companies rnaintain the 
sales quotas ; in others, they have absorbed sorne of their cornpetitors; 
or - less freq ue ntly- the rnain rival companies have disappeared. The 
second competitor 's market share g ives usan idea what real control the 
leader exerts over the rest of its competitors . In sorne countries the dif-
ference between the first and the second is striking, as occurs in Aus-
tria, Jreland o r French-speaking Belgiurn. 
TABLE2.3 
Dailv Prcss M ark ct Lcadcrs ICircul:uion) (% ) 
Co untrv 1990 2000 
AT ,\ll·1hapnnl S·l.5 ~kd1.mnm 50.2 
13E líl\ \'L"\ I J I \'l"~ I 42.2 
BE lfrl l lt:r~:iru ·Ru,q· I 411 Ro .. ~d & C:il· 52 
DE Snrill l!l"í ?\9 Snrin\!t.'r 2J.6 
DK D.1cli lade1 25.1 lkrlinc;kc 24 
ES c;nmo Correo 15,1 Pri':t 15.'· 
Fl ~:ll\ OJll:l 25.5 S:rnoma 25 
l'R 1 h.·ro;,:lnt 25 l lcr:ii:uu 24 
GB :'\:c.·" " lntc.·n1.111011 :1I J.1.- "l'\\ .. lmi:rn .11 . 2$.2 
Gn 1'1 Trt"" l?.1 l..1mbr:1k1 ... c;roup 1-.1 
In lndc.:n. :'\.cw:-.p:tpt.: r' 51 l 11d l'fl. Nl'\\':-,p :tpcr:-; 4-5 
IT RCS 1".8 RC:S 19.5 
NL De Tdecr:1:1f 18.3 Pc.·r,c11rnhina1ic 30.<. 
NO Schth'\1<,:d (; roun 25 Sch1bsted ( ;rnur> 3·1 
PT l .u ... nrnundo 25 IYf Tl'it·com .. ·15.3 
SE l\o t1n1l'f 20.2 l\tUltlll."í 26 
Tn Sah:ih IR.9 Do~111 ( ;roup 39.5 
·c .()ff ('() c;rc•up hl:C:tml· lt•:tcll·r U\ 'l,;l'prc:mba :mo 1. :tú n ¡,, magl'f \\11h Prcn':l 
l ·,p.1f1ola (tol.11 nur~,·1 ' han·: .:?O,I ) 
- - 1 u,nnn111d11 \\':l' lu1ugh c IH l'or1 11g;1l T 1.:lccom 111 no\c:mhn ::oOO. 
Snurcc: autltors' 0\\11 rcsc:1rch 
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TABLE 2.4 TABLE 2.5 
Sccond Placed Groups of Ncwspap crs' Two L argcst Publishing Groups of 
Markct Sh:uc (%) Ncwspapcrs' Markct Sh :u c ( % ) 
Countrv 2000 Country 1990 2000 
AT Snria J?- AT (18 (1">.l) 
DE(fl) O c Pcr.-Lrro~p 34.G DE (íl) :=>•J -r •. 8 
BE lfrl 11'~! 24 BE (fr) (1:-i -¡, 
DE W1\i'. 6 DE 29 21J.(1 
DK D:igbl.1Jl't 1'1,l111kcn 22 DK 48 -J(, 
ES c;ru11u Corrc:o I>.- ES 29 1lJ 
FI Alma ~kdia ¡- F l ; ¡ -11 
F R ( >uc.:~t Francc 10.5 F R _) _) \ .¡5 
G B Trinm 22.H GB ~X ,, 
GR ·rl't''•u•nal''' 
" 
GR .'\(1 ;11.1 
IR tn .. h Time~ 1 i IR -,, <.2.~ 
IT J ~,nr(.'''º J(l.(o IT \ 2 l~ 
N L !)¡· T ckl(raaf 30 NL '~ (111.6 
NO .\ Pn ....... ".-n 16 N O 45 ~11 
PT )(1 (,J -
SE )1 ·-lS 
PT C.oíina 1 (, _4 
SE Sclul><icd 9 
TR l\ill!m (; roup ::!>5 TR )4 (,) 
Source: :mthors ' own rcsc:trch Sourcc: aurhors' o\\ n rc.,l'arch 
In Austria, the newspaper pub lishing company, M cdiaprint. with ils 
flagship newspaper, Neue Kro11e11 Zeit1111g, controls fifty per cent of thc 
market65• Austria receives a big amount of forc ig n cap ital. cspccially 
from German companies. owing to its geographical. soc ia l. cu ltural 
and linguistic proximity. The struc ture of Lhe A ustria n sector is madc 
up of a strong regional markel, led by local newspapcrs. w hose main 
comperito rs are the regional editi ons of Lhe Neue Km11e11 Zeitw1,r/'''. 
Small markets are more prone to concentrat ion proccsses and forc ig n 
investment, especially if their ne ig hbours are la rge c.:ountries. wi th 
companies seeking to create sca le econom ies67 . 
In Holland , Pe rscombinatic (prev iously PC M ) ancl De Te legraa f are 
the leading g roups in the newspaper sector and Logethcr mak c up more 
than s ixty per cent o f the market. The leader in 1990 - De Tc lcgraaf-
65 Scc Manfrcd Knochc (2000). La cm1c<>11tracití11 de e111¡>1"<'sa.\ ,¡,. r·o1111111i("(1ciú11 <'11 A11., -
1ria. Archi ve~ DEIUN. 
66 Sce Paul Simpson ( 1994). E11mpea1111e•\".\(IC1fier i11d11.Hry. Pira lnternalional. Surrcy. 
67 Sce Andrca Grisold ( 1996). Pres.\ co11ce111rC1lirm C111(/ 111edio ¡w/i<T i11 .\1111i/I c111111trie.\. 
SAGE. London. 
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despite have notably increased its market quota went down to second 
place in 2000. 
In the Scandinav ian countries, the nationa l governments g ive aid to the 
press in rhe form o f subsidies for expenses re lated to di stribution and 
printing costs w ith the a im of promoting free competition. For the 
newspape rs compe ting agains t the market leader, rhe subs idies bare ly 
provide a fifth o f the company's resources. In Norway, the granting of 
subsidies fo ll ows crite ria suc h as divers ity, pluralism and the promo-
tio n o f competi tion. Subsidies prevent the ex istence of monopolies and 
promote thc consolidatio n o f newspapers in local markets w ith a low 
popula tion dens ity. w hich otherwise would be unprofitable without the 
government 's he lp. 
Even with thc subsidies. in some countries the highest marke t share are 
concc ntrated in a few companies, as table 2 .5 shows. In Norway. for 
in stance, Schibsted and A-Pressen control fi fty per cent of newspape r 
c ircul atio n in che country. Schibs tecl represents the rnain Norwegian 
communicati ons group. wi th a considerable presence in the press. 
commerc ia l te levis io n a ncl Interne t services. The growth process of 
this group has been s imil ar to that of othcr European groups. It began 
with a newspaper. A.fte11puste11 . founclecl by Christian Schibsted in 
1860. From then on. it carvecl o ut for itself an ever more sol id positi on 
in the Norwegian marke t. In 1992 it was íloated on the stock exchange. 
Family ownership was reduced to a third and it is now managed by 
professiona l investors. It is the sector leacle r o f the main e lec tronic me-
dia (te lev is ion ancl Interne t) ancl has carried out j o int ventures w ith oth-
er Scandinavian groups"x. 
In Sweden. the regio nal press represents forty per cent o f the marke t: 
advcrti s ing in ves tme nt makes up the s ixty per cent o f the Swedish 
newspapers· revc nue ancl most o f the m are sold by subscri ption. Bon-
nier has gained a large percentage of the market: it is the traditi onal 
68 Scc Joh;inn Roppcn ( 1999) De11111ark :~ ref!Ort. º'Thc Bulle1in'·. vol. 16. No. ·L 
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Jeader and its dominant position does not seem to be under threat in the 
short term. In the same way, Sanoma - WSOY in Fi nland heads the 
press market, it brings together an important section of the market and 
combines, with business acume n, the printi ng of newspapers with the 
publication of books and magazines and radio broadcasting. In 1999 it 
was floated on the stock exchange and is one of the most profi table Eu-
ropean groups in Europe. In Denmark, the concentration processes o f 
the regional markets of the press have strengthe ned foreign groups 
such as Berlingske Officin, of Norwegian ownership69 . Dagbladet 
Politiken, which was leader in the nineties, now holds second pos itio n . 
In Switzerland, Ringier still re tains the leadership of the newspaper 
market as it did in 1990 The newspapers of thi s country are cha rac-
terised by their strong dependence on advertis ing, making up between 
sixty and e ighty per cent of the newspaper pub lishing companies' rev-
enue. The structure combines a strong syste m of regional newspape rs 
and few newspapers of a national scope w hich lead sorne local mar-
kets. Of the three main languages spoken in Switzerland -German , 
French and Itali an-, the main one is German (70% oí the popul a tion ) 
and the circulation of newspapers in this language g reatly exceed s the 
res t. 
In sorne countries, regional newspapers tend to be bought up by large 
national companies wishing to consolidate or increase the ir regional 
market share, as is the case in Austria w ith Mediaprint o r in Denmark 
with Berlingske. In Spain, one of the most important newspaper pub-
lishing companies, the Grupo Correo, so ld over ha lf a milli on issues . 
the total sum of its ten regional titles. After severa! fa iled atte mpts, in 
2001 it has succeeded in reaching first place in national c irc ul atio n: it 
has merged with Prensa Española, whi ch prints the Madrid dail y. ABC. 
as well as other regional newspapers. With the me rger, the Grupo 
Correo has recovered its leadership of the sector, w ith a quota o f 2 1 %. 
Jts chief competitor continues to be the Grupo Pri sa, w hic h pub lishes 
69 See Ole Prehn (2000) Dcmish Media La11dswpe, at /11117://uwll".ejc. 11/. 
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El País - leader of che nacional newspapers-, As - in che sporting press 
segment- and Cinco Días, the second economic newspaper. In a lJ , it 
controls fi fceen per cent of che market. [n Spain, the eighc largest press 
groups amass 80% of the total newspaper circulation. 
In Germany, the structure of the press market appears to be highly di-
versified and local, but newspapers are mostly put together in central 
offi ces: therefore, different local titles share the same news on cu lture, 
economy, national and international politics. The most consolidated 
companies are Axe! Springer and WAZ7º. Emblematic newspapers, as 
d iffe rent as the popular Bild or the quality Fran!..furter Allgemeine 
Zeitun, are published by them. 
Greece is going through a re-structuring period in its newspaper mar-
ke t. Nacional newspapers live side by side with regional ones, although 
che former are gaining importance to the detriment of the latter. News-
papers with political news content control the greater part of the mar-
ket, wh ilst the sporting and financ ia! newspapers have a lower circula-
tion . Lambrakis. Tegopoulus and Bobolas are the Jeading companies in 
the sector. Ta Nea and To Vima head the list of the most widely-sold 
newspapers, both are owned by che Lambrak.is group. 
ln Italy, the soc ial, policical and economi c institutions control a con-
siderable part of the media industry. In tum, family groups, such as 
Berlusconi , Agnelli, Romiti or De Benedetti dom ínate che ltalian econ-
o my. Family Lí es are very strong. The well-known phenomenon of the 
"Chinese boxes" arises: by means of holding shares in sorne compa-
nies, ownership is controlled by others. Rizzoli-Corriere della Sera 
(RCS) is leacler in rhe press, a sector wi th a low readersh ip leve! and 
low advertis ing invcstment. Espresso, owner of La Repuhblica, holds 
sccond place. The high business concentrat ion makes it difficult for 
new competito rs to break through: foreign groups with strong fi nancia! 
70 Sec Runar Woldt (2000). La co11ce11tració11 de empresas de co1111111irncirí11 en Ale11111-
11ia. Archives DEIUN . 
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muscle can onl y break into the Itali an market by means of deals and 
jo int ventures with local partners. 
Belgium represents a special case. The traditional lingui sti c-cultu ral 
division between territories of French and Flemish influence requires 
a special study for each geographical area. But, recently, the market 
has gane through one of the most intense integration and concentration 
processes in Europe. The Flemish group VUM broke this historical di-
vision in June 1999 when he bought 33% of Mediabe l, the second 
group of the French-speaking pa.rt of Belg ium. When the tota l c ircula-
tion in the count.ry does not reach two million issues. VUM control s 
42% of the market in the Flemish side. Mediabel, in turn, groups to-
gether IPM -second newspaper publishing company, with 24% of the 
market- and Vers I 'Avenir. VUM's takeover sparked off heated debate 
among the main newspaper publi shing compani es, such as Rosse l and 
De Persgroep, not only on cultural issues, but espec ial ly. o n the hi gh 
leve! of concentration in the Belgian newspaper market71 • 
In Great Britain , the market is divided between the quality and po pu-
lar newspapers . In the last decade the economic structure of the re-
g io nal and local press has also been strengthened. Of the nati onal press 
groups, News Intemational stands out, market leader publi shing both 
The Times and the tabloid The Sun, among others. The Trinity M irror 
group, created after a merger in 1999, is leader of the regio nal sector 
and main ri val of the newspaper publishing company of Ne ws Corpo-
ration 72. 
In lre land, the recent accelerated growth of the lri sh econo my has 
favoured the communications industry and, especially, the press. T he 
presence of Briti sh owners is s till significant. The strongest company, 
Independen l Newspapers, controls almost ha lf the sa les of the daily 
71 See Daniel Biilereyst ( 1999). Belg i11111 :1· report. "The Bulletin". vol. 16. No. 3. 
72 See Peter Humphreys (2000). Co11ce111ració11 de empresas de co1111111icació11 e11 el 
Rei110 U11ido, Archives DEI UN. 
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newspaper market. It is also leader in the Sunday press and controls 
forty pe r cent of the regional market. 
In 1998. 77 per cent of the newspapers sold in Ire land were. to tally or 
partiall y owned by Inde pende nt NewspapersB. This multimedia gia nc 's 
empire s tre tc hes to Australia. New Zealand a nd South Africa. As well 
as having some tilles in the United Kingdom, it owns a packet of 
shares in Lusomundo in Portugal. 
In Portugal. newspapers be long to g iant corporations which acquired 
thc m from fam ily firm s in the mid e ighties. The fa milies cou ld no 
longer clea l w ith ris ing production costs and were unable to finance in-
vcstmcnts fa r the re-mode lling of their companies. Portugal"s e ntry in-
to the European Un ion and thc re-pri vatisation of companies has pro-
vided thc c limatc far the concentration of capital in a few hands. The 
grou ps pursue political intercsts and have developed multimedia 
strategies favouri ng foreign investment. Companies, such as the 
British Pearson. the German Be rte lsmann. the Fre nch Hachette Fili-
pachi , the Braz ilian Gl obo or the Spani sh Te lefónica, Recoletos and 
Ibe rdrol a own shares in the capital of many of the Portuguese commu-
nications groups, such as Lusomundo, Impresa, Media Capital or Im-
pala. Impresa. presided over by the former prime-minister, Francisco 
Pinto Balsemao. was floated on the stock exchange w ith 30 per cent of 
its capital in Junc 2000. ln November of that year. Portugal Te lecom 
bo ught the wholc of Lusomundo, which publishes the newspapers Jor-
na l de Notíc ias and Diario ele Notíci as, as well as a wning radio stations 
a nd film a nd video dis tribution companies. 
73 See Wolfgang Truetzscheler (2000). lrish Media Lmulscape. m /111p://11·11w.ejc. 11/ 
N 
o 
o 
N 
.. 
e: 
" ..., 
ALR>NSO 1 M EDIA CONCENTRATION IN 
SÁNOUOZ-T ABERNERO TllE EUROPEAN M AR KET. 
M1Gua CARvAJAL NEw TRENOS ANO CltALLENGES 
N 
o 
o 
N 
o 
e 
" -. 
TABLE2.6 
D ailv Prcss Lcoders and Fo reil!Tl Caoit:tl Invcs1mcn1 12000) 
Co untr\' Comoanv Markct sh arc (% ) 
AT ~lcdionrint 50.2 
BE (FI) VU,\! 42,2 
BE (Fr) Ro!'i!ood 52 
DE Axcl Springcr 2.1,6 
DK Bcrlinl!Skc 24 
ES Pri~a 15,7 
FI S:moma 25 
FR Hcrs:lm 24 
GB '.'..:cws ln(crn:uion:il 28.2 
GR Limbroki• 1-.1 
IR lmlcn. Ncwsr>>r>crs 4-5 
IT RCS Editori 19,5 
NL Pcrscomhin:uic 3U/> 
NO Schib•tcd 34 
PT PTTdccom 45.3 
SE l3on111cr 26 
TR Do!'lln Group 39.5 
. ~ 3.>ºlo of 1 furnyct :tnd 21°'0 o( ~lilhyct mvcstcd 111 Stock l:xchanAc . 
Sourcc: authors• own rcsca.rch 
Forcien capital (% ) - Country 
511 (\X·. \/.1 - () !: 
o 
40 (Sociirc"cl - I · 1( 
1) 
s-.9 -:'-.O 
tl 
(1 
u 
(1)11 (:-.icw' Curp.) - 1 'S 
11111 (Stock E'ch.111i:q 
HKI (Stock l"ch>nl!c) 
" (1 
9 
75 (Swck Exch"'"c) 
o 
Tn spite of the aggressive wave of mergers and takeovers in the 
nineties, the traditional publishing companies, save a few exceptions, 
have retained control over their newspapers. The press sector -after 
that of radio and television- is the one which receives the least fore ig n 
investment in Europe. Among che leaders, as table 2.6 shows. nationa l 
newspaper publishing companies predominate; in sorne cases, they are 
family fírms which have diversified their business and have hindered 
che entry of new competitors. Many of the newspaper publishing com~ 
panies have invested in television, radio and Internet compa nies. 
The most important presence of foreign capital in lead ing companies 
is that of News International, Rupert Murdoch 's fl agship, which dom -
inates the British market and rai ses questions on the legis lation on con-
centration in the United Kingdom74 . The leading compa ny in che mos t 
comfortab le dominant position is to be found in French-speaking Be l-
gium: Rossel, with 52 per cent of the total in its li ngu istic s pace, is con-
trolled, rnoreover, by a French publi shing company, Socpresse, which 
74 See James Harding and Ashil ing O'Connor ( 19.Xl.200 1 ). UK to abolish rnrbs 011 Mur-
doch 's media ambitio11s, "Financia) Times". 
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owns 40 per cent of its capital. The German group's - WAZ- owner-
ship of fifty per cent of the shares of the Austrian Mediaprint also rep-
resents one of the most interesting foreign capital investments. 
The economic press sector in Europe has grown in the environment of 
an internationalised economy (table 2.7). Its evolution and structure 
depend on world economic events and the impact on stock markets, 
which must be covered quickly and accurately. Perhaps because the 
great engines of the world economy hai l from the Anglo Saxon world, 
it is usually said that in economy Engli sh is spoken. The Wall Street 
Journal and The Financia/ Times represent the peak of the economic 
news sector, characterised by a high leve! of concentration. In Europe, 
the leaders wi th the lowest market share -Greece and Turkey- reach 
almost 50 per cent of the total sales. Knowledge of the business, the 
prestige of the brands of reference, financia! capacity and the avail-
abi li ty of trust-worthy sources and exclusives promotes deals between 
international suppliers of economic news and local partners. This sec-
tor, within the traditional media, is one of the most influenced by glob-
ali sation. Pearson, far example, is leader in Spain, France, United 
í 
Kingdom and Portugal. ...J 
TABLE 2.7 
Econ omic & Finan cia) Prcss Lcad crs and Forci~n Capi1:1I lnvcstmcn t (2000) 
Countrv Companv Markct s hare (º/.) Forei~ capital ('Yo) - Countrv 
AT \\ m•chaft,bl.111 Hkl o 
BE (FI) T11J :-.:, ltkl (1 
RE(Fr) l ~dUl'CO 101.l 5.6 (Socpn·><c) - l·R 
DE l landchblm il.6 22 (D'"' lonn ) - l 'S 
DK l· rlwnu' llbd,·1 66.4 n 
ES Rl·cuk10" 60 - , (Pcar<nn) - Gii 
F l :\ lm.1 \lcdi.1 8:? tl 
Fil l .c.:~ l ~choo; 58,8 
' 
1 no (l'ca.,nn) - (; 11 
GB hn:mc1al Tirnc~ H- ll 
Gil J\olml:l:- 1H n. :t. 
rn Sund:"t\ Bu~im·,, Po .. [ <JO 11 
IT 11 Sulc 24 Clrc 'lll ll 
NL S1j1hoff 1m o 
NO l).U,!_l 11' '\:4..'ílnl"h\ - ¡¡ 11 
PT l ·.0111úm1r.1 ltMI ;¡1 tPcar'•"'1 - ( ;n 
SE B 11nnll'f 11 . ·" ll TR l>u11v;1 lH 11 
Sourcc: muhors• own rcscarch 
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A similar phenomenon occurs wi th consumer magazines, where Ber-
telsmann (Germany) and Hachette (France) are leaders in the E uro-
pean market (table 2.8). In this sector a need has arisen which has be-
come a streng th : the creation of synergies in contents, advertis in g and 
technology with other foreign groups, in a rder to opLimise resources 
and diversify risks. Always in need of attractive contents. technolog i-
cal innovations a nd internationa l contacts in c ulture. c inema. sports 
and society, magazines usually belong to inte rnationa l cha in s w hic h 
explo iL them in d ifferenL markets. Germany, France a nd Ho lla nd own 
distribution networks of consumer magazines w ith an in ternat io nal 
presence. Hachette Filipacchi (France), G + J - Berle lsmann·s sub-
sid iary- and Bauer (Germany), VNU (the Nethe rla nds) and RCS 
(Italy) are sorne of the strongesL compan ies. 
The consumer magazine market has absorbed hi gh in vestrnents of for-
eign capital because of the rapid expansion of demand in spec iuli sed 
sectors. For the compan ies, growth prov ides them w ith udvantages 
typical of scale economies: the same tilles are edited in differe nt coun-
tries and savings are made in the market ing, contents production or re-
search and development costs. The geographi cal areas w ith c lose c ul-
tural ties also e ncourage the creation of chain s of editorial c irc ulati o n 
of great magnitude, such as VNU for the Netherla nds o r Bonnier for 
the Scandinavian area. 
The strategy of some groups that publi sh pan-European products, both 
magazines such as Time, The Economisr or Business Week, and dail y 
newspapers such as Inrerrwrional Herald Tribune or Wal/ Srreer Jour-
nal Europe contrasts with g roups Lhat opt for a mullí-regio na l pres-
e nce: they form alli ances w ith local partne rs to bring ou t local versions 
of internat iona l brands75 (Hachette, G + 1, IPC, EMAP). 
75 See Paul Kanwar (Xl.200 1 ), Bordercrouing. "M&M Europe .. (Pocket guide). 
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TABLE 2.8 
Mn2azincs Lcadcrs and Forcign C:ipital lnvcs1mcn1 (2000) 
Cou111rv Comoany l\l:irkc1 s harc (º/ o) Forcign capilOI ( 'lo) - Coun lrv 
n 
BE (Fr) Tl·'' - \ch.tt, ll . . l. n 
DE l ~:uu_·r 22.:? ll 
DK \lb 1 ;_s 
ES l l:1rlw1tt· hhp.1t:d11 I(._- l·R 
l'I '\ h1\ lll' l.'I km ak:hdt.·1 29 
l'H 
___ l l.1l'lll" rlc..' hliP.Hl°lll 20 
'(;U 1 PC • \ 1.u.:;vuw, n .. 1. 
~ l .rlu:ra' n .. 1. 
II KI- l 'S 
n. :i 
IH RTI' 11 •. 1. () 
IT \l1 11h,l.1d•1n 1.1.-
NL \ "\.l" !}6 
NO :--i ... · &lli•r 15.2 llMI - DI-.: 
PT 
'"'!'"''" (. \<:¡ n. :1. ~ '\lb :2CJ 11~1 - l)f,. 
TH 1 )1 11.!. lll Hurd.t R1n11li -1 :i 411 íllurd.1 - D ie 1 Riaoh l"li 
· ( lnh \\n.'kh or< ul.l111m \''.'\.l ' 1, h-.u.·d 111 lh": S1oc.: J... 1 :'ich~n).!.1. .. '\01 11 ( ;n, 1(1º o ~l .. IH ' L'S. 12·• ,, l\F. - ,," 
DI ·. 11 .,,¡,"', 
So urce: :1111lwrs' º'' n rcscarch 
In arde r to fol low the tra il of forc ign capital flow, it is essent ia l to take 
a c lase look at book publishing (table 2.9). Unlike o ther communica-
tion s sectors. the publ ishing industry in Europe has had no c urbs on the 
presence of fore ig n inves tors. For this reason. the chief publi shers had 
a lready begun to acqui re publi shing houses in o ther countries a lmost 
half a century ago. 
Most of the large Europcan pub lishing co mpanies are the offspring of 
s trateg ics of vertical integration. so that press. ed itorial production and 
distr ibution are grouped togethe r. Bertelsmann in Germany, Portugal 
and Spa in, Havas in France, Sanomi=WSOY"in Finland , Mondadori in 
Ital y, Schibstcd in Norway or Bonnier in Sweden re prescnt signi ficant 
examples of publishing companies wi th a strong presence in thc ne ws-
pape r pub lication sector. Berte lesmann 's domi nion c rosses German 
borders reaching the United Kingdom and Portugal, a lso as leader of 
the publi shing market and a lmost a lways among the most imporrant in 
every country in the magazine market. 
In latte r years. some of the great international publishers - Macmi llan, 
McGraw Hill , Random House. Penguin Books - have brought their bus i-
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nesses closer to the new technologies. Sorne bought virtual book shops 
or created joint ventures (Bertelsmann - barnesandnoble.com) -encour-
aged by the premature success of amawn.com- in arder to gain a new 
window from where it could distribute its huge catalogues. Others ex-
perimented with electronic publishing, which has still not discovered a 
clear business model and has been affected by technological uncer-
tainty. Despite ali of this, most part of the publishers believe that the 
future of their companies lies in being present in e lectronic publish-
ing16. 
TABLEZ.9 
l'ublishinl!'. l ndus1rv Lcadcrs (Books) a nd F orci2n Caoi1al lnvcstmc n 1 12000\ 
Coun1rv Comoanv Forcirm caoital 1%) - Countrv 
AT Ustcr. Bun<lcwcrl:tl! n. a. 
BEIFl\ \X'olu:r~ - 1'.Juwcr lfM> - l~I.\ 
DK J>,lúcmbl 1] 
DE Bcnclsmann 1) 
ES Planeta 11 
FI \X'SOY / Sanom:i o 
FR l IJ\'a< l\ '1,.cntlil l) 
GB Ranclom 1 lou<c 10!1 lllcnc l<mannl - n1:. 
GR Pa1ak15 (l 
IR G1ll & :lbcm1Jl:im 49 (~lacmilbn) - (;I\ 
IT ~lond:ulon o 
NL \X'ohcr~ - K luwcr 65 
NO Aschchou~ () 
PT lknclsm:inn 100 
SE Bonnicr f) 
TR Rcm7i J...:.i1:1bn·1 11 
Sourcc: authors• own rcscarch 
2.2. Television Companies 
The television sector in Europe has undergone perhaps more changes 
in the last decade than at any other time in a li of its previous history. 
The deregulation of the sector at the end of the e ighties permitted the 
creation of new prí vate channe ls which transformed the aud iovisua l 
world . If, then, we witnessed the rise in the number of commercial 
channels and the slight increase in consumption time, now what is 
76 See Jim Mi lliol and Calvin Re íd (1.2002), E-P11b/islzi11g, .. Publ ishers Weekly ... No.2. 
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most worthy of note is the massive rise in television offers, audience 
frag me ntat ion and the internationalisation of te levision groups. 
In 2000, the world audiovisual market presented a healthy image, char-
acterised by the rise in profits o f the m ain te levis ion companies and the 
increase in adve rtis ing investment and of pay te levis ion subscription , 
especial ly in the European marke t, thanks to the development of dig i-
ta l te lev is ion77. At the beginning of that year over 580 channels with 
the capability of national coverage were broadcast via sate lli te, terres-
tria l or cable. which meant an increase of 170 per cent from 199678. 
The trans-border development of European te levis ion has led to man y 
small States that share the same language as more dense ly populated 
States receiving s ig nals from fore ign c hannels, especially via satellite 
and cable. There are over fifty te levision channels that are mainly tar-
geted a l markets differe nt to the one in which they are established, 
s uch is the case of CLT in Luxembourg. ldustrial concentration is also 
one o f the main tendencies in the market79• 
Frorn the legis la ti ve point of v iew, sorne writers propase the need far 
Community legisla tio n to adopl a toughe r approach towards conce n-
tratio n80. The g ianl groups' strategies are aimed at maintaining the ir 
g rowth speeds, e nsuring access lo the most popu lar conte nts, minimis-
ing risks by means of collaborat ion agreeme nts and protecting the ir 
markct shares. Si::.e is the key: on the size achievcd depend the possi-
bil it ies o f creating scale economies of the ir produces or o f the ir activi-
ties. 
77 Scc ··1DATE NEws·· ( 15.3.200 1 ). The World film mrd 1ei<•1•i.1io11 111arke1. No. 175. 
h11p://www.idatc. fr/maj/qdn/an-Ol /lF I 75-200 l 03 15/indcx_a.html 
78 /// Re¡1or1Jm1111he Co111111issiu11 w rhe Cm111cil. 1/ie E11mpn111Parlin111e111 0111/ 1/ie Eco-
1111111ic a11d Social C0111111i11ee COM (200 1) 9 cnd. Brusscls. 15 Jan u al)' 200 l. 
79 Scc Phi lip Crookcs ( 1996). Co111·erge11ce 0111/ allianccs: rhe shape of 1hi11gs ro come. 
'Thc Bullctin". No. 2. 
80 Se..: Gillian Doy le ( 1998). T()\rnrd.f 11 pa11 E11ropea11 Direc:rire? "Fm111 Co11ce111ra1io11s 
allll l'l11ralis111' 10 "Media 01rnership '. ··commu11ica1ions Law". Vol. 3. No. 1. 
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National television fict ion is still at the top of prime time in every 
country in the European Union; however, in the rest o f programme 
scheduling North American series and films predominate 81 • lndeed, in 
1998 the commercial television balance with the Uni ted S ta tes re-
vealed a deficit of 2,900 mi Il ion dollars for the Europeans, 14 per cent 
up on 1997. The g lobal audiovisual deficit was calculated to be in the 
region of 6,600 mili ion doll ars. This deficit is, firs t and foremost. the 
result of the commerce of films, television fiction and cartoons be-
tween the United States and Europex2• 
In table 2. 10 it can be observed that in most countries da il y te levision 
consumption has risen. However, the re was g reater growth in thc 
e ighties; towards the end of the twentie th century cons umptio n seemed 
to have stagnated both because of the extremely hi gh levels reached 
and al so because of dcmographic trends and the devel o pment of Inte r-
net. S ince 1990 the number of television viewers has g row n in Turkey. 
Sweden, Portugal, Ho lland. lta ly, Spain, Greece. the United Kingdom. 
France, Denmark and French-speaking Be lg ium. A ud icnces have fa ll -
en on ly in Austria and Flemish Belgium. 
8 1 Scc Teresa la Pone e t al. (V l.2001 ). Globali.mtim1 i111/w Media /11d11s1ry a11tl p11s.,i/J/e 
1/1reats to rn/111ra/ dil ·ersiry. wort..ing Jocumcnt for thc STO/\ Pane l. Bru,~ck PE 
296. 704/rn.St. 
82 Sce Europcan Aud iovisual Obscrvatory <2000). 
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TABLE2.JO 
Tclcvis ion Audicn cc (In Million s) 
Countn· 1990 2000 
AT ... - ..¡5 
BE(íl) ·l.5 s.:; 
BE lfr\ 2,9 .>.9 
DE ~n.1 -16.6 
DK 2 .. -l J.6 
ES 2-.- l0.9 
FI 5.1 S.I 
FR 35.'J .¡.¡ 
Gll .¡.¡ .¡(, 
GR 5.H ,.., 
IR 3.1 l.(1 
IT .¡.¡ r 
NL 12 12 
NO ~.9 .).0 
PT -.<i K9 
SE S.5 (1,5 
TR :;5 r.i.-
Suurcc: .1uchors' o wn rc~c:-i rch 
T he rise in television consumption has coincided with 1he stagnation 
or the more traditional media. such as radio and press: some sectors. 
such as consumer magazines have undergonc a sl ight drop in circu la-
t ion in severa! markc ts. Thc process became more pronounced at the 
cnd o f the eightics when many countrics liberal ised telcv ision broad-
casting. Thc main threat to thc hegcmony of tc lev ision in the homes is 
Internet. In spite of this. as many ana lysts had forecast. the mass acccss 
ofthe publ ic to Internet has not lcd to a signi fi cant fal l in the time spent 
watching telev ision by vicwers on a dai ly basis. 
With thc emcrgence of new operatorsx; - hundreds of channcls via 
sate ll ite ami cable- and thc massivc incrcasc of local broadcastcrs. au-
diences have become íragmcntccl. and the distri but ion or the market 
quota is less stab lc than in the print med ia. The new d ig ital channels 
havc brought about a break in telcvision consumption habits. with the 
launching or programmc packets and thc spccial isation oí the contents. 
The ti me that Europcan cit izcns spencl watching telcv ision is main-
1 83 Scc David Brown (I V.1999). E11mp1'1111 rnble aw/ sm l' l/i11' ernnmiiin. ··s r n:rn Di-
ge, ( '. London . 
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tained within levels of between 140 minutes a day -Austria- and 230 
- Italy and Greece-. Almost every home in the European Union has a 
te levision set and there has been a considerable inc rease in penetratio n 
of the remote control , video machines and digita l reception equipment. 
With such high audience quotas, te levision attrac ts the greatest amount 
of advertising investment: in most marke ts more advertis ing is invest-
ed in television than newspapers which had previous ly occupied first 
place in the ranking for adverti sing expenditure per med ia (table 2.11 ). 
TABLE 2. ll 
~ Advcnisinl? Expcnditurcs (2002 Proicctcd) 
Mcwum USA Jop2n Gcrmom· Uniled Kinr•dom Francc l H1h-
TV 38 -16, I 24.3 29.8 2-4,) 52 
Ncwspapcrs 32.9 T.3 H.S 411.3 .¡;_5 22 
Radio 14,2 4,6 3.8 4.<· ;,8 
l\la1•azincs 11.2 9,6 1-.s 2.>5 l(o 
Sourcc: Adagcglobol (April, 2002) 
The main source of revenue for television companies in the Europea n 
Union is advertis ing. Following years of continued growth, in 1999 the 
brute market in advertis ing in television channels - pri vate and public-
was estim ated to be 23.200 million Euros, 13.8 pe r cent mo re than in 
1993x4 _ However, an increasingly greater percentage o f revenue pro-
ceeds from d irect pay ment from c itizens (pay-TY, pay pe r vicw a nd 
video on demand). 
European television channels' profitability has improved. owing both 
to the inc rease in advertis ing investment as well as g reate r pe ne tratio n 
of the pay system. The proliferati on o f new dig ita l channe ls. via satel-
li te or cable, has also brought in to be ing new aud iov isua l produc tio n 
companies. 
Communications groups. with the aim of sa feguarding conte nts access. 
have carried out a policy of takeovers of thc most successfu l produc-
tion companies. If in the Uni ted States it was thc g iant productio n com-
panies - Walt Disney, Viacom, Warner, News Corporat ion- that boug ht 
84 Scc The European Advcrt ising and Media Forccast (2000). Forecast j(11· adl'er1isi11g 
and 111as.1· media in Europe. London. 
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channels -ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox- in order to distribute their contents, 
following the model of downward vertical integration. In Europe an 
opposite phenomenon has occurred: Bertelesmann, Vivendi, Kirch, 
Admira or Mediaset have bought the rights to the most popular fiction 
or sporting products, or the companies which produce them. 
Audiovisual groups cross over their country borders to gain in size and 
create scale economies, to exploit to the full their products in other 
windows for display and to enhance the company's attraction for ad-
vertising commercialisation or investments in the stock exchange. In 
this decade, the number of companies that have been floated on the 
stock exchange has risen considerably. With this strategy, audiovisual 
groups have sought additional resources to finance their expansion 
plans anda greater transparency and professionalism in management85• 
Public television Ieadership in audience levels stands out as one of the 
most salient facts of the sector in the European Union (table 2.12). Prí-
vate channels head audience quotas only in Turkey, Greece, Flemish 
Belgium and Portugal. Most of the leaders ha ve suffered a drop in mar-
ket quotas in the last decade, as a result of the increase in the number 
of channels (tables 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14). 
l 85 See Richard A. Gershon (2001), Te/ecomn11mications Management, LEA, Mahwah 
(New Jersey). 
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TABLE2.12 
T elc,ision l\!arkct Lcaders (Audiencc) (% ) 
Countrv 1990 2000 
AT O RF 94 OIU· 56 
BE(íll \~í.\l 40 V.\l\I ).i,5 . 
BE lfrl RTBF 25.8 RTllF 25 
DE 1\RD 41 t\RD T 
DK T\'2 47 T\'2 ;r,_4 
ES lYE ) (, TVE 12 . ..i 
F I Yl.E 4; Yl.I ·. 41 
FR Tl·l ·11,'J. Frnncc Tl:ll:\"i~ion .n 
GB 111\C 4'J.5 1111<: 185 
GR ERT {¡l .\nicnn:l T\' 22..1 . 
IR RTl ·: (,8 RT I·: 1>' 
IT Rt\ I 4.1.7 R.\l -16.1 
N L ;-.:os 58 :-;os ·w 
NO :-;f(¡,; - 5 :-;1u; ·w 
PT RTI' l«J.S SIC 4'i. 
SE S\T 82 S\'T 44 
TR TRT 100 Show T \" 1- ~ . 
·( .ompan1l·~ ,,,,h pnva1c c:ipu:il. 
Sourcc: authors, own rcscarch 
TABLE 2.13 TABLE2.14 
Sccond L T 1 .. C arecs t e CVJSIOn 'es ('lo) on1pan1 Two Larg:csr Tc kvision 
Countrv 2000 Com :mies' M:irkct Sharc (% ) 
AT 1\T\ .. 2000 
BE (íl) \ 'RT 31.I• 11 .• 1. 
BE (fr) RTl .-T , 1 2.1 
DE RTI. 2-l 
DK 1 )J( T\" 11.-
ES T1.:k·c111c1, ". 
--·' 
F l ~n 1·' 40 
FR T l 1 .l l 
GB (1r.1J1;1d:t 14.6 
Gil ~ l n!.1 Chonnd 21.2 
IR T\') (, 
IT 7\ lt .. •t.h:hl 'I 4(, 
NL 1 loll.md \lnho 28 
NO T\'2 l1 
PT P<•rlUl!ll ( ilohal ·n.>< 
!T 
•12._1_ J 
,,-
-11 
SE T\'4 T -x.>< 
Tll 1'..111.11 J) 155 -1 
· ( >nh c.1hk· TR "\~ .-
Sourcc: authors' uwn rcsearc h Soun;c : ~n11hnr;-, · O\\tl rcs c;tn:h 
Public channe ls have rnany years of ex pe rie ncc behincl thc m. thc ir 
brands, to a cerla in extenl, are associated w ith the idea o f public serv-
ice a nd the ir fund ing is s tabl e throug h S talc a id or spec ial laxes paid 
TRENOS IN TIIE E UROPEAN MARKCT 
by viewers86• Sorne of these companies are also financed by advertis-
ing revenue, such is the case, far ins tance. in Belgium. Denmark, 
Spai n, Italy and Sweden. The European Union 's regulatory bodies cur-
rently question the legality of "dual funding", heavily critic ised by pri-
vate companies87. 
At the beginning of the nineties, A ustria, Switzerland and Turkey were 
the last s trongho lds of t::c: public television monopolies systern. Of the 
three countries, Turkey and Austria have legally liberal ised the ir tele-
vis ion broadcasting. Switzerland receives signals via sate llite from 
other countries. 
In Gcnnany, the constitution itself stipul ates that regulation of the tel-
cvis ion sector is the responsibility of the le nder. Public regional cor-
porations are grouped together in the ARO, marke t leader, as shown in 
table 2. 12. In the mid eighties, comme rc ial competition in the audi o-
visua l space was init iated wi th the arrival of RTL from Luxembourg 
and Sat 1, in the hands of Leo Kirch unti l 2002. 
Berte lsmann controls 89 per cent of the RTL Group. In January 2000, 
it bought the Germa n te levision channe l YOX from News Corporation. 
The sale o f Rupert Murdoc h's company was carried out afte r the Aus-
tralian impresario had signed an agreement with the Kirch group. 
Berte lcsmann ·s rival , to acquirc 22% o f the dig ita l televis ion, Pre-
miere. 
The strategic mo ves of these giant aud iovisual groups sel the slandard 
far the trends a nd main in novations of open and pay te levis ion . The 
Fre nch Canadian company Vi vendi Universal -owner of Canal +- a nd 
the Ang lo-A merican BSkyB domínate thc pay telev is ion sector. 
In less than fi ve years. Jean Marie Messicr has transformed an old and 
86 Scc Jan Wictcn. Graha111 Murdock and Petcr Dahlgren (2000). Te/el'Ísirm acm.u E11-
m¡Je. SAGE. London. 
87 Se.: 111 Repon of thc Commission 10 the Council. thc Europcan Parlimnent and thc 
Economic and Social Comminee. COM ('.WO 1) 9 end. Brussels. 15 January 2001 . 
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respectable water company, Generale des Eaux, into a multimedia 
group on a global scale which combines the film industry, mus ic, pro-
duc tion and television broadcasling, publishing and the new techn olo-
gies_ In 2000, it made a profit of 46.1 bi llion do llars, beating Lhe big-
ger groups: AOL Time Warner, Berlelsmann, News Corp. , Yiacom a nd 
Walt Disneyss. It has managed to break inlo the Norlh American rnar-
ket wirh the recenl purchase of the cable company, USA Networks _ 
which will enable it to di stribute its wide catalogue o f produc tsx9 . 
Yivendi 's partners in the rest of Europe are leaders in e ig ht nati onal 
markets in pay television. 
In Holl and, Lhe production company Endemo l has takc n pa rt in o ne o f 
the most s triking aud iovisual pheno mena of the las t years of the 
decade. Thi s company operates in fo urteen European countri es and has 
a catalogue of over four hundred formats, such as the wcll-known Big 
Brother. In March 2000, Admira, the media divis io n o f the Spanish 
telecommunications company (Tele fó nica), launched a takeover bid to 
gain 100% of the production company. With this operatio n. the Span-
ish company was guaranteed a contents supplie r for its te levisio n corn-
panies - such as Antena 3 and Vía Dig ital- and for thc scrv ices of its 
Internet provider - Terra -. 
In Belgium, worthy of note is the high penetratio n of cable in homes. 
The public channel, RTBF, located in the French spcak ing part. has 
maintained the same market quota as in 1990. Its competiLo rs are Lhe 
channe ls RTL-T vi and French te levision stations . Jn the Fle rnish area. 
in contrast, since the arrival of YYM in 1987, the prívate channels 
have dominated. VTM controlled , then - as table 2. 12 shows- 40 per 
cent of the markec. The SBS group, leader in Scandinav ia, launched a 
second channel, YT4. YTM, c reaLed Kanaal 2 to re in force iLs position. 
88 See Bruce Crumley and Thomas Sancton (6.Yll.2001). Master n.f tlie wlii•er.H!. 
"Time". 
89 Sce Jo Johnson and James Harding ( 17.X 11.2001 ), Wal/ Street blesses Vivendi-USA 
Networks deal. " Financia! T imes". 
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Togethe r they form the company VMM, current leader in the Flemjsh 
te levision market w ith 34%. 
In Sweden, the public channeI SVT dominates the market, in spite of 
compelition fro m the commercial channe ls which emerged at the be-
g inning of the e ighties. The commercial television stations, TV4 and 
TV3 are its chief competitors. SVT has gone from controlling 82 per 
cent of the marke t in 1990 to 44 per cent in 2000. In Fin land, YLE, the 
public broadcasting service, is market leader. S ince l 997 its main com-
mercial competitor has been MTV3, of the Finnish giant A lma Media. 
Sanoma-WSOY, leader in the print media sector, a lso entered the au-
diovisual market in 1997 w ith the launching of Channe l Four Finland 
("Nelonen")9º. 
In Norway, the public channe l NRK controls 30 per cent of the mar-
kel, which means that it has lost over half its audience in the space of 
only ten years. ln the e ighties, its on ly commercia l competition was 
limited to the Sky s igna! vía satel lite. But the appearance o f the Pan-
Nordic Swed ish channe l in 1998 and the arrival of the firs t commer-
cial te levis ion station - TV2- in 1992 has fragmented the Norwegian 
telev is ion audicncc91 . In Denmark, the public channel TV2 is also 
marke t lcadc r. The main fore ign presence among the leaders of Danish 
telev is ion is thal of the Swed ish channe l, TV3. In spite of thi s, in Den-
mark the pub! ic corporations · market quota reached 67 per cent. 
In Spain, a fler the econo mic recession in 1993, the prívate telev is ion 
channe ls undertook restructuring plans, which in late r years have led 
some o f them to achieve the highest profit margins in Europe, such as 
the case oí Te le 5 in 2000. RTYE still maintains irs leadership. w ith the 
90 Scc Eva Harric (2000). Tlie Nordic 111edin 11111rke1. "Nordicom'' (Nordic llll'<lin 1re11ds 
No. 5). Gotdmrg. 
91 Scc Ole Prchn (2000). Ln Cfllll'<'lltmci1í11 d<' <'111//re.wis de co1111111i1"aciti11 e11 Esrn11di-
11111·ia. Archives DEll lN. 
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sum audience total of its two channels, TVE! and TVE292. The two 
mai n private television stations, Te le 5 and Antena 3, changed owners 
and stracegy in 1995 and 1997 respectively. In Te le 5, the entry o f the 
Correo Group sionalled the beoinnino of multimedia diversification o f Q Q Q 
the Basque company, leader in che press sector in Spa in . Two years lat-
er, Admira, media subsidiary of the Te lefónica Group became the chie f 
shareholder in Antena 3. In Spain, investments of fore ign capital are 
mainly concentrated in the te levis ion sector. Mediaset and Kirch (until 
2002) in Teleci nco, Canal + France in Sogecable -owner o f Canal 
Satélite D igital and Canal + España- and Bertels mann - through the 
RTL group- in Antena 3. 
In Ita ly, worthy o f note is the presence o f o ne of the c hief European te l-
evision groups, Mediaset, company owned by Sil vio Be rlusconi , the 
Ita lian prime minister. The lta li an aud iov isual system is characte rised 
by duopo ly: Mediaset and the public company RA I share a lmost 
equally between them the te levision market. The pri vate company 
owns Cana le 5, Ita lia 1 and Re te 4, which jointly obta in 46 pe r cent o f 
the market quota. T he RAI also has three channe ls and s lig htly exceeds 
Mediaset. 
In the United Kingdom, the BBC has become o ne o f the c lassic mod-
e ls of p ubli c te levision, both because of the qua lity of its channe ls as 
well as its traditi onal independence and fun ding which excludes ad -
vertis ing. Despi te this, in the last decade il has lost more than ten pe r 
cent o f its market quota owing to the appearance of new commercial 
channe ls - such as C hanne l 5- and the greater pe ne trati on o f pay te le -
vision93. 
G reece and Portugal liberalised the ir respecti ve te levisio n marke ts in 
1992. Portugal gave an enthusiastic we lcorne to the a rriva l of the firs l 
92 See Miguel Carvajal (2000), La co11ce11tmcilÍ11 de empresas de rn1111111irncirí11 e11 Es-
polia. Arc.:hivc' DEIUN. 
93 See Pe1er Humphrcys (2000). Co11ce11t r111:i á11 de empresas de 1·01111111icaf' irí11 e11 el 
Reino U11id11. Archive' DEIUN. 
T RENOS IN THI! E UROPEAN MARK~I 
commercial channel, S IC, of the Impresa company, co ntrolled by the 
forme r prime miniscer, Franc isco Pinto Ba lsemao. One year lacer, Me-
d ia Capi tal, another leading Portug uese group, began broadcasting its 
channe l TVJ9~. 
The do minance of public ce levis ion explains the limited presence of 
fore ign capital in the Ieaders of commerc ial te levision. Thirteen o f the 
countries s tudied ha ve a public channe l as leader. None of the leading 
companies receives fore ign capita l, with the exception of Antenna TV 
in Greece and Impresa in Portugal, which has a third o f its capital on 
the s tock marke t (table 2. 15). 
TABLE 2.15 
T clcvision Lcadcrs and Forcit?n Caoital Invcstmcnt 12000) 
Coun tn ' Con1p:tnv lllarkct sharc ('/•) Forcil!n caoital (-;•) - Countrv 
AT OIU 5<1 11 
IJ E (FI) \".\l~ I 3-LS (} 
BE (Fr) RTll l· ~5 ti 
D E .\RD T (1 
DK IY2 1úA tl 
ES Ir! \"I ;2_..1 11 
FI Yl.F .j} 11 
Fn l· r.1111.:, · Tl· l,•, 1 ... 11111 .n 11 
GB 111\( . 3R5 11 
~ \1 11t.1111.1 T \ ' 22.-l l.J.111.m~ol '-) - l :. 
rn RTF .j~ 11 
IT R \ 1 .J(1.I l) 
N L '-.ClS llJ 11 
NO '-.Rf..: ;n o 
PT :-.11 ü lí•.-1 (Stock l:,ch.1111!l') 
SE :-. \ T .j.j tl 
TH ~hu'' T \ ' ,-' ti 
Soun:l.": :uuh ors' º'' n rCH':trc h 
In conlrust. the European pay te lcvis ion market prese nts a very diffe r-
e nt picture : in ne w businesses rcquiring deve loped techno logy a nd 
hea vy capital invcstment lhe lre nd is for large rorc ign companies lo be 
presenl (table 2.16 ). Espcc ially worthy of note is the predominance of 
the Vive ndi Universal (France) and BSky B (UK ) groups. T hcsc two 
co mpani es have terres tri al ancl sate llite c hanne ls. and tha nks to s trate -
94 Se.: Nobrc Correia (2000). C111we11tm1·iú11 de empresas de co1111111irncití11 e11 Por111gal. 
Archive~ DEIUN. 
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oic moves -such as J· oint ventures takeovers and mergers- the ir con-
º ' 
tents are in high demand. 
TABLE 2.16 
Par TcJc ,;sion Lcadcrs and Forci:rn Capital l nvcstm cnt (2000) 
Countrv Comoa nr llla rkct s ha rc (o/•) Forciiro cnoital ( % ) Countrv 
AT J>rcm1crc \Xº" rld JO() ll~J (22° u de JISkdll - l ;11 
BE (FJ) <:anal .¡ lk l1tium 100 JIH) (C:aml +¡ - l'H 
BE (Fr) C:tn:tl .¡. IUO H~l (C:a11.1I +) - l'R 
DE Prcmicrc \\ 'orl<l n. :i. .líl.2 (12" ,, <k llSkl'll) - c;11 
DK n. :t. n. l. n. :t. 
ES S111tl°Cablc 8-1 20(< .anal l)- 1·1( 
FI Canal + 11.:l. 100 (C .mal .¡ ¡ - l·H 
FR Can:11 + -8.5 1) 
GB ll<k111 .'i2.2 18 ( :\:t.'\\' ( nrp. J - l ·s 
GR l·ilmrH.'I n. a. l tllJ :-.:1. 
IR llSk1 11 (Sk1J (, 1\ 
IT Tdc· + 70 llKl (Canal 1)- l· R 
NL Canal + 90- 1m rc :anal .¡ l - l·H 
NO Canal + n. :1. J()íl ((°.ln.11 • ¡ - l·R 
PT SporT\º n. !l. .H.3 (l'T Tdcc• nn) 
SE .\ JTC n. :1. ll 
TR Cint.· 5 -o 11 
Sourcc: :tuchors' o wn rcsc:irch 
Vivendi, through Canal +, holds a hegemonic position in the Belgian, 
Spanish, French, Finnish, Dutch, Norwegian and Tta li an marke ts . 
BSkyB has been leader in Germany and Austria by means o f Premiere 
World and directl y in the United Kingdom and Ireland. News Corpo-
ration controls most of BSkyB 's capita l and Univers al has faund in 
Vivendi che perfect panner far transmitting its fi c tion conte nts throug h 
its d iffe rent platfarms. 
Financia] capacity, kn ow how and exclusivity o f contents, marketing 
and sca le economies are the main s trengths o f these g iant compa nies95. 
The ownership structure o f pay te levision in E urope re fl ects the diffi -
culty of making a strong inte rna! market -able to compete with North 
America and Japan- w ith the favourab le c lim ate far c ultural di versity 
in thc area of audiovisual contents of qualit y ""· 
95 Sce David Brown (IV.1999), E11mpew 1 cable wu/ sm el/ite, "Scrccn Digcs1". London. 
96 Scc Arnaud Gcrbcr ( 1996). /11depende11ce and Co11verge11c<' . ºThc Bullc1in ... vol. ~-
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2.3. Radio Groups 
The mass media usually compete against each o ther on three fronts. 
The first battle is gene rated by the dispute for attracting audience's 
time. Secondly, there is the fi ght to gajn the Iargest slice of the budget 
spent by the public on the consumption of news and e ntertainment. 
And, lastly, there is the battle to attract a high share of advertising in-
vestments97. 
Radio's chie f strength lies in its complementarity. If the massive in-
c rease in te levis ion entertainme nt offers and the consolidation of the 
Internet represents a threat for reading newspapers and magazines, this 
is not the case for radio audiences. Radio w ill find itself bare ly affect-
ed by the developme nt o f other media because its consumption is com-
patible with o ther activities; driving, walking. working. doing house-
work. etc. With an increase in offer and improveme nt in sound quality 
the trend will be for radio audiences to grow. 
1 97 
TABLE2.17 
Oailv radio listcncrs lin miUions) 
1990 2000 
AT 4.- 5.9 
BEíll .¡5 3.H 
BE f~) l.2 \ 6 
DE l•>. 1 ,11,4 
DK 1,1 3.~ 
ES l ''.·I 18. I 
l' I 2.6 2.ú 
FR H .6 W.H 
GB l-t ' 4\4 
GR ).') .'.!.-
m 2.~ 2..(1 
IT 21>.I w.'l 
NL :!.-l , 
NO .?.<1 2.íl 
PT ú.S 
SE ~5 -i.9 
TR .>o 11.1• 
Sourcc: authurs' own rcscarch 
Scc hu:ul1atl tic Co111unica1.:1611 tic la Universidad de Navarra anti Anhur Andcrsen 
( 2001 l. U f11111m d1• /11 telerisil í11 " " t:s¡H11io . Pamplnna-Madrid. 
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Crossed ownership between te levis ion and radio presents sorne advan-
tages: it permits the joint sale of adve rtis ing time, it is he lpfu l for the 
crossed promotions of certain programmes, it generates savings in 
costs, for instance in news sources and infrastructure, and strengthens 
.... che companies' negotiating position w ith governments. 
Technological innovation under way in the audiovi sua l sector and the 
interactive media has still not substantia lly modified the radio sector. 
There are still a few years to go before digital radio becomes an ac-
cessible offer for the public, s ince - for the moment- the investment re-
quired for obtaining new sets is disproportionate . 
Most of the markets find themse lves in a vicious c irc le: companies 
wi th a dig ital radio licence do not invest in contents because the pene-
tration of dig ital rad io se ts is extreme ly limited . The lack of attract ive 
contents generates a low demand so sca le economies are not produced 
in the radi o se t manufacturers sector, a necessary requiremenc for 
prices to be red uced which would then cause a rise in the penetration 
o f the se ts o n the marke t. In this technological context, to ta l variations 
in audi ence leve ls are insignificant, except in cou ntries where the au-
d ience tracking syste rn has changed. 
With the de reg ulatio n o f radio broadcasting in Europe and the massive 
increase in loca l transm itters in the Member countries, the granting o f 
new digita l radi o frequenc ies has promoted a new arca of industri al 
concentration. If. in the nineties. we witnessed a takcovcr process of 
local tran smitters, with the change o f the centu ry, most o f the big radio 
compani es have uscd the ir negotiating power Lo obta in a d ig ita l radio 
licence98. 
One of the most noteworthy pheno mena of the European rad io broad-
casting sector. a:-. was the case for tc levision. is the domination o f thc 
public corporations. Except in French-speaking Bc lgiu m, S pa in. Por-
98 See Miguel Carvajal (2000). u1 cm1ce111mció11 de e111presa.1· de cr11111111irncirí11 en Es-
paiia. Archive!> DEIUN. 
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lugal and France, the public cornpanies hold leading positions in ali of 
the European markets. Their experience, consurner habits and, in man y 
cases, Lheir dorninant position in the area of distribution, constitute the 
chief strenglhs of the public radio companies in Europe. 
Of the e ightee n markets s tudied, thirteen are dorninated by a public 
company. The Contact Group (French-speaking Belgiurn) allows one 
company of Gerrnan ownership, Berte ls rnann, the e ntry of foreign cap-
ital Lhrough RTL. Worthy of note are the high audience quotas con-
trolled by the main radio groups (table 2. 18). Most of the lead ing pub-
li c companies have experie nced a fa ll in the ir market share with re-
spect to 1990, as a result of thc appearance of new pri vate broadcast-
ers (tables 2. 19 and 2.20). 
TABLE 2.18 
Radio Markc1 Lcadcrs (Audicncc) (%) 
Country 1990 
T <lRI 
BE(fl) lllff'-
BE (ír) lfflll · 
DE \RD 
DK 1)1( 
ES ~ I R 
FI '1.1. 
FR lffl. 
GB 111\C 
GR 1 1n 
l lt 1n 1 
lT lt \i 
N L R.1d111 ~ 
1'0 '-Rh. 
l'T l~~l' ll.l 'l'\.'IH;.l 
L SE ~lt Tlt l"ltT 
·C .cm1 p.1111l'' \\ 1th prh·at t.· c:tpual 
Sourcc: au1hor~ ' º" n rcscarch 
,,~ 
-2.(1 
411 
-, 
:'l,t' 
l~. 
(1 l 
~2.~. 
(1X 
2::; 
(12 
45.-
li> 
~' 
l(1. 
''S 
)IHI 
2000 
< lRI 
\ 'RT :-G.h 
Cirorn' c:om:ict 145 . 
\ lll> ~u.-
DR (1(1 
Sl ·R 11. 
Yll (111 
-..: RI i ll.I · 
1111( ' U 
n .. t. n .. 1. 
RTI !') 
ll \I I (.,~ 
'\,():O, J'I 
'\;1{1' ;:-.i 
R.1thj1 lkn.1'<l'l\(. .t 2< •.'' . 
~ lt :;~ 
·11n l'J:> 
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T ABLE2.19 
Sccond Lar!!cst Radio Com panics (% ) 
Co un trv 2000 
AT Anrenne Srcie rm :irk 
BE(fl) \ '.\l\ t 
BE (fr\ T\'i 
D E l lii R:tdi11 
DK Thc Vnicc 
ES CO PE 
Fl Suomcn 
FR RT I. 
GB (;\\'R 
GR n. :t. 
IR lbd10 1 rdand 
IT (irunn 1 .' F.~nn; ... -.o 
N L Ski· R:tdio 
NO p.¡ 
PT ~k<li:1Cani r:t l 
SE RIX F\ I 
TR Show ll:td10 
"" O nly rc:gion!\I r ;1J10 . 
Sourcc: autho rs' own rc scarch 
TABLE2.21 
15' 
5,9 
l lJ.5 
3.3 
.¡ 
22A 
11 
2'i.7 
9,1 
8 
-
17 
29 
26.5 
1) 
9.8 
Radio Lcadcrs and Forci!!n C:ip ital lnvcs tmcnt (2000\ 
Coun1rv Com pany Markct sharc (%1 
AT ()f(I ' 80 
BE (FI\ \ ºlff 83,8 
BE (Fr\ ( ;roup Cnnt:tn 2.J,S 
DE \f(J) 50,7 
DK DR 66 
ES :,I:R .J I 
F I \ 1.E 60 
FR :--.RJ )l), I 
GB 111\C. 51.4 
GR 11 •• 1. n. a. 
IR RT I-. .¡•) 
IT RJ\ I 111,8 
N L '-:OS .¡9 
N O '-R1' 5X 
PT Rad11, Rl·11.1..,n·n<;:t 26.9 
SE ~R SS 
T R Tl\T 1-.r. 
Sourcc: aut hors' O'l.\,1 rcscarch 
T ABLE2.20 
T wo L argcst Radio 
C . ' M k Sharc (%) omnamc s 1 ar e t 
Coumrv 2000 
AT 9:; 
BE ffn 89,2 
BE ffr \ .¡:; 
DE 5.¡ 
DK -o 
ES (,1.-1 
r:1 71 
FR :1:;.x 
GB C1U.o 
G R 11 . . l. 
IR :;-
IT 23,8 
N L (,(, 
NO 87 
PT 80 . .l 
SE (1-I 
Tll ~1) . -
Sourcc: authors' o w n rcsc arc h 
Forci!!n c:mital (%) Countrv 
(1 
11 
15 nrn . c; roun ; D I· 
11 
-
" 1) 
" 
" () 
n. :t. 
" (1 
·-
IJ 
,, 
1) 
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2.4. Internet, Entertainment and Advertising 
As well as the traditional media supply -television, radio and press-
new dig ital broadcasting services (terrestrial , via satellite and cable) 
a ncl services on the Net, mainly those distributed via the Internet, have 
jo ined the m. In this way, the entertainment supply has been consider-
ably extended. Digital convergence in an economic framework char-
acterised by globalisation means, in practice, joint ventures and merg-
e rs be tween media, te lecommunications operators and computer firms. 
The European communications groups have not remained on the s ide-
lincs of these international a lliances which seek to be well placed in the 
entertai nment industry. 
In Inte rne t, Mic rosoft (MSN) and Yahoo are the leaders in severa! 
countries (table 2.22). In spite of the diffic ult ies of unifying criteria for 
audience tracking on the Inte rnet, the presence of these giant North 
American companies is clear to see in the whole European market. In 
sorne countries, however, the te lephone operators - which are a lso In-
ternet service providers- bought nati onal portals which enjoyed huge 
popularity among end users and compete for the top place in the rank-
ing wi th the gianl international providers. Thc biggest portals on a " na-
lional" scale are re-launched by mean s o f investments made by their 
parent companies, interested in creating value added products . The 
cases of Spain (Telefón ica-Terra), France (France Telecom-Wanadoo), 
Great Brita in (BT-Arrak is), ltaly (Telecom ltalia-Seat Pagine Gialle) 
and Germany (Deutsche Telekom-T-Online) represent examples of na-
tional companies that have raised a sma ll entry barrier to the North 
American multinationals. The new technologies companie in Europe 
have a lso sought partners w ith financia! capac ity to take on the ir larg-
e r North American competitors99 . 
99 Scc Huh~rtus Hoffmann (1996), Ve11111re capitnl: where are Eumpe'.f 11eiv media e11-
1re¡1re11e11rs?. l111ennedia vol. 24. No. 6. 
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Currently, after the stock market crisis of the new techno logies and 
debts run up through heavy investments in the mobile phone market, 
sorne te lecommunications companies find themselves at a c rossroads: 
these companies face the choice o f e ithe r specialis ing a r integrating 
their businesses1oc1• In such innovative and changing sectors, competi-
tors' strategies increasingly require the combination o f imag ination 
and d iscipline 101. 
TABLE 2.22 
Internet Lcadcrs :ind Fo rCi!!n Capil:tl lnvcstmcnt (Sclcc 1cd Countrics) 
Countrv Comp;m v Markct slrnrc {% ) Forci!!n caniwl {% ) - Country 
BE íFll ::>k1nc1 ilkhr.1coml :!I 4'1 Í\.trtou' I 
DE o T·<>nfüw 49.l 
DK lui>11 )(1,-I 
ES Ti.:rr.1 (1lt,<i 11 
FR \\ :tn:idrn1 (.1.l 11 
FI Soncr.1 ~H.3 
GB Y:tluu1 4:!, I 1111 11Y.1h1u11 - L·~ 
IR '\':'t lHu> S5.:! 
IT Sc:u P:\l.!llU.' (,t:\llc: 58.4 o 
NL Jl,c f\º:0-.L n. a. 
NO !--01. n. :l. 
PT l'T h·lcc"'n .> -:; ( \,lrt•HI' ' 
Sourcc: Niclscn 1'c1Ratings y Jupitcr J\IMXI (:tpril 2001) 
The offer o n Inte rnet could be grouped into four general fic lds: infor-
ma tio n; ente rta inme nt; e lectron ic commerce: and commun icatio ns 
services (chat. e-mail, newsgroup, video conferencing). The most re-
cen! surveys reveal that European consumers use Inte rne t as a tool far 
searching far in formation on products and services and no t so much as 
a support far ma king purchases102.The Inte rne t service prov ide rs (ISP) 
usuall y integrate several of the offers me ntioned from the ir own Inter-
net porta l. Accord ing to the mo nth ly reports o f the most respected In-
terne t audience tracking companies, thc hig hest places o n the ranking 
of each country are usually he ld by porta ls offering general informa-
100 Sce Jo'>cp b crn and María babe l Ríos (2002). Facing di.H"1m11ectio11: Hard choice.1· 
for E11mpe :1· te/cos. ··The McKinse y Quanerly"". No. I. 
] O 1 Sec Gabriel Szulansky and Kruti Ami n (200 1 ). Leami11g to 111ake Hmtegy: lui/1111ci11g 
disci11li11e wul i111agi11ati1111 . .. Long Rangc Planning··. No. 34. 537-556. 
102 See t:umpea11 /ntem er s111fer.1· in 1/1eir a11i111des ro 011/ine pril'(l(:y. (X II .2001 ). ··Media 
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tion, services and entertainme nt. Users a lso visit online vers ions of the 
leadi ng conventiona l media when they demand quality general infor-
mation , but they do not ho ld highly relevant places in the ranking of 
Internet consumption. 
From the bus iness point o f view, rhe global entertainment conglome r-
ares such as AOL-Ti me Warner, Vi vendi Uni versal, News Corporarion, 
Walt Di sney or Be rtel smann have a ltcred the ir business approach. lf a 
decade ago these companies usually made films, te levis ion pro-
grammes, music or publications. now they creare brands 103. Business 
uncertain ty is combared w irh a strategy of commercial explo ita tion of 
each link of the value c ha in. The brand of a product generales revenue 
in films, te levis ion, mus ic, publications, merchandi ing, the me parks 
a nd the Internet. Thi s strategic mode l requires dece ntra li sation, team 
work a nd confidence to innovate. Owners' personal aspirations have 
also been crucial in the ac tivities of these giant corporatio ns: persona l 
ri valries. a nd - occasionally- the desire to gain med ia powe r1w . 
The global isation of entertai nment has become more accentuated es-
pecially in businesses re lated to music and film s, which usua lly creare 
a ho mogeneous dcmand in markets w ith diffe re nt cultures'º$. The pro-
life ration of te levis ion platforms in Europe has provided many busi-
ness opportunitics for global companics, wh ic h have expon ed c han-
ne ls such as MTV, Nickelodeon or CNN. The bala nce between be ing 
g lobal and seeming local has prod uced deals be twecn national firms 
and international c ntertainment compan ies. Recently. sorne multina-
tiona l entertainment companies have made a fundame nta l leap w ith 
the ir enrry into markets w ith great potc nti al which unril o nly a few 
years ago were heavily rcstricted by po litics and legis lation '°<'. 
103 Scc "Thc Economist"·. ( 19.Xl.1 998). A brand 11e 11· .\"fmle¡:r. (survcy). 
104 Sce .. Thc Economisl°· ( 19.X 1.1 998). Elbmi· pml"er. (survey). 
105 Scc McChesncy. R .. ( 1999). Ricfl Mnlia. P1111r Democracr, Univer,ity of lllinois 
Pres,. 11 1 inois. · 
106 Scc ·TBI .. (Novcmber/Dcccmbcr 200 1 ). AOL 7ime \\~1mer wr¡:l'l.\ Asia. 
.: 
i 
N 
o 
~ 
" e: 
" 
.., 
ALR>xso 1 M EDIA Co:-;cENTRATI0 :-1 IN 
S ANOIEZ-TABER<,'ERO T llE E UROPEAN M ARKET. 
M IGUEL CARVAJAL NEW TRENOS AND CllAU. l!J\GES 
N 
o 
o 
N 
T he film sector represents the extreme case of the United States' dom-
inance over Europe. The Buenavista, Warner Bros., United Interna-
tional Pictures and Fox Films d istributors ho ld extremely importanl 
pos itions in European box-office takings. Batch distributio n. syndi-
cates between the majors, the huge size of the Hollywood industry and 
the absence of a strong business fabric in Europe present problems for 
the competitiveness of the European fi lm industry. With inadeq uate 
funding, marketing and distribution , European companies have fa iled 
to redress the commerc ial balance with the United States in the audio-
visual sector (table 2.23). 
TABLE2.23 
Film Ois iributjon Lcadcrs and Forci!!n Caoit:il lnvcstmcnt 12000\ 1 Sclcctcd Countrics\ 
Counrrv Comp:my !llnrkct s lrnrc 1% \ Forci!!n caoit:tl l 'lo\- Countrv 
DE l 11' 21.- 11~1 (l' 1 I') - l "S 
ES Bw:o .t\l..,(J 11 .. ~ 11.1(1 llllll' l l.I\ "'ª' - l º:-i 
FR c ;.1umonc Uul'l13\ 1 .. t:i 18.ft 5t ) ( Bu<·n :t\'1 .. ra) l"S 
IR l] lf' 25 llXI (Lil ' ) l'S 
SE l·ox Film'i 27 100 (l·ox) - l .S 
Sourcc: ~uthors' own rcscard1 
§ Over the Jast decade, there has been a drop in the audiences of fi lms 
.., 
produced in Europe, despite the increase in the number of produc tions. 
The single market favours the export of North American fi lms whic h 
ha ve the baclci no of extreme ly e fficient distribution and marketin o sys-
º o 
tems. T he North American star system has not fo und an equi valent in 
the European industry and beyond the ir national borders produc tions 
are rare ly box office hits. T he EU's ' interventio n - with subsidies grant-
ed by the Media Programmes and the Telev ision without Frontie rs Di-
rective- has not proven itself to be particularly cffecti ve up to now. 
Market fragmentation restricts the competiti ve capacity o f the Euro-
pean production sector. Gennany and Great Britain represent 50% o f 
the audiovisual market. With France, lta ly and Spain the fi gure rises to 
86%. Of the rest of the EU countries not one of them reaches 2% of the 
market. For less populated European marke ts it is even more difficult 
to keep a check on the dominance of the North A merican aud iovisua l 
industry. In the las t decades the imbalance has become worse: in the 
sixties, European films in a foreign language took 5 % of box-office re-
TRENOS IN TUE E UROPEA N M AR KET 
turns in the United States. Today the figure is around 0.5 per cent. In 
2000, the total revenue from films in a foreign language in the Unüed 
States only carne to 29 million dollars. E ven though it was ayear when 
there were more new films premiered than ever, there had not been 
such poor revenue figures since 1995. 
Europe continues to be the main destination for the North American 
audiovisual contents : it contributes 57% of the revenues o f the North 
American companies outside their own market107. This percentage 
means that the chief Hollywood producers make their audiovisual 
works increasingly with E uropean consumers in mind. 
In music distribution, Napster's initiati ve on the Internet has caused 
the record companies to re-think a change in the ir traditiona l business 
model. Universal and Sony will place the ir record portfolio at the pub-
lic's disposal in Pressplay, M icrosoft's MSN web page, in Yahoo and 
in MP3.corn. Its rival, MusicNet, a cong lomerate o f the record compa-
nies EMI. BMG, and Warner, will have its dotcom dominion in the al-
liance with RealNetworks. In this sector, in which fi ve companies mo-
nopoli se the world market, techno logica l uncertainty is accentuating 
concentration through all iances. 
The online music market looks promising . Napste r managed to have 
80 million users exchanging up to fifteen thousand milli on musical 
archi ves. But it remains to be seen how the public will react to the 
change fro m free usage to subscripti on charges. 
Jn the European music industry the presence of fore ign capital in the 
leading companies is highly signi ficant. Warner. Sony and Universal 
are the giant distributors and control a good part of the market (table 
2.24). The German company Berte lsmann Music Group (BMG) holds 
first posit ion in its natio nal marke t and an important position in the 
othe r countries. 
107 Europcan Audiovisual Obscrvatory (2000). Sratistical Yearbook: Ci11e111a, Telel'isio11, 
Video and Ne11· Media in E11rope. Strasbourg. 
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TABLE2.24 
Music lndus rrv Lcadcrs and Forci2n Caoiral Jnvcsrmcnt 12000) (Sclccrcd Counrrics ) 
Counrrv Comoanv Markct s harc (% ) Forci!?n caoitnl (º/ o)- Countn· 
DE 11 ~ 1 (; n .. 1. ll 
BE(Fl) l 'nin:r;al 25.<1· 1(111 (\'mnd1 l ' nl\·cr,al) - l·R 
ES L'nl\·cr.;:tl n. :.1. llKl (\ 0 1H·n1h l ' nl\w<al¡ - FR 
FR L'mn.:r,.:tl .15 l!KI (\'J\ c mh l 0 11IH'í' al - l' R 
FI \\ 'arncr .\lu~ic 14 lfl{I (\X':ml<' r) - l 'S 
NL U n1\·rr .. :i.l r llHJ (VJ\ rnd1 L'nl\cr>ail - l·R 
NO '''''''1!.r.tnl 21 HHI (\ 'in·ndi l ' n l\<'"ª 1) - FR 
PT Un1n:r~:tl 2 1.8 lllll (\'i,·rnd1 L0 1\J\ <'í'"ll - l'R 
SE Son\' ,\ lu .. ic 211 ((1(1 (~1>1 1\) - 11' 
GB Um\·c r~:1 l 24 llKI (\'1vcnd1 l '1m c r,.1I) - F lt 
- 1999 fi¡,•urcs. 
Sourcc: authors' own rcscarch 
The comm issioner for the defence of competition for the European 
Union, Mario Monti, has often acted to prevent abuses of a dominant 
position in the sector. The merger attempts of the British EML first 
with Time Warner and then with Bertelsmann, were averted in arder 
not to creare si tuations of excessive dom ination. 
The advertising sector is also characterised by a high degree of con-
centration and by the presence of fore ig n capital in most o í the leading 
companies of each country. Concentration in the advert ising market 
had its beginnings in the sixties and has increased in the last decade. 
The world corporations dominate the market (table 2.25). Buying ad-
ve1tising space in the media inc reasingly requires a strategy of con-
necting agencies from different countries with trnnsnational med ia 
groups. Small companies tend to be absorbed by the larger ones_ so 
that the world scene is dominated by a dozen of rnacro-corporations 
such as Ogi lvi & Matter, Saatchi & Saatchi , Omnicom, McCann or 
Grey Adverti s ing. 
The advert ising marke t's heavy dependence on the economic s ituatio n 
is another factor favouring concentratio n. In moments o f recession 
consumption fa lls and companies are forced to cut back o n advertis ing 
spending10M. Jnternationally d ivers ified companies are better placed to 
108 See ''The Econorni si'· (25 Octoher 2001 J. S11cked i1110 the q 11ick.1·a11d. 
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deal with those economic ups and downs than the smaJI national agen-
cies. 
TABLE 2.25 
Advcnisine lndus trv Lcadcrs and Forcien Capital Invcstmcnt (2000) (Sclcctcd Co untrics) 
Country Comoanv Foreien capital (%) - Countrv 
BE <>&~1 G mun IUO (O~iln ) - L"S 
DE 1111()() wo nmno¡ - es 
DK ( ~ n.T C :om. 1m IGrn) - L'S 
ES ~le Ca11 11 Ericksnn 100 
r:n l l:w:t' ,\c.ln·rii~inc RO (Stock lºX. +i Jl.' Snn.h.:r \ Pum:in) 
F l S«k & Cm· 22 (C;re1·) - l"S 
GI3 Abhott ~lcad \'!Cha' IU(I (BBDO) - L'S 
IR ,\le ( "01111db. () 
IT 1\ rm:lndo Testa o 
NL 11111)< > --:ctlwrbml, 1 tHI (111\D< l) - l 'S 
PT 
.\le Cann Enck!-oO 100 - L"S 
Suurcc: authors' own rcscarch 
The full picture, then, of the concentration of the communications in-
d ustry in Europe is an extremely varied one. Sorne sectors, such as 
newspapers, radio or commercial television are dominated by home-
grown companies. Others, in contrast, have seen the ir capital pass in-
to internatio nal ownership: pay te levision. the film and music indus-
tries, advertising and Internet. The degree of concentrat ion has fallen 
in radio and commerc ia l te lev isio n as a result of the liberalisation of 
the two sectors. However, the leaders usua lly attract high market quo-
tas in music. film and pay te levis ion. The regulatory authorities will 
have to remain vigi lant in arder to prevent abuses of dominant posi-
ti ons in those sectors. 
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3. Strategies 
The main task of the most senior managers in any company líes in de-
termining how their organisation w ill compete in the market: what w ill 
be done to exploit its strong points and the opportunities that arise as 
well as neutralising its weaknesses and threats; if the top managers are 
right in their strategic decisions, companies can obtain a competitive 
advantage sustained over time l09 : they are able to offer something that 
has value for the public and cannot be easily imitated by the ir ri vals. 
Strategy aJways involves establishing priorities, backing sorne objec-
tives at the expense of others. For instance, a regional newspaper can 
start up a policy of local editions, bringing it closer to its reade rs; and 
a radio station or television channel can specialise in pop music, w ith 
the aim of presenting a particularly attractive programming schedule 
for young audie nces. But in any of those situations, other possibilities 
will have to be precluded: perhaps in the first case it may not be pos-
sible to designate much in resources to international news, and an old-
er audience may not be interested in pop mus ic radio stations. 
Strategy is not about reaching a fixed point, a point of arrival: each 
company's strategic plan should be mod ified at the same pace as the 
changes that take place in externa) circumstances (the market) and the 
interna) ones (available resources, staffing, company prestige, etc.) 
Strategy, then , is rather a moveable point located on the horizon, pro-
viding light so that companies' bas ic decisions are cohere nt and are not 
taken solely on the consideration of immed iate needs. As sorne writers 
have pointed out11 0 that focal point on the horizon changes place with 
increasing speed because markets are becoming more and more dy-
namic. 
109 See Michael Poner ( 1985), Co111pe1i1ive Strme¡¡y, The Free Press. New York. 
1 IO Sec e.g. Gary Hamel (2000), Leadi11¡¡ the Revo/111im1, Harvard Business Press, 
Boston. 
There does not exist an "ideal" strategy, which adapts itself to any or-
ganisation: the decision on how to compete is taken after the interna! 
and externa! analysis; and no company ever finds itself in an identical 
situation to another one which means that we can conclude that it is on-
ly by chance that strategies limited to imitating one of the rivals, per-
haps the market leader, are successful. 
The first strategic decision refers to the size: managers ask themselves 
if their company should a) grow, b) stay as it is or c) cut back. After 
deciding on one of those options, they will have to decide when and 
how they can put their plans into practice. 
But those possibilities only exist on a theoretical level; in practice, no 
company can reject the chance to grow. Indeed, maintenance and cut-
ting back strategies are almost always considered as provisional: 
sometimes companies understand they cannot grow until they solve 
certain interna! problems (normally economic, financia! or labour mat-
ters) and they give more time to the reorganisation of their structure, 
staff, financia} resources and material assets. 
Any choice different to growth is really a way to recognize that, at least 
for the time being, te company is not able to increase its size; this is 
confirmed by how companies fare on the stock exchange: investors 
chiefly reward profitability and forecasts of growth, so that companies 
with substantial profits may be penalised by investors if their growth 
rate falls. 
The pressure of value markets and other economic, political and psy-
chological factors on managers are the reasons why there is a general 
obsession with increasing company size111 ; however, -as we shall 
analyse in the first section of this chapter- growth poses many prob-
lems. 
111 A critica) vision of this tendency in the communications industry can be seen in Dean 
Alger ( 1998), Megamedia: How Giant Corporations Dominare Mass Media, Distort 
Competitim1 and Endanger Democracy, Lanham, Littlefield Publishers. 
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3.1. The Risks of Growth 
When companies grow there is a greater risk o f them becoming less 
specialised and, as a result, less effic ient in their acti vity; mo reover, 
corporate culture can suffer as a consequence of the di ffic ulties of in-
terna! communication which tends to have an adverse effect o n staff 
moti vation; increase in size usually brings in its wake self-suffic iency, 
less experimentation and the ímpetus far innovation is lost. 
Also, sorne executives are well able to manage s mall companies but 
are not so good at directing large corporatio ns: the same type o f ski lis 
are not required far motivating a small team o f write rs o n a local radio 
station as far organising 85.000 employees fro m AOL-Warner a nd ex-
plaining to them the advantages o f the merger of the two companies. 
In those cases when media groups grow and managers keep their posts 
the characte ristic situation of the "Principie of Pete r" can occur, ac-
cording to which employees tend to rise in the ir companies until they 
reach their level o f incompetence. 
Large sized companies usually become bureaucratic o rganisatio ns 
with high costs in coordination between departments and a re slower 
o ff the mark to respond to changes in the prevai ling c limate. C hris-
tensen. in his widely read book 112, argues that the giant firms a re expert 
in serving their c lients but that same orientation limits their capac ity to 
take advantage of the possibilities o ffered by the new techno logies. 
Even more critica! of the gigantic size o f firms is Pe ter Chernin , in 
charge of Lhe Fax te levision and fi lm e mpire far News Corpo ration: 
" In the management o f creativ ity, size is your ene my" 113: o ne person 
managing 20 mov ies is never going to be as involved as o ne do ing fi ve 
movies. This leads to the tendency to break down large bus inesses in-
to small independent units or to initiate "cannibali zatio n" strategies. 
112 Clayton Chris1cnscn ( 1997), The /111wvaror '.!· Dile111111a. Whe11 Ne11• Trch11ol0Jiies 
Cause Great Firms ro Fail, Harvard Business School Press. Boslon. 
113 Cit. in Fearofthe U11k11mv11 (4. XII . 1999). 'Thc Economist'", 73 . 
one of the most striking examples of this is Jack Welch's Internet ini-
tiative at General Electric called "Destroyyourbusiness.com". 
Most concentration operations pose problems of a financia! nature: 
takeovers usually involve an increase in debt, because they have either 
been financed by bank loans or because the acquired firm has substan-
tial debts. Many of the worldwide takeovers on a large scale in the last 
few years have produced giant sized companies but they have also 
been burdened with huge debt commitments. One way of neutralising 
that problem is to sell off part of the assets acquired as Vivendi did 
with Universal's division of alcoholic beverages 114• 
Many multimedia groups have not been able to generate meaningful 
synergies. On paper -that is, in assessments prior to the decision to 
take over a company or Jaunch a new medium in the market- the inte-
gration of severa) communications media in one group offers advan-
tages; advertising exchanges, joint use of news sources and other re-
sources, sales and purchases en bloc, etc. However, those plans are not 
always put into practice, among other reasons, because any type of co-
ordination requires managers from each business unit to be capable of 
accepting different points of view and to play a less prominent role; 
and. if egomania is an illness quite commonly found amongst execu-
tives, in the media world it seems to have reached epidemic propor-
tions. 
Another classic difficulty of growth strategies stems from the extent of 
the geographical area where companies are present: frequently, one of 
their most valuable assets has been an excellent knowledge of their 
market, and after penetrating other territories they have discovered 
-with a higher or lower cost to their income accounts- the negative ef-
fects of being unaware of the new rules of the game. This was the case, 
for instance, for most of the companies that acquired communications 
media in Central and Eastem Europe in the nineties. 
114 See Risks abound in Vivendi's convergence strategy (3.VII.2000), in .. Variety Deal 
Memo''. 8. 
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A similar phenomenon occurs when groups specialised in the manage-
ment of one type of communications media become owners of anoth-
er sort of product. After the liberali sation of the European audiovisual 
sector, a good number of companies awning print media have, w ith 
reasonable success, ventured into the te levision industry 115• In contrast, 
this has not been the case of the traditional communications compa-
nies' initial experience in Internet 116; indeed, many takeovers in that 
sector have been the result of the wish to incorporate new know-how 
- rather than new brands or new material assets- as far as Lhe e labora-
Lion and distribution of on-line contents are concerned . 
The growlh of companies means that managers become unfoc used, 
finding themselves forced to give their time and atte ntion to many ac-
tivities; thus they are less able to take on specific problems, put for-
ward ideas and motivate employees. 
Rupert Murdoch's career may illustrate this problem. The sto ry of his 
communications group began with a newspaper inherited from his fa-
ther, the "Adelaide News". The owners of the top newspaper in Ade-
laide threatened in writing to drive 22 year o ld Rupert and his mother 
out of business unless they sold out at a bargai n price. 
Forty fi ve years later Murdoch explained his reaction: "I publi shed our 
opponent's offer on the front page under a headline that screamed, Bid 
for Press Monopoly! And 1 included in the story a photograph of the 
confident ial letter to my mother. That ruined any chance l might ever 
have had of being invited into the better clubs of Adelaide" 11 7. But he 
won the ensuing newspaper war and later gobbled up his rival. 
115 This el\plains Lhat between 1990 and 2000 1000 new cable and sate llite te levision 
channe ls have been Jaunched in Europe. See "Screen Digest" (111.200 1 ). Over 100 
New E11ropea11 Clra1111els Eac/1 Year. 85-86. 
116 An analysis of the causes of the failures of investme nts in Internet can be found in 
Michael E. Pon er (111.200 1), Strategy and tire Internet, " Harvard Business Review". 
63-78. 
117 Cit. in Marc Gunter (26.X. 1998), Tire Rules according to R11pe rt , in "Fortu ne", 92-97. 
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In contrast, Murdocb failed in bis repeated attempts to become one of 
the leading players in the television market in several European coun-
tries, sucb as ltaly, Germany or Spain. In every one of those cases, the 
investments carried out in the nineties were not followed up by an im-
portant personal presence of the President of News Corporation, given 
tbat in tbat period bis priorities were aimed at consolidating the posi-
tion of Sky in Great Britain, Fax in America and gaining ground in the 
Asian television market. 
Tbe difficulties pointed out explain bow the evolution of many com-
panies can be mapped out as follows: in a first pbase, the ímpetus of 
the promoters and the boldness of all of the members of staff allow 
them to "enter" the market and to cballenge, to a certain extent, bigger 
rivals; later, tbe company gains competitive production instruments 
and distribution systems, enabling it to reinforce its position in the 
market and improve its profitability; tbis is followed by a period of ex-
pansion into new markets or by tbe greater variety in offer in its own 
market; at tbis point, the problems previously mentioned wbicb are 
cbaracteristic of large corporations can emerge: growth crises. For 
sorne companies, tbat signals tbeir end; in contrast, others manage to 
recover -wbicb means tbey are forced to review their structure and 
strategy- and tbey continue to progress until a new crisis arises 118• 
As organisations grow tbey take on new cballenges and carry out tasks 
wbich require tbe ability to adapt and leam quickly. All cbange -par-
ticularly if it affects size- involves risk; but, despite this, most compa-
nies decide tbat tbeir best strategy -and often the only decision possi-
ble- lies in increasing their size. 
118 A systematic analysis of these processes can be found in Larry E. Greiner and Virginia 
E. Schein ( 1989), Power and organization developme11t: mobilizi11g power to imple-
ment change, Addison-Wesley, Reading (MA). 
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3.2. Advantages of Growth Strategies 
Companies attempt to grow because they cons ider that they w ill be 
able to neutraJise the d isadvantages of increasing the ir size 119 and they 
believe that stagnation is even worse, proving unsatisfacto ry to in-
vestors and employees: the former, because lac k of growth would im-
ply a drop in the value of the ir shares, a nd the Jatter, because their 
chances of getting on and developing professio nally w ithin the firm 
would be extremely limited. 
The relalionship between business growth and personne l policies is, in 
a certain way, paradoxical: as we previo us ly poi nted out, the success 
of creative businesses does not depend so much on the size o f the or-
ganisations as on the ability to build excelle nt teams; but people w ith 
talent -who make up those teams- want to work in innovative compa-
nies which, because of their cultu re of meeting new cha llenges, tend to 
grow more quickly than their rivals. 
Moreover, in sorne communications sectors, creati vity in the e labora-
tion of contents requires a strong comple me nt of d istribution and , in 
this latter aspect, size provides fundamental advantages. Thc record in-
dustry is a good example of thi s situation: the fi ve g iant companies in 
the sector: Universal, Sony, EMI, Warner and BMG-each o ne of the m 
with an extraordinary distribution network, monopoli ses 77.4% of the 
world market. The rest of the companies, w ithout a competiti ve distri-
bution network, between them divide up the remaining 22.6% of the 
market12o_ 
Other reasons exist far why communications companics have carried 
out growth strategies: a) to combat the concentration o f the adverti sing 
Í 119 "'T hc last few years have seen more and more large finrn. tryi ng to imilale the llex i-
bil ity of their smaller ri vals. Some havc cont ractcd out ali but thcir corc businesses. 
Othcrs (. .. ) have organised lhemselves into semi auionumous 1cams ami then 1reated 
those 1cams as business unils". Doe.1· si:e 11w11Pr ?. "The Economisl'" ( l l .VJ. 199-1). 68. 
120 See Mu~ic Business lndustry (2000). World Report. 
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industry; b) to make the most of the advantages inherent in scale 
economies and synergies; e) to diversify business risk; d) to seek "op-
portunities" in particularly attractive markets and businesses; e) to 
keep up their market share and privileged relationships wiµi suppliers 
and distributors; f) other causes which are more psychological and 
emotional than economic in nature. We will now proceed to analyse 
each one of those causes. 
The changes undergone by the advertising industry at the close of the 
twentieth century are one of the main reasons for the growth of the 
communications firms. Increase in investment, distribution of a more 
varied range of supports and the concentration of purchase orders of 
advertising slots and times places small media businesses in a weak 
position, because they lack negotiating strength with the giant adver-
tising intermediaries (agencies and media buying services)121 • 
The traditional relationship between advertisers and media was estab-
lished in conditions of a certain balance. The only intermediaries -the 
advertising agencies- confined themselves to devising the campaigns, 
negotiating the media plan and retained a fixed rate commission of 
15% of the advertiser's budget investment, but they did not take part 
in decision making on tariffs and discount policies. That contracting 
system has been replaced by a more complex, and frequently less 
transparent relationship. 
Hardly any of the main advertising groups has escaped the wave of 
mergers and takeovers that have been typical in this industrial sector, 
as shown by the commercial names of many important agencies and 
buying services, whose acronyms are often the initials of acquired or 
merged companies. The increase in size has been due both to the aim 
of achieving bigger discounts from the media as well as the necessity 
to meet the needs of the multinational corporations which tend to com-
121 "Already. 20 companies control three-quarters of worldwide advertising revenue. In 
America, eight companies control 97% of television advertising revenue". Star tunz. 
"The Economist" ( 11.111.2000). 79. 
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mission agencies and media buying services present in the most de-
veloped countries to take charge of the ir worldwide adverti si ng cam-
paigns. 
Faced with the increased negotiating strength of the intermediaries. the 
media most dependent on advertis ing have been forced to g roup to-
gether and to operate in a more coordinated way. The most effective 
response has been to carry out concentration processes similar to those 
carried out in the advertising sector. 
Other companies that -far diverse reasons- were not able to increase 
their size have sought other ways to miti gate the advertis ing interme-
diaries' position of dominance. Far instance, sorne regional French 
newspapers have set themselves up as advertising sales services; in 
that way, they can negotiate with national advertisers and media serv-
ices from a less vulnerable position. 
The search far size, credibility and scale economies is another deter-
mining factor in the growth strategies of communications businesses. 
As they increase in size these companies gai n sorne advantages unre-
lated to the commercial activity carried out: firstly, they are more ab le 
to exert influence on the political system; they can, far instance, con-
dition decisions relating to the labour framework, tax rates or legisla-
tion on free competition 122 . But, above a li , they exert their lobbying 
function on aspects d irectly Iinked to the communications industry: 
awarding licences to radio stations and te levision channels, concess ion 
of direct or indirect aid to print med ia, regulation of med ia conte nt, ad-
vertising, etc. 
In latter years, many regional companies have sought to have a greater 
presence in the capital city of their national market wi th the aim of be-
coming part of the small group o f commun ications companies that act 
as regul ar negotiators with the governments of the ir respective coun-
tries. This situation al so occurs in smaller geographical areas with re-
122 See M.E. Becsley (cd.) ( 1996). Markets (111{/ tlie Media. Competitirm. Reg11/a1iu11 (11/(/ 
tlie /111eres1s of Crms11111ers. lnstilute of Economic Affairs. London. 
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gional governments and larger markets such as Europe with the giant 
corporations which influence political and economic decisions of the 
Commission of the European U nion. 
Another advantage in size lies in the ability to establish alliances and 
joint ventures with privileged partners. Many cooperation agreements 
between companies of two or more countries correspond to the fol-
lowing model: a company provides their know-how of the business 
( contents, marketing plan, type of relationship which is established be-
tween suppliers and distributors, etc.); the other company contributes 
its knowledge of the market and its power to influence the govemment 
of that country, if the commercial activity to be carried out requires pri-
or authorisation or administrative concessions. 
This strategy was followed, for instance, by Canal + and its intema-
tional expansion into pay television, Fininvest and Kirch in open com-
mercial television, Pearson in economic and financia! news, Bertels-
mann and Hachette in books and magazine publishing and RTL in the 
radio industry. In each country, those companies usually partner up 
with the leading communications group in their respective market, 
benefiting from the brand name, the know-how and the financia! ca-
paci ty of the previously mentioned multinational corporations. 
Company growth also provides advantages particular to scale 
economies 123• The increase in units sold brings down the unitary cost 
of the products because the fixed costs are distributed between a 
greater volume of units produced. In this way, in businesses with very 
high fixed costs -such as in the daily press, in the management of ca-
ble and satellite television systems and audiovisual production- the big 
companies tend to monopolise a growing part of the market. 
Also, the growth of companies has made the possibility of generating 
synergies greater; these are achieved when the company's structure 
123 See Alan Albarran and John Dimmick ( 1996), Co11ce11tratio11 and eco11omies of Mul-
tiformity in tire Commu11icatio11s Industries, "Joumal of Media Economics" 9 (4). 
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acts as a multiplier effect on the efficiency of its assets: in several de-
partments -far instance, contents production, distribution, technology 
or marketing- different media of one company join forces to get the 
rnost out of their resources. 
In the area of contents, newspapers make savings by sorne sections be-
ing prepared by centralised edi torial units. They can thus have a 
greater number of foreign correspondents, offer the ir readers column 
writers of prestige and own a great varie ty of news sources which 
would be irnpossible if they had to face the costs alone 124 • 
Something similar occurs in the radio and te levision broadcasting in-
dustries: radio and television join together to share the production 
costs of news and fict ion programmes, although in sorne countries leg-
islation does not permit simultaneous broadcasting of those contents in 
severa! geographical areas 125 • 
In contrast, communications companies located in very small markets 
-with little abi lity to generate scale economies and synergies- are at a 
disadvanrage in competing with the giant communications groups. In 
the European audiovisual sector, American companies have obtained a 
dorninant pos ition: far instance, in most European countries the screen 
share oí national films is between 10% and 30% whi lst American pro-
ductions reach figures of between 60% and 85% of the tota l sa les 126. 
In the print media industry, the latter years have seen a g reater pres-
ence of French publishers in Belgium ancl German companies in A us-
tria and Switzerland. Medium-sized and small companies have reacted 
in different ways to combat the competiti ve advantages of corporations 
124 See Nicholas Coleridgc ( 1993). Poper 7i¡;:ers. The /mes/. grea1es111ewspaper l.'·coom . 
Caro! Publishing. New York. Also see Roben G. Picard et al. ( 1988). Pre.u Co11ce11-
1rmirm ami Mo11opoly: New Perspectil'es 011 Newspopers 01n1ership w1d Opero1io11. 
Ablcx. Norwood (NJ). 
125 Sce Col in Hoskins. Stuarl M cFayden and Adam Finn ( J 997). Global Telel'i.1·io11 r111d 
Fi/111: /\11 /111md11c1io11101/ie Eco11rm1ics 0/1/ie Business. Oxford Univcrsily Press. Ox-
ford. 
126 "Scrccn Digcs1" (V J .2000). US do111i11mes fra¡;:111ell/ed Euro ji/111 111arke1. 188- 190. 
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with greater resources: in Austria and Ireland, governments have 
favoured the consolidation of two large groups -Mediaprint and Inde-
pendent Newspapers- which dominate their respective markets; in 
Switzerland there have been mergers of prestigious nrunes such as 
"Journal de Geneve" and the "Gazette de Lausanne" or the "Luzerner 
Tagblatt" and the "Vaterland"; as far as Scandinavian countries are 
concerned, they have continued with their traditional subsidy system, 
initiated in the late nineteen sixties, aimed at curbing the disappearance 
of titles. 
Those measures have only partly mitigated the disadvantages of com-
panies in small markets; the best solution has been put into practice by 
highly specialised companies -such as the Dutch Elsevier in the area 
of scientific news-, which have been able to penetrate other countries 
and have thus become competitive. 
Company growth is also the result of the aim of diversifying risks. 
Corporations owning media of the srune kind (for instance, television 
channels, production companies, or magazines, etc.) located in the 
same geographical zone accumulate a high business risk; at the oppo-
site extreme are the companies present in highly varied markets, 
grouping together print and audiovisual media, and whose business 
units depend, to a differing degree, on advertising revenue. 
Up until the nineties, a regional economic crisis, the rise in the price of 
newsprint in the international markets, a change in the legal frrunework 
of the audiovisual sector or inflation in the prices of television pro-
grammes could cause the main groups in each country to founder. 
However, the largest communications companies in the world increas-
ingly obtain an ever smaller percentage of their revenue in their home 
market whilst, at the same time, tending to amass media of a widely 
di verse nature. 
In this way, the giant intemational corporations have erected powerful 
protective barriers against any possible crisis: only if there were reces-
sions at the same time in many countries or if there were a worldwide 
drop in the demand for news and entertainment could there be any risk 
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for the survival of the well managed highly diversified, g iant cornrnu-
nications companies 127 • 
Frequently, the management of those cornpan ies decide to penetrate 
new markets and take part in new businesses no t so much to diversi-
fy their assets as to benefit from investment "opportunities". The ide-
al situation for a company to successfully introduce itself into a new 
country fo llows thi s model: a) it possesses the know-how that other 
companies are unable to irni tate; b) there is political and econornic sta-
bility and a high level of consumption in the country; and c) by rneans 
of joint ventures with local partners its lack of knowledge of the new 
market does not prove to be an insuperable obstacle. 
This type of s ituation does not usua lly arise because in the most at-
tractive markets -developed and with legal frameworks protecting free 
enterprise- there is a strong level of competition and, the refore , many 
cornpanies try to innovate and incorporate technology, conte nts pro-
duction and d istribution systems and marketing plans that have been 
successful in other countries. 
The only exception to that phenornenon occurs in " maturing'" markets 
which are still not attractive enough - lack of econo mic development 
or political stabili ty- , but can overcome this s ituation in a short space 
of time. Those cases bring together two crucial aspects for fore ign in-
vestors: vul nerable local companies a nd good prospects for profit in 
the short or mid term. 
127 The multimedia strategy is more effcct ive for diver~ i fyi ng r isk than for increasing 
prufits; such is suggested by Doy le in his anal y~is of the Brit i~h market: "'The sug-
ge~uon_ that common ownership of television and newspapers creates specific cos1-e f-
fic1enc1es or other tangible economic benefi1s is comprehensi vcly challengcd by the 
fintlings of this study". Gi llian Doylc (2000). Tite Ecr1110111ics of Mn110111edia a11d 
Cross Media Expa11sir111: A S111dy of tite Case Fa 11011ri11g Dereg11/atio11 of TV ami 
Nell'spaper 0 11'11er.1·ltip i11 tite U. K. , Journal of Cultural Economics (24). 23. 
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This is the case, for instance, with the recent wave of investments of 
Spanish communications companies in Latin America128; from the ear-
ly nineties an analogous phenomenon has taken place with sorne Ger-
man, British and French companies which have increased their pres-
ence in the Central and Eastern European markets. 
A different option -taken, for instance, by Bertelsmann, News Corpo-
ration and Vivendi- lies in choosing a market with greater entry barri-
ers -the United States- but which is crucial for reaching global di-
mensions. In contrast, European companies -for legal, cultural and lin-
guistic reasons- have scarcely invested in Japan, which is the second 
communications market in the world. 
Growth strategies also serve to neutralise the strength of rival compa-
nies The increase in sales and assets of other companies present in the 
same market brings with it the deterioration in the position of the or-
ganisations that have stayed at a standstill. Market leadership provides 
extremely valuable competitive advantages: it favours the company's 
prestige and its commercial brands; it enables it to maintain privileged 
relationships -for instance, exclusivity contracts- with suppliers and 
distributors: it confers a predominant role for establishing prices and 
other "rules of the game" of the market; and, as has been pointed out, 
it facilitates the establishment of pacts with prestigious corporations 
from other geographical areas 129• 
In the communications industry, newspaper companies figured as per-
haps the first examples of those defensive strategies: in order to main-
tain their predominant position in the offer of current news and adver-
tising information in their respective markets, they offered free publi-
128 A detailed analysis of this tendency can be found in Mercedes Medina (Vl.2001), Al-
gmws clal'es de la expansión de los grupos de comunicación espaiioles en Lati-
11oamérica, "Comunicación y Sociedad", Vol. XIV, 71-99. 
129 "There is generally a strong and positive correlation between the market share and the 
operating profitability of firms involved in either television or radio broadcasting or 
newspaper publishing". Gillian Doyle, ibid.,1. 
E ¡: 
.. 
.8 
!i 
z 
-
N g 
N 
Q 
i:: 
::3 
.., 
ALfoNSO 1 M EDIA COl\CENTRATION IN 
SÁNCHEZ·TAllERSERO TllE EUROPEAN MARKET. 
MIGUEL CARVAJAL NEW T RENOS ANO Ci JALLENGES 
~ 
~ 
~ ] 
-¿ 
llm 
N 
o 
o 
N 
" e: 
" 
.., 
cations; later, -when the legal framework permitted it- they acqu ired 
shares in other media providing similar contents aimed at the same au-
dience: radio stations, television channels, on line news ser v ices, etc. 
Similarly, television channels attempted to hold on to their abili ty to 
win most of the publ ic's leisure t ime by their penetration into the in-
teractive contents industry. In most industri ali sed countries the average 
television view ing time per person is between three ancl four hours: 
but, at the end of the nineties, the develo pment of Internet posed a 
threat to television channels, especially in attracting the free time of 
young people. At that time, the main television compan ies began to 
make cleals with companies spec iali sed in the elaboratio n of content 
for on line med ia and large corporations manufacturing software wi th 
the aim of holding on to thei r lead as suppliers of cntertainment to 
households13º . 
A lso, many telephone companies -and, to a lesser exLen t, water, gas 
and electric companies - have diversified into the contents industry 
and have become cable television operators in arder to maintain their 
predominant pos itions as suppliers of basic serv ices in the home . 
These corporat ions have enormo us fin ancia) resources al their dispos-
al. with the result that in some markets in very few years they havc 
gone from a position of not awning any communications med ium to 
becoming one o f the leaders in the sector. 
In practice, Lhe communications companics grow becausc their man-
agement seek Lo simulLaneously obtain several of the aclvantages sig-
nalled. For this reason, thc mergers, takeovers, joint vcntures and 
launching of new media are usually owing to "offensivc" and '·defen-
sive" reasons at Lhc same Lime; Lhey attempt both Lo maintai n the mar-
ket share as well as Laking advantage of invcsLment opportuniti cs : and. 
o flen, they are also the result o f the w ish to becomc biggcr and the 
need to diversify business ri sk. 
130 See Jan Thompson ( 1999). Co11verge11ce in Te/evisio11 wu/ the /11ternet (2ncl ecli1 ion ). 
Informa Media. Lonclon. 
STRATEGIES 
There are al so non economic reasons behind companies' growth strate-
gies: frequently, owners and executives have acted out of personal rea-
sons: attracted by a new professional challenge or out of a desire for 
greater professional prestige or power through increasing company 
size 131 • The risk inherent in these motivations is that the executives' in-
terest or preferences may not coincide with the best decisions for the 
companies and their shareholders. 
3.3. Vertical and Horizontal Integration 
After analysing the advantages and disadvantages of the growth of 
communications groups, we will study the ways of putting those cor-
porate strategies into practice: by means of processes of integration 
(vertical and horizontal) and diversification (geographical and multi-
media). 
Vertical integration assumes that a corporation controls the production 
and commercialisation process of a business, either in order to avoid 
dependence on suppliers and distributors or with the aim of increasing 
profits. The first of these two objectives is necessarily attained when 
the level of vertical integration is raised: if a company produces or 
manufactures the raw materials, transforms, packages, sells and dis-
tributes them no intermediary can impair the quality of the products or 
services made available to the public. 
But, in practice, organisations are unable to reach complete vertical in-
tegration because they do not have at their disposal the experience, 
know-how and financial capacity to be able to take part in each phase 
of production and commercialisation of their business: in one way or 
another, they always depend on other firms. 
The other priority aim of vertical integration -raise company's prof-
131 A detailed analysis of this phenomenon can be found in Jeremy Tunstall and Michael 
Palmer ( 1991 ), Media Moguls, Routledge, London. 
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itability- is based on a logical premise: the same compan y could retain 
for itself the total sum o f the profit marg in earned by a ll of the inter-
mediaries present a t the diffe rent stages of the produc tion a nd com-
mercialisation process. 
However, that argument does no t take into cons idera tion a key prob-
lem: vertical integration impli es loss of spec ialisation 132. it means a 
growth in fixed costs and leads to g reater organi sationa l compl ex ity in 
companies: the most well known supporte rs of the .. recngineering" 
processes used the weight of those negati ve racto rs to pro mote the sub-
contracting of services a nd tasks in the nine ti es 133 • 
The most advisable degree of verti ca l integration far each o rganisation 
depends, above all , on the interest for com pani es in controlling one 
part or ali of the production and commerc ial isati on process. 1 n the pri nt 
media industry, that control brings very limitccl advantages: companies 
do not become st:rong in their ma rkets by aw ning the raw mate rial o r 
efficient printing presses, or by possess ing exclus ive news sources or 
by awning the best distribution channels . 
In many markets, publ ishers do not compete in distribution (because 
they share the same channels) o r in raw materia ls (they are acqu ired 
from the same manufacture rs): their competiti ve strategy - the ir ability 
to achieve sustainable advantages- is concentrated in the e laboration 
of news products. In those cases, vertica l integrati on prescnts mo re 
proble ms than advantages . 
Sorne governments cncourage vertical di sintegration o f thc print me-
dia: for instance, in the Scandinavian countries, whe rc c iti zens indi-
reclly fund the press through a subs idy systc m, legisla tion c ncourages 
newspapers to share works pre mises so as to prevent hig h printing and 
circulation costs which could be a cause for publ ic complaint. 
'1 132 See C. C. Markides and P. J . Williamson ( 1994). Relmed dit'ersification. core ca111pe-
te11ce.~ a11d corporate perfor111a11ce, "Strategic M¡¡nagcmcnt Journal" 15. 1-19- 165. 
133 See '."'ichel Hammcr and James Champy ( 1997). Ree11g i11eeri11g tlie rnrpora1io11: a 
ma11ifesto Jor b11si11ess re110/111io11. Nicholas Braley. London. 
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In contrast, sorne of the large publishers from other European countries 
still maintain a high Ievel of vertical integration: Bertelsmann owns 
print works, publishes books, newspapers and magazines and distrib-
utes its publications through "book clubs" in Germany and other mar-
kets; Hachette publishes and prints newspapers and magazines and is 
the main shareholder of the "Nouvelles Messageries de la Presse 
Parisienne", which distribute most of the Parisian newspapers; Rizzoli 
and Mondadori have followed similar strategies in ltaly, as have Inde-
pendent Newspapers in Ireland or Mediaprint in Austria. 
In any case, the print media usually reach a moderate or limited verti-
cal integration and, for the reasons pinpointed, that level of integration 
is on the decrease 134• The appearance of new print media and advertis-
ing outlets and the fall in newspaper readership in many countries may 
favour the processes of vertical disintegration. 
However, in the audiovisual industry a rising level of integration can 
be detected: unlike the case of the print media, in this sector it is of ut-
most importance to ensure the supply of key products and the control 
of distribution, to such an extent that -as Grover and Lowry point out- a 
company's survival can depend on those factors 135• 
In Europe, Latin America and Japan the television channels have dom-
inated the audiovisual industry; therefore, those companies have led 
the processes of vertical integration. In contrast, in the United States 
channels have, to a large extent, handed over their leading role to the 
giant production companies. 
134 See Robert G. Picard ( 1997 ), The Newspaper Pub/islii11g Industry, Allyn & Bacon, 
Boston. 
135 Ronald Grover and Tom Lowry (30.VII.2001 ), For Media Giants, How Big is Big 
Enough?~ "Business Week'', 32. Also see William McCavitt and Peter Pringle (1996), 
Electronic Media Managemellt. Focal Press, Boston. 
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In the audiovisual industry, vertical integration can a rtic ula te itself in 
two ways136: a) "Up-s tream": di stributors of fi lms a nd owners of 
broadcasting rights acquire te levision channe ls, a nd radio slatio ns and 
te levisio n companies break into the prod uc tio n seclor. B ) "Oown-
stream" : producers acquire or start off new te lev is ion c hann els. and the 
latter acquire shares in companies which a re cable and sate llite opera-
tors. 
The most complete vertical integra tio n impli es Lhat a company is p res-
ent along the whole cha in, from the produclion of Lhe inslrume nts (te l-
evision sets, trans istors, aeria ls, e tc.), Lo the sale of advertis ing broad-
cast by lhe channels. T he control of sorne stages of Lh at process pro-
vides companies with few advanlages; far inslance, rhe ma nufac luring 
of appliances and technical infraslruc ture bus iness; in contrast. the 
channels which control Lhe produc tion of successful programmes and 
occupy a predomina nl positio n in di slri bu li o n - lerreslria l. cab le or 
sate llite- will very probably gain a hi gh marke l sha rc, w hil st a t the 
same time eslablishing an impassable enlry barrie r far thc ir riva ls. 
In Europe, fro m the birlh o f te levis io n. stale corporati o ns have 
achieved a hi gh degree of vertical inlegrat io n. With deregul ati o n in Lhe 
e ighties and nine ties privale compani es have fo ll owed tha t mode l. 
Some owners of channels w ith access to te rrestri a l broadcasting ne t-
works (Fininvest in Italy, TF J and Canal + in France) a nd companies 
with broadcasting rights of the most popu lar programmes (Bew-Tau-
rus in Germany until 2002) have achieved privilcged posi tions in the ir 
respecti ve marke ts. In othe r c ases, such as Grcat Brita in. Ho lland or 
the Scandin avian countries, anti -concentrati o n rcgulati o n has restri ct-
ed vertica l inlcgrati on, so pre ve ntin g companics reac hing do minant 
pos itions. 
l 136 Tiniothy Todre~s ( 1999). Value Crea1in11 a!lll Brn11di11g i11 Telel'i.1io11 \· IJiKilal llgt' . 
Quorum Books. Wcstporr . 100-104. Abo see Thc Et:onomis t ( 19. Vlll.2000 ). One 
lwuse, man y 11•i1u/011•s. 68-70. 
The evolution of the degree of integration between producers and 
broadcasters depends, to a great extent, on legislation: sorne govem-
ments determine that channels must acquire a percentage of their 
broadcasting time from independent producers and have set up mech-
anisms to encourage the vertical disintegration of state corporations. 
Horizontal integration implies the decision to manage a certain type of 
business, situated at a specific stage of the commercial process 137; in a 
certain way, its advantages and disadvantages are opposite to those of 
vertical integration, because it promotes specialisation and permits the 
generation of synergies and scale economies, but does not give simul-
taneous control of supply and distribution. 
Communications companies integrated horizontally own the same type 
of media in one or several markets: radio stations, or "real time" in-
formation services, or free publications, etc. With these growth strate-
gies, corporations attempt to introduce a product which has been effi-
ciently managed in its territory of origin into new markets. 
Sorne factors favour the success of the processes of horizontal integra-
tion: 
a) Executives are experienced in the management of the business 
they are to initiate: the new tasks do not require specific addition-
al training and they do not distract them from their usual activity. 
b) The problems of getting to know and penetrating a new market can 
be solved through joint ventures with local partners. 
c) If the communications medium to be incorporated into the group 
is not located in a remole market, it can benefit from the commer-
cial relations that the corporation has established with suppliers 
and advertisers. 
137 P. Very ( 1993 ). Success in dfrersijication: building 011 core compete11ce. "Long Rangc 
Planning" 26, 80-92. 
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d) The increase in size and spec ialisati on generates sav ings in the 
purchase of raw material (newsprint) and e la borated produc ts (pro-
grammes, news services, etc_) 
e) With the incorporatio n of a new communicati ons medium, the 
group can establish an organisatio na l and accounting system 
whi ch contri bu tes to the development of this new medium: for ex-
ample, it faci litates access to the general services of the company 
(data banks, reporting services, consultancy s tudy reports, special-
is t advice in design, programming or marke ting, e tc_) at very low 
prices. 
The c lassic strategies of tiori zonta l integrati on occur above a li in the 
print med ia sector138: as has been pointed o ut, televis ion companies 
have preferred to have s imultaneous control over pro duc tion and 
broadcasting of audiovisual contents; in contrast, publishers have 
placed more emphasis on amassing titles : they have put less effort in-
to controll ing the printing and dis tribution stages. 
In most cases, horizontal integration is usually accompanied by other 
growth mode ls: companies acqu ire more media o f the same kind and 
penetrate othe r countries whilst di versify ing the ir activity towards new 
businesses and acquiring shares in companies that supply and d istrib-
ute the ir products. 
By means of those investment polic ies " in ali d irec tions", communi-
cations g roups are made up of extremely complex struc tures whi ch at-
lempt to integrate the ad vantages of each one of the growth mode ls_ 
3.4. Multimedia and International Diversification 
Up until the e ighties and nine ties, prívate corporations auained a mod-
e rate degree of "multimedia" diversification: the ir activ ity was con-
1 138 Scc Francisco Ig lesias (2001 ). Marketi11g period!'.1-tirn. Ariel , Barc.:clona. 33. 
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centrated on one type of communications media. The first diversifica-
tion processes were carried out by newspaper and magazine propri-
etors who also began to publish books and free publications. Howev-
er, both legislators as well as the general public considered that those 
growth strategies were a "natural development" of newspaper compa-
nies, and did not generate an excessive concentration of the power to 
influence opinion. 
From those years, "multimedia" diversification processes gained mo-
mentum which meant that, in a strict sense, the corporations were own-
ers of print and audiovisual media at the same time 139: the technologi-
cal innovations and the liberalisation of the audiovisual industry en-
abled the groups with greater resources to acquire or set up radio sta-
tions, television channels, cable and satellite broadcasting systems, 
services distributed by Internet, and other news and entertainment me-
dia. 
Therefore, fewer legal barriers and the impetus of technology have 
been necessary in order for companies to diversify their business in the 
communications sector . Having overcome those obstacles, corpora-
tions have almost unanimously followed those growth strategies. 
"Multimedia" diversification generates basically three types of advan-
tages for communications groups: 
a) It allows company risk to be diversified: when a company only 
owns one type of media, any externa! factor that may have serious 
effects for the profitability of that sector jeopardises the future of 
the whole company. 
b) It means going into new sectors with the potential for growth: in 
many markets in which the sale of newspapers and magazines has 
stagnated, publishers have invested in the audiovisual industry 
139 See Juan Carlos Miguel de Bustos (1993), Los grupos multimedia: estructuras y es-
trategias de los medios europeos, Bosch, Barcelona. 
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which a ttracted a growing pe rce ntage of ad vertis ing revenue 1-1°; a t 
the same time, owners of publica ti ons, radio stations and televis io n 
cha nne ls have acquired shares in compa nies owning interac tive 
media. 
e) It leads to the gene ratio n of synerg ies : w ith the integrati o n in one 
g roup of diffe re nt publications, radi o s tation s, te lev is io n c hannels 
and othe r media, sorne can lend s uppo rt to others, to the exte nt th at 
a medium 's survival may depend o n the fac t th at it is backed up by 
a large, highl y diversified compa ny. 
The media owned by " multimedia" groups bene fit from the syne rg ies 
that appear in severa! areas: they share news and in formatio n sources: 
they achieve g reater work e ffi c ie ncy, for exampl e because the y pro-
duce information or sell adverti sing for severa! di stri bution channels : 
the prestige o f the mo re conso lidated med ia is trans mitted -at least in 
part- to the more recent initia ti ves: a corporation 's comme rcial re la-
ti onships with its s upplie rs and di stributo rs smoothcs the way for a 
favourable reception of their media in the ma rke t. inc luding of those in 
a weak competiti ve situ atio n: the group's rcsearch serv ices prov ides 
valuable in formatio n - regarding audiences a nd the econo mi c c lim ate-
for a li its business units ; and, in so me cases , severa ) med ia can make 
use of the same in sta llations and productio n systc ms, and make thc 
most o f the techno logical innovations that occur w ithin each corpora-
tio n. 
Dcspite thc advantages po inted o ut, most o f thc compa nics that ha vc 
followed ··multimedia'' di versifi cation strateg ics havc e nco unte rcd 
more proble ms and difficulties than thcy had calcu lated o n: o ftc n_ they 
have not been able to meet the deadlines forecast for the ass imilation 
of the new acquisiti ons and the recoupment o f in vestmcnts. 
140 /\case analy'i ' of thc cconomic cffcct' of 1hc divcr, i ficution o f ni:w,papcr i.:ompanic, 
can be found in Roben G. Picard anti Tonny Rimmcr ( 1998). WNi1hl'l'i11g a l?eces.1io11: 
Ef(ects of Si:e a11d Dil'ersifl«otim1 011 Ne 11•sp11per Co111¡1miies. " Journal o f M edia Eco-
nomb" 12 (1 ). 1- 18. 
Another problem of multimedia diversification is that. on occasions. it 
does not Iimit the business risk as much as the owners and executives 
would wish: as shown in table 3.1. companies awning severa! media 
which are apparently businesses bearing Iittle relation to each other 
may depend on one predominant source of revenue - advertising -
which could have serious consequences for those corporations if that 
sector were to go through a period of difficulties 141 • 
Multimedia diversification requires company executives to widen the 
scope of their knowledge; companies that carry out the same type of 
activities increase their efficiency through experimentation: failure as 
TABLE J. 1 Europcan Media Groups' Dcpcndcncc on Advcrtising 
Mediaset 
ProSiebenSat1 
TF1 
RTL Group 
Granada Media 
MTG 
Carlton Comm. 
Studio Canal 
BSkyB 
Fox Kids Europe 
o 
Sourcc: Mcrrill Lynch 
6 
. 46 
- 37 
30 
20 40 
- =::-;:·. -:;~~-,,~~-:-·:~~-·-=-:J96 
·--~----·-.-;-·- ~=~-~:··~; 94 
.i 74 
.-::-::.
1 71 
.-.- 62 
60 80 100 
% of revenues from advertising 2000 
well as success provides highly valuable information, permitting 
processes to be improved upon and higher quality of the supply. 
In contrast, when corporations go into new bu~inesses .bearing harctiy 
any relation to their traditional activities, there is very httle possibility 
to benefit from this type of ··gradual Iearning"; therefore, executives 
1141 TV International (5.11.2001 ), Repon rmmdup. 3. 
STRATEGIES 
SÁNOIEZ·TADERSERO TIIE E UROPEAN M ,\RKET. 
AlroXSO 1 M EDIA CONCEl>TRATION IN 
MIGUEi. CARVAJAL NEw TRl'1\'DS Al'D C llALLB<GES 
"' o o 
"' .. 
e: 
" 
.., 
tend to make more mistakes, especia lly if they have a limited ability to 
learn or if their way of thinking is highly determined by the profes-
sional tasks carried out in the past 142• 
In this last aspect, the diffic ulty of the g iant communi cations compa-
nies to understand the "game rules" o f Inte rnet is s ignificant ; the lead-
ing players of most of the success stories of the nineties within the on 
. line sector have been companies which were not present in the com-
municati ons sector: sma ll, flexi ble companies unencumbered by bu-
reaucracy and with the capacity to understand the logic of no n lineal 
contents have devised the most visited porta ls and the most successful 
businesses on the Net. 
Joint ventures and collaboration pacts are the q uickest and most effi-
cient way to preventing mistakes and loss of competiti ve capaci ty in 
multimedia diversifications when corporations venture into un fa miliar 
sectors: in this way, to the fi nancia) capac ity and the value of the brand 
names and the material assets of the traditiona l compa nies are added 
the innovati ve spirit and the know-how provided by other partners . 
As we have seen, multimedia and multi secto ri a l grow th presents ad-
vantages and disadvantages, so that each comrnunicati ons company 
rnust detect the most appropri ate degree of d ivers ification in accor-
dance with their interna) and ex terna) characteri stics. In contras!, al-
most ali the companies -or, a t least, thc most successful ones in the ir 
respective markets- aim to broaden the geographical area in which 
their messages are di stributed. 
The only examples of leading communi cations groups in thei r coun-
trie that have not penetrated into other markc ts are statc radio and te l-
evision companies: very few of these companies undertook interna-
tionalisation processes when they could have benefitcd from situations 
of monopoly in their interna! markets because thei r mission was re-
142 Chris Forrester (2000), The B11si11es.~ of Di¡:¡ital Televisio11. Focal Prcss. Oxford. 240-
26 1. 
stricted to guaranteeing pluralism and the quality of the radio and tel-
evision contents within the boundaries of their national borders. 
The globalisation of markets has meant that at the end of the nineties, 
a good part of those public corporations -like the BBC, the RAI or 
TVE- had initiated their international development143; their managers 
have discovered that they need sources of additional income in order 
to provide quality products attractive to the public, because otherwise 
they will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage faced with 
much larger rivals. 
In the growth of communications companies several stages can be dis-
tinguished: strengthening of the competitive position in their own in-
terna! market. first sortie abroad, consolidation of the international 
presence and configuration of "transnational" groups. 
At least two causes impel those growth processes: legislation and tech-
nological innovations. The legal framework acts in a dual sense: first-
ly, each country establishes mechanisms for preventing an excessive 
concentration of media, so that the companies which reach the estab-
Jished limits must invest in other markets if they wish to continue their 
growth strategies; secondly, in many countries the protectionist barri-
ers preventing investments by foreign companies become less strin-
gent. 
Technology drives communications companies to be present in more 
markets because the coverage of a good part of the contents transmis-
sion systems goes beyond national borders, as is the case with Internet 
and satellites relaying radio and television programmes. This phenom-
enon affects -although to a lesser extent- newspapers and magazines, 
which can use satellites for sending pages to their printing works. 
143 About the British case. See The Economist (20.V.2000), Greg's big ideas, 49-50. 
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As Pearce points out, the processes of international development pose 
new challenges and problems 1-1-1_ The first obstacle a ri ses from the d if-
ficu lty of knowing and adapti ng to the "ga me rules" of new marke ts . 
Often, the organisational syste ms, producti o n processes, contents and 
d istribution channe ls cannot be transfen-cd from one country to anoth-
er: the differences in consumer habits and public prefe rences, eco-
nomic and cultu ral climate, labour legis lation and othc r aspects o r the 
industrial fabric present serio us proble ms of adaptatio n for exporti ng 
firms. 
Almost ali comm uni cations companies have e xamples o r expens ive 
and speetacular fai lures in their processes or inte rn ationa l develop-
ment, ca u sed by ignorance or unde rest i mati ng the d i ffere nces bel wccn 
thei r domestic markets and those of othe r countri es. Thi s type o f dan-
ger is averted by a more care ful ana lysis o f the new markets. experi -
mentation and by means of jo int ventures w ith local partne rs. 
As we have poi nted out, there do not exi st ·'idea l" geographica l arcas, 
degrees of media divers ification o r types of integ ration : ali combi na-
tions have advantages and disadvantages_ risks a nd poss ibi lities. Each 
company should be aware o f this fact and c hoose thc bcsl opti on for 
their interna! and externa! c ircums tanees. with the aim of reaching and 
preserving a sustainable competiti ve advantage. 
3.5. The Versatile Organisation 
lrrespective of the strategy e hosen, the dynamism of the marke t re-
qu ires increased fl ex ibility, g reater antic ipation of contextual changes 
and more innovation from communications compani es. D irecto rs of 
the best managed European communications g roups attempt to swirtl y 
gain an in-depth unde rstanding of the sector's new cha lle nges and to 
lead ehange in their organ isations. 
r l44 Roben D. Pcarcc ( 1993). The ¡:mu·th and e110!111io11 of 11111!1i11a1io11ol e11rerprise: p111-
tems of geo¡:mphical all{f industrial di1•ersijict11io11. Edwar<l E lgar. Alclc rshol. 
A company is only innovation driven when its managers are realistic 
in their perception of the difficulties that any proposal for change must 
face 145 • Innovative proposals will encounter interna! obstacles even if 
companies identify deficiencies in the distribution of newspapers and 
magazines they publish, discover that the programming schedules of 
their radio stations are elaborated by imitating competitors or realise 
that the brand names of their television channels have Iost prestige and 
are second-rate. 
Innovation is hindered by corporate cultures focusing on short term re-
sults, by paralysing bureaucratic structures, by a low level of trust and 
staff integration, the lack of team work, arrogant attitudes of executive 
directors, the absence of leadership and the human fear of the un-
known. 
Traditional business thought used to conceive organisations as ma-
chines prepared for carrying out productive functions. That mentality 
explains in part the role played by engineers in business management: 
their task lay in designing and controlling the system. Precision and ef-
ficiency were the classic aims of those companies. 
As Tumer explains 146, the new language of innovative organisations is 
different: federalism, pacts, voluntary teams, commitment, passion for 
new discoveries and "ad hoccery" have taken the place of excessive 
rules and regulations and inflexible structures. 
In the past, business thought was based on the idea that human deci-
sions are carried out mainly by rationalistic calculations pursuing indi-
vidual self-interest. However, there is sufficient evidence to show the 
reductionism of that anthropological basis; in institutions in which 
there prevails a climate of trust, most employees accept decisions 
which they neither like nor are beneficial to them: they are aware that 
145 See John P. Kotter ( 1996). Leadin¡: Chan¡:e. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
146 Rodney Tumcr ( 1997), The Ver.mtile Organisation: Achie\•ing Ce11turies of Sustain-
ah/e Grmrth. "Europcan Management Journal", ( 15) 509-522. 
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al i work requires commitment and effort wh ich isjustified for the good 
of the company and their work col leagues 147 • 
Traditional communications companies are discover ing that thei r clas-
sic advantages are losing ground: experience in the elaborat ion of 
news and enterlainment programmes, good reputation and pri v i leged 
relations with suppliers ancl distributors. Thesc strengths cannot pre-
vent the success of the new competitors w ho are ·'intensi vc in know-
how", and have a greater culture in innovation . 
More and more companies awning print and audiov isual med ia are fo-
cusing on models of people management characteristic o f more i nno-
vati ve and versatile organi sations: in the selection o f new staff man-
agers place much more value on the candidates· energy and capacity of 
commitment: also sorne communications companies that are over-en-
cumbered by bureaucracy have created smal l pockets of innovation 
and generation of know-how, with the aim th at thcy wi ll become 
bridge-heads for more general ised cultural changes: th is is the case 
w i th the on- line editions of sorne newspapers and new producls 
launched by the publishing companies. 
This change in the business paradigm has brought about a secondary 
positive effect - the greater the interna( cu lture of the organisations. the 
less structure is needed to ensure coordinati on: as a consequence. bu-
reaucracy is reduced and rapid response and flex ibility i n a company 
are promoted. 
The drawing up and communicatio n of sorne clear_ intell ig ible and in -
spiring aims - the " mission" o f che company- helps to promote che cul-
ture of interna! learning and innovat ion 148 . The mission is nol a slogan, 
an advertising ploy, a new strategy ora declaration of goocl intentions. 
r 147 Sce Fredcrick F. Rcichhcld (VI 1-VI 11.200 1 ). Lead fo r Loya/1_, .. ··Harvard Bu,ine;s Rc-
vicw", 76-84. 
148 See Alfonso Nieto ( 1988), Carras a 1111 empresario de la i11fnr111ació11. Fragua. Madrid 
(e'>pecially Carta XI. ·'Los nuevos gerentes ... 89- 105) 
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On the contrary, a clear mission fulfils severa} interesting functions: a) 
it guides, because it promotes a long term vision and helps to establish 
priorities; b) it is a reminder of principies and reasons for decisions; c) 
it inspires new possibilities, it encourages challenging targets to be 
tackled; d) it controls, because it pennits the resolution of conflicts of 
interpretation or competences; e) it provides a greater share of free-
dom, because it renders rigid structures and niggardly regulations un-
necessary, and means that no initiative is paralysed before meeting the 
supervisors' approval. 
Companies cannot obtain competitive advantages by amassing islands 
of information and closed pockets of experience, which do not benefit 
the rest of the departments and areas of work. In practice, the main 
source of synergies of the big communications groups comes from the 
capacity to share and transfer ideas and knowledge. This occurs, for in-
stance, with Pearson, in the field of economic and financia! news, with 
G + J in the magazine market, with VNU in the sector of computing 
publications, with RTL in commercial radio and television, or with 
Canal + in pay television. 
Growth, therefore, can lead to self-complacency and bureaucratiza-
tion; but it can also promote dynamism and innovative capacity in 
companies. The future, of communications companies, in good meas-
ure, lies in the choice they make between one strategic and organisa-
tional model and another. 
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4. Legal Framework 
Up until the end of the eighties. the mass media in Europe were regu-
lated by the governments of each country. ln thi s period natio nal fron-
tiers sti ll constituted barriers difficult to break down: most o f the lead-
ing companies in the communications sec tors were made up o f nation-
al capital ; each State faced different problems of concen trati on and at-
tempted to deal wilh them w ithoul looking too much to thc ir neigh-
bouring countries. 
In this way, a tradition w hich had emerged w ith the first press laws of 
the seventeenth century was continued. High courl jurisdicti on. legal 
regulations and the anti-monopoly commissions had a " nationar ' geo-
graphic scope. 
At Lhe beginning of the ni netecn forties a similar phenomenon oc-
curred in the European audiovisual industry: the Govcrnments o f each 
country played a fundamental ro le: thcy set up public radi o and telev i -
sion bodics which, racccl with the technical cl ifficu lty o r prov iding th~ 
public w ith a varicd o lTer. attcmpted to guarantce plural contents14'i. In 
countries w ith a greater democratic tradition. those pub l ic monopolies 
lried to meet the citi zens· interests; in contrast. in other cases. the po-
litical aims - the preser vatio n o r power- were g iven preccdcnce over 
the miss ion of public service. 
However, certain po litical , economic and technological events havc 
rnodified the "status quo": national Govcrnments have handcd over a 
large part o ftheir lcadership to Brusse ls: the princ ipal companies com-
pete on a g lobal scalc: and technical innovations havc g i ven ri se to thc 
cmergence of new communications media. For those reasons. in 1hc 
l 149 Karc n Siune. Claudc Sorbels and /\sic Roland ( 1986). ··A fran11: work J'or rnmpara1i n : 
ana ly~ i' of Europcan media pulic.:y-mak ing ... in D. Me Quail and K. Siunc. Nt•w Me-
dia Politics: Comparatil'e Perspecti1·e in \Ve.\lem Europe. Sagc. London. 13. 
-
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
last decade new problems and controversies over the regulation of 
concentration have emerged. The first section of this chapter sum-
marises the most recent changes of the legal framework of the com-
munications media in Europe. 
4.1. Historical Perspective 
Two legal texts in 1989 represent, to a certain extent, the beginning of 
the European Un ion 's regulatory activity in the area of concentration 
of communications media. In that year the directive referred to as 
"Television without Frontiers" 15º and the Council's regulation on con-
centration operations were passed 151 • The directive's aim was to 
achieve two priority objectives: the free circulation of television pro-
grammes between Member States and the promotion of the broadcast-
ing of a greater percentage of programmes of European origin. Regu-
lation attempted to give the Commission a capacity for manoeuvre to 
be able to veto concentration operations of a "'community dimension" 
that implied a risk of abuse of dominant positions in the market. 
Those two legal texts carne into force in a very characteristic econom-
ic context: firstly, at the end of the eighties and beginning of the 
nineties a wave of mergers and takeovers was initiated on a global 
scale which would continue until the change of century giving rise to 
the growth of giant communications groups; secondly, as Machet ex-
plains, in those years .. the burning issue was the emergence of satellite 
and transfrontier broadcasting, but the European broadcasting land-
scape was still characterised by the predominance of public service 
1 
150 Council Directive of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States conceming the 
pursuit of television broadcasting activities. Official Joumal of the European Com-
munitics. 17 October 1989. 
151 Council Regulation No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentra-
tions betwecn undertakings. 
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broadcasters. In 1982, Europe had o nly four commerc ia l telev ision 
channe ls. By January 1996, this numbe r had soared to 2 17" 15 2• 
From the poli tical perspective, the European Union was ma king stride s 
in its integration process_ In 1986 with the Sing le European Act, the 
member countries had committed themselves to establishing an inte r-
na( market by 3 1 December 1992, with common initiatives in aspects 
which until then had been the reserve o f nati ona l governments, such as 
fi sca l, moneta ry, social and environme ntal po i icy. European integra-
tion would receive a definiti ve boost w ith the s igning of the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993: the sing le currency was approved and a harmon i-
sation of budgetary polic ies to achieve grcater convergence between 
markets was decided on_ 
Later, the Treaty of Amsterdam, whi ch carne into force in 1999_ wou ld 
extend the European Parliament's power by estab lishing the syste m of 
co-decision: Parliament had the right o f ame ndme nt and veto over sev-
e ra! aspects, such as the interna! marke t o r consume r protectio n, al-
though it could not by itself prome te the pass ing of legal provis ions. 
Finally, in 2000 the Treaty of Nice was approvcd, whi ch attempts to 
adapt the political system of the Un ion to the e ntry o f new countri es in 
coming years_ 
With the progressive streng thening of the Community 's in stitutions_ 
the weight o f regulation referring to concentrat ion a nd pluralism in in-
formation has passed , in part , from the natio nal Governments to the 
Commission and Parliame nt of the EU. This evolutio n in vol ves power 
sharing, in which a third type of actor al so takes part: the regional com-
munities which, in so rne European countries, have certain regulatory 
power . . 
However, with the exception of the States w ith a federal structure , the 
power o f regions to generate the ir own communications policies is 
limited to the degree of power ceded by the central governments to re -
152 En1rnanuellc Machct (Vl.1 999). Reg11/nrio11 reporr. "The Bulle tin". 36. 
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gional govemments. The latter bodies demand greater power to act and 
put forward two basic reasons: a) a large number of the problems of 
concentration are raised in local and regional areas so it would be log-
ical that those types of concentration operations were supervised by 
the regional authorities; b) moreover, already from the first talks which 
concluded in the signing of the Treaty of Rome, European unity was 
not conceived as a recipe to promote uniformity but rather as a politi-
cal framework which would guarantee peace and the pluralism of Eu-
ropean cultures 153• 
However, there does exist a legal subordination of the regional gov-
emments' action to the legal initiatives of the Member States and the 
Community institutions. The national govemments have been more 
willing to cede part of their regulatory power to Brussels rather than to 
their regions. 
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One of the biggest innovations of the legal framework of concentration 
in the last decade lies in the growing interdependence between sorne 
markets and others. Policies cannot be decided in isolation, without 
analysing the legal changes passed in other countries. The evolution of 
European legislation, for instance, is only explained by the modifica-
tions introduced in the legal framework of the North-American com-
munications market. 
-
In 1996 in the United States the Telecommunications Act was passed, 
the main legal reform of the audiovisual industry since 1934. The law, 
among other liberalising measures. eliminated sorne restrictions refer-
ring to the maximum number of radio stations that a company could 
own: until then, the limit had been seven radio stations on FM and sev-
en on AM in the whole country; with the new law the only condition 
resided in that more than a certain number of radio stations could not 
153 The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament have constantly insisted 
on that principie from their foundation until the present. See e.g. European Parliament 
( 16.Xl.2000), Resolution 011 Comnmnity Policy in the audiovisual sector in the digi-
tal era, DOCE C 14. 
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be owned in the same locality; between two a nd e ig ht, according to the 
size of the market. 
That decision generated severa! knock-on e ffects: a) it s parke d off a 
wave of mergers and takeovers in the sector 1 5~; b) the degree of mar-
ket concentration g rew 155; c) the companies · sca le economies permit-
Led a reduction in costs and the big channe ls increased the ir adverti s-
ing turnover, because they began to a ttrac t thc inte rest of the large ad-
verti sers; d) between 1995 and 1998 radio companies' shares increased 
Lheir value by 35% against the 21 % of the Sta ndard & Poor 500 Index. 
A few years later, in 1999, rhe Federa l Communicati ons Commiss ion 
reduced the restrictions established for the ownc rship of te levis ion sta-
tions which had remajned in force -with very fcw modifications- s ince 
the fort ies. The new regulations esta blished th al a compa ny, in cercain 
condition s, could own two television stati ons in the same metropolitan 
area; the limitations on the control of cable systems and vertical inte-
gration between the areas of production and the broadcas ting of au-
diovisual programmes were also re laxed 1511 . 
The new legal framework of communications in the Un ited States has 
permitted the growth of the giant North-America n g roups which, with 
a strong position in the most prosperous market in the world. have 
strengthened their internati onal development strategies. The necessary 
response from the other side of the Atla ntic has been to promote a sim-
ilar relaxing of the rules and procedures that regulare the concentra tion 
of communications companies. 
l 1s4 "According 10 Paul Kagan Associates. out of 10.000 radio stalions somc 4.000 have 
changcd hands since thc acl was passed, in dcals wonh around $ 32 bill ion". "'The 
Economist" (24.1.1 988). Cable 's hold 0 11 America, 67. 
1 SS Thc se ven largesl radio companics. whic h gained 17% of total revenuc in 1995, wenl 
on to rcach 40% in 1998. See Vermiis, Suhler & Assoc.:ia1es ( 1999). Co1111111mica1io11s 
l11d11S11y l?eport, New York. 
J S6 For Tom McQuaide, "the rule c hangcs by the FCC rcvcal c n1husias1ic s upporl of cor-
poratc growth". ( l. 2000). US Report, ''The Bullctin". 42. 
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The priority aim of those who have taken part in the modification of 
the "rules of the game" has been to promote the growth of large Euro-
pean companies, which can stand up to the giant North-American cor-
porations, whilst trying to avoid situations of a predominant position. 
This criterion has been present both in the decisions of the national 
regulatory bodies as in those of the Community institutions. 
Despite agreement on the general aims, the practica! application of 
those ideas has been the cause of frequent controversies in the last 
decade; among others, the following can be highlighted: 
t 
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a) Is it more effective to establish highly detailed rules or legislate 
only on general aspecls at the same time as allowing the commis-
sions and tribunals charged with watching over the proper func-
tioning of the free market a wide capacity for manoeuvre? Legal 
texts may not be flexible enough but commissions pose other risks 
such as a Jack of independence, arbitrary decisions and a certain 
unreliability for companies. 
a 
b) What is the ideal number of competitors in a market? 1t might 
seem that pluralism is directly proportional in relation to the num-
ber of existing companies; but if there were thousands of car-mak-
ers in the world, very few people would be car-owners: if scale 
economies disappeared, the rise in price would be exorbitant. As 
the world market is in the hands of about twenty manufacturers, 
companies are big enough to build cheap cars; and, at the same 
time, there is just enough amount of competition for there to be in-
novation and drive to offer an ever better quality-price to potential 
buyers. 
e) Should the authorities act when there is a risk of a position of dom-
inance or when that risk is confirmed and continues over a period 
of time? To a certain extent, the answer to this question involves 
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taking the side of either the market or the State in order to solve 
quickly and e fficiently prob lems caused by monopo lies 157. 
d) How is the audience calculated of a company owning minority 
shares in communicatio ns media? For instance, if it possesses 5% 
of the capital of a telev is ion channe l should that a udience share 
reached by the channe l be added irrespective o f the real control ex-
e rted by the com pany? 
e) How should we deal with concentration operatio ns regarding new 
media -such as Interne t- whose bus iness model is s till un fami liar? 
f) Is the transition, which is taking place in most European countries, 
fro m the sharehold in"g approach to the market share approach ap-
propriate158? The sharehold ing approach does not present serious 
problems of interpretation o r appl icability; but the proli feration of 
media means that the control of each o ne of them is tend ing to be 
less and less s ignificant. 
In contrast, the market share approach poses a practical problern: 
techno logical convergence - whi ch weakens sorne of the tradi-
tional barriers be tween the communicati ons industry sectors -
generates new channels and new types of contents hard to class i-
fy: interactive te levision program mes, o nline ed it io ns of newspa-
pers and magazines, rad io programmes broadcast on the Interne t, 
etc. To this can be added the growi ng complex ily of the market and 
debate about the reliabil ity of the aud ience measurement systems. 
g) W hat are the real "bottlenecks" in each communications sector? 
W hich bodies should be in charge of keeping a Iookout for the pos-
sible di stortion of competition exened by the ''gatekeepers··. espe-
l ¡57 For instance, "The Economis t" (30.IV. 1998) suggests lhat "governmenls shou ld s1op 
worrying about s ize and ask on ly whethcr a firm can excn market power ( ... ) Evcn if 
a firm gains market power, !he effect will usually be temporary. because hig h profib 
will allracl new competitors". The 1rus1b11.1·1ers' 11e111 100 1.\-. 64. 
158 A de1ailed analysis of this issue can be sccn in Tho mas Gibbons ( J 998). Reg11/f//i11g 
lhe Media, 211d . ed. , Sweet & Maxwell. London. 
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cially in the audiovisual sector? 
h) Finally, should we accept that the relevant function of the media in 
democratic societies means that there should be a stricter regula-
tion of concentration than in other sectors? This is. at heart, the 
great issue posed in the Green Paper on Concentration and Plural-
ism published by the EU Commission in 1992. which. as Doyle 
explains 159 has still not found an appropriate answer. 
In the following sections we shall Iook at how these controversies have 
been dealt with in the last decade and which debates have still not been 
resolved. Firstly we will analyse the activity of the Community insti-
tutions and we will then go on to study the protection systems of the 
free market in European countries. 
4.2. The Legal Framework of the European Union 
The Community institutions· power to intervene in problems generat-
ed by the concentration of communications firms hinges on two piv-
ota! elements: the laws on free competition and audiovisual policy, de-
veloped by the EU especially from the eighties onwards. The defence 
of the pluralism of information could have acted as a third element 
which regulated concentration; but, as we shall see later, the proposals 
of the Community directives on pluralism were never passed. 
The Treaty of Rome 16º constitutes the legal document establishing the 
basis for the policy of competition of the Union. Its main provisions 
applicable to communications companies are the following: 
159 Gillian Doyle ( 1997). From 'P/uralism 'to 'Ownership ': Europe :v emergem policy 011 
Media Conce11tratio11.'i 11al'igate.'i the doldrums. "The Journal of Information. Law and 
Technology" (3 ). http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/commsreg/97 _3dyl/ 
160 Treaty of Rome of 25.III. 1957, modified by the Single European Act of 17 .11.1986. 
The articles are referred to according to the already revised text. See La Documenta-
tion Fram;aise ( 1992), L · Union Européenne. Les traités de Rome et de Maastricht. 
Textes cnmparés. Paris. 
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Article 81 forbids agreements contrary to competition: for e"am-
ple, pacting the selling prices, as sorne pay televisions have occa-
sionally attempted to do. 
Article 82 prevents the abuse of a dominant position in the market, 
for example, limiting production or imposing extremely unequal 
conditions on third parties for similar services (as has occurred 
with sorne cable operators with channel suppliers). 
Articles 31 and 86 oppose the existence of state monopolies a~d 
monopolistic rights, although they permit sorne exceptions. This 
issue has affected, above ali, the duration of sporting rights con-
tracts. 
Articles 87 to 89 try to prevent state aid from distorting free com-
petition. Sorne prívate television channels, on the basis of these ar-
ticles, consider "dual funding" (advertising and subsidies) of pub-
Iic television as contrary to free competition. 
The second key document of the policy of competition of the European 
Union is the EU Council Regulation of 1989 161 , which perrnits the 
Competition Directorate General to analyse and, where necessafY· to 
ban or establish conditions for approving mergers, takeovers or agree-
ments between companies which reach a ··community dirnension". 
Table 4.1. sums up the legal basis of the Community action and its ar-
eas of action. 
r;:-1 council Regulation No: 406418_9 of 21 December 1989 on. the control of con~entra­
tions between undertakings. Th1s Regulation has been mod1fied by the Counc1l Reg-
ulation J 310/97 of 30 June 1997. establishing a new threshold for the total business 
volume of companies involved so that takeovers or mergers have a ··community di-
mensionº. 
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Tabl~ 4. 1 EU's Competition Policv: Ficlds of Action 
·'"'" ' .... ·Arca LcL?al Basis 1 Examples in thc audiovisual sector 
Restrictivc 
Agrcemems 
.\rt. Hl •il 
thc TI 1 1
, \ppr• '.' .11 '" t. r.c.lf•· .1 """' d , , •!n('.lll\. 1 1 P. ce '"'''11ng • •t 
) 111.IJ• >r' ) q..;q 
1\.111 .. t .tll\ .l!'l<<"tn<11! lwn\<Tll I IP.111.1 
r----------L---------~~~ ¡wr \tl"\\ 'l_.11_1"~'----------------~ 
1
:--.,11t<ll< file••,,· R.11h" ·1, l,·:i .. 1 1rv.mtl .111.l lnd •. ·p•n,knt 
Power Position 
Abuses 
\ rt. -"2 ·1d,.,1-1• •ll 1'11lili, .111t 111, I• ir dnl\ m.I..'. thir.i p.1rt' 
11fT1·1. ¡ ••>lllJ'.1111,, lrtcti...c' ,,, ;'·.ihli,h rh,1r "'·,·l..h l''''-':r.1111 1 
r--~St-a-tc-:M-:-o-n_o_p-ol-ic-·s_a_n_d_¡___ ___ \ t-.t.-,-, 1 s(,- -- -¡-"·dh·d11lc, ---------------~--;-1 
Monopolistic Ri<•hts . 1\.111•11 c,,·)11,1\ 11' 111 , •. ¡,., ,,,, •n .1<h n n,1og 111~h1' l'.r.1111n ¡ 
.. •itth,·Tll· t••••1111mt1t1.1lr\· .. :.111••t1\.T\l111l·l.m.i,·r,· . : 
r-------__ _¡_ ____ ... ---------- ---l 
Regulation of : l'rnrnn1 ·, 1\.111 l'l'l:-:· 1 
Concentrntion Practices lll'd .. ¡111>.t H'J J \['pr•1\.tl ••I < 1 ·¡ l 1 \ nwrl..'.cr l''''h· .11hl llllT¡..'.<"I ,,f 
t-----------4-- \t\t"lhii ( .lfl.tl • J lll\:_:l'l~·, .... tl-=..21:._lt_H_t: ________ _ 
S \r¡ H- H'J --. ·\1~r·.-;::-.~ :;-! ¡;-;r-t~11J;n;-:, 1! tlw p, 1rtt"'\1"''. ¡>uhlK tdl'' 1-1• •n tate Funding 
'-;::-----:=--c,------l.__-_:'.~'t~'l_:."1.:.'...l_·_ - "·Ul••ll RTI': 111•111 
Sourcc: Caries Llorcns (Conccntrnciún de c1~1pr~;--; de co~~1k~1~iú;; ~:el plur:1lismo, p. 277-278) 
The companies that carry out a concentration operation of Communi-
ty dimension are bound to inform the Commission which usually noti-
fies the competitors and any company that may be affected. so that 
they can present any objections. This information constitutes work ma-
terial of great interest for the Commission. 
In a first stage, which may be no longer than a month. the Competition 
Directorate General must decide whether it approves thc merger or 
takeover because it poses no problems for the interna} market or 
whether it must initiatc a second stage of analysis which may be no 
longer than four months. After this time period has elapsed, the Com-
mission may a) approve the concentration operation. b) approve it sub-
ject to conditions ore) han it. 
As table 4.2 shows, the Commission analysed 1908 concentration op-
erations until 31 December 2001. Of these. 18 were banned. In almost 
every year the number of mergers and takeovers analysed has risen : 
from 63 in 1991 (first complete year in which the Regulation carne in-
to force) to 345 in 2000. 
Ofthe 18 concentration operations banned by the Commission. five in-
volved the communications sector: MSG-Media Service. Nordic 
Satellite Distribution. Holland Media Groep, Cablevisión and Pre-
miere. 
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TABLE 25 4. tausu cs ab o u t thc En orccmcm of thc Council Hc!!ulation 4064/89 
l. NOTIFICATIONS 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
Numbcr of norificd cases 12 63 60 58 95 110 131 172 
Cases withdra\\TI - Ph1Sc: 1 3 1 6 ·I 5 9 
Cases \\ithdrn,i.·n - Phasc 1 J 1 1 
11. F INAL D ECISIONS 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
A n icle, kind of dccision ... 
6.1 Tal out of sconc illcmcr RcL'Ubtion 2 5 9 .¡ 5 9 (, .¡ 
6.1 fhl comnaublc 5 .¡7 43 49 78 90 11!9 11 8 
6. t -ih\ como wid1 commirmcnrs 3 ·I 2 3 2 
Total 6.1 (b) + 6.2 5 50 47 49 80 93 109 120 
9.3 n anial rcfrrral to 111. S. (nh. ll 1 1 (, 
9.3 full rcfcrral 1n ;\lcmbc r Srarc' 1 3 1 
Toral 9.3 lnh. 1\ 1 1 1 .) 7 
Phasc 1 7 55 57 54 86 )()2 118 1.11 
9.3 nani:U rcfcrral 1n /\ l. S. lnh. JI\ 
8.2 comnatiblc 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
8.? como. \\ith commfrmcnrs 3 3 2 2 3 3 7 
8.3 nrohibition 1 1 2 :; 1 
BA rcstorc cffccti\'C comncriuon 2 
T m:U 8 5 4 3 s 7 7 11 
Phosc 11 5 .¡ 3 5 7 7 11 
Total final d ccis ions 7 60 61 57 91 109 125 142 
llJ. Phasc 11. Procccdin!'s initiarcd 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
1\niclc, kind of dccision ... 
6.1 le\ 6 .¡ .¡ 6 7 (j 11 
IV. OTHER D EC ISIONS 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
Amele, kmd of clccrsion. 
6.3 (,;\ dccisio n rcvokcd 
8.5 (;;\ dCCJ>Íon rc\"Okcd 
14 dl'ci~ion imnosinl! fines 
22.3 1 1 1 1 
9 rcuucsr rciccrcd b,· t.k·cision~ 1 
7.4 d cro1!'3t.ion fro m susncnsion 1 1 2 3 1 2 3 5 
Sourcc: E uropcan Con1miss1on 
(hrrp://curopa.cu.inr/comm/compctition/mergcrs/cascs/st ~ ts . h tml) 
98 99 00 01 Total , __ 
- .l:> 292 345 3.15 1908 
' 
- R 8 56 
.¡ 5 (, 4 21 
98 99 00 01 Toral 
(, 1 1 1 53 
20- J){, 293 299 1574 
12 19 28 13 86 
219 255 :\21 312 166(\ 
1 1 4 6 22 
1 3 :! 1 12 
.¡ 
·I ( 1 7 3.¡ 
229 2(o(I 328 320 17·17 
1 ll 1 
; o 3 5 20 
.¡ R 12 10 57 
2 1 2 s IR 
() 2 
9 9 17 2U 97 
9 10 17 20 98 
238 270 345 3-10 1845 
98 99 00 01 T oral 
12 
'º 
19 22 11 7 
98 99 00 01 T otal 
1 o 1 
o o 
1 .¡ 1 o (> 
o 4 
1 () 2 
13 7 .¡ 5 .¡7 
The firs t re fusal affected the Germa n te lecommunic ations sector: in 
1993, Berte ls man, De us tche Teleko m and Ta urus (compa ny owned by 
Leo Kirch) pl anned to merge in the consortiu m MSG-Med ia Servi cc to 
commerc ia ll y exp lo it a pay te levis io n servicc. The Commissio n decid-
ed th at that agreement sho ul d not be perm itted because it cons ide rcd 
tha t the " re levant m arke t" corresponded to the pay te levis ion in Ger-
many and no t to the te levis ion sector as a who le 162 ; MSG-Media Se r-
l 162 Commissio n decis io n 94/922/EC o f 9. 11.1 994. MSG Media Scrvice. DOCE L 364/1. 
of 3 1 . 12. 1994. 
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vice might prevent competition by means of vertical integration in 
w hich the ma in audiovisual operators were involved: Deutshe 
Te lekom (cable and te lephone systems), Kirch (production and pro-
gramme rights) and Bertelsmann (commercial television). 
One year later, Norsk Te lekom - the largest cable operator in Norway, 
Te le Danmark- wh ich had 50% of the cable television market in Den-
mark -and Kinnevik- one of the giant com munications companies in 
Sweden - founcled the company Nordic Satell ite Distribution; their aim 
was the distribution of te levision programmes by sate llite both to ca-
ble te levision operators and homes equipped with a satellite dish. 
Again , the Commission opposed a concentration operation which 
brought about vertical integration in the audiovisual sector, in this 
case, in the Scandin avian countries 163. 
In 1996. the Commission opposed the creation of Holland Media 
Groep (HMG ), in which the television channels 4 and S of the RTL, 
Veronica - a c ha nnel that had j ust been privatised - and Endemol 
which was the n the independe nt production company with the highest 
turnover in Holland we re involved. The Competition Directorate Gen-
eral opposed the creation of HMG because it considered that it would 
have control of at least 40% of the open television market in the 
Netherlands and 60% of the televis ion advert is ing market '64 • 
In 1996, two Span ish companies, PRISA -chief communications com-
pany in the country and sole pay television operator- and Telefónica 
- mai n te lecommunications operator, whi ch had just been parti ally pri-
vati sed- agreed to carry out a jo int venture in order to commercially 
exploit cable te lev is ion in Spain. The Commission did no t authorise 
the concentration operation because it considered that the two compa-
nies could gain a dominant position in three secrors: pay television 
163 Commission dccision of 19.VIl.1 995, Nordic Sate ll itc Distribution. DOCE L of 
2.3. 1996. 
164 Cummission dccision 96/346/EC of 20.9.1995 (HMG). DOCE L 134/32. of 5.6. 1996. 
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contents, management o f the systems of cable telev ision and tele-
phone165. 
I n 1997, the two main television companies i n Ger many - K irch and 
B ertelsmann- together w ith D eutsche Telekom dec ided to share the 
control of the pay channel Premiere, w hilst L eo Kirch gave the under-
taking that he would cease in his efforts to set up his d ig i tal television 
plat form, DF l. Thi s proj ect was banned because, in the Commission's 
opinion, i t meant too great an amount of vertical integrati on o f the tel -
evision sector in German speaking countries (programmes. manage-
ment of subscribers and technology) 166. 
I n contrast. the Comm ission has approved o ther concentration opera-
t ions such as the agreement between K irch and News l nternational to 
develop pay television in Germany, the mcrgcr of AOL and T ime 
Warner or the takeover of U niversal by V i vendi. These three concen-
trat ion operati ons. which took place in 2000. i n the Commission·s 
v iew, did not imply a risk of a dorni nant position or a degree of verti-
cal integration which cou ld distort free cornpetit ion. 
After analysing the key aspects o f Cornmun i ty policy o n free compe-
ti tion, we w ill study the o ther basic instrurncnt for Comrnissio n acti on: 
audiovisual policy, whose beg innings can be traced to 1989. w ith the 
passing of thc Directi ve of telev ision w ithou t Frontiers 167. 
Even though from the nineteen sixt ics the Comrn ission and o ther in-
stitutions such as the European Parliament and the Counci l of Europc 
showed interest in the European audiovisual market. until the nineties 
the regulation of the sector was i n thc hands o f the govern rnents of the 
Mernber States. With the D irecti ve of television without Frontiers thc 
Commission began to be able to make use of an i nstrurnen t to achieve 
one or its priority aims: the harmonisation or the legal frarnework of 
165 Scc Europcan Commission. Repon 011 rn111¡u' 1i1io11 policy. Brw.~cb. 1996. 
166 DOCE C 374 of 1O.X 11. 1997, S. Sce a l so prc~s relea se 1 P/98/-177. or 27. V. 1998. 
167 Counc il Dircc1ive or J Oc1ober 1989. DOCE L 298 or 17 Oc1<>hcr 1989. T ha1 legal 
provbion has bcen modified hy 1he Dircc1i vc 97/J6. DOCE L 202 nf 30 July 1997. 
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te levis ion in Europe in o rder to correct the excessive fragmentation of 
the market. 
A lso. the Directive atte mpted to avoid vertical integration of te levis ion 
compa nies, for whic h it established that Member States should guar-
a ntee that channe ls reserve "at least a 10% of their programming 
budget for European works created by independent European produc-
tio n companies" (art. 5). It also establi shed broadcasting quotas for Eu-
ropea n works (art. 4) a nd limits on ad verti sing on te levision (art.1 7). 
In a documc nt of 2000. the Commission evaluates the level o í fulfi l-
mcnt o f thc inde pendent producti on quotas indicated in the Dirccti ve 
o f 1997: ·'the results found in the nationa l reports are g lobally satis-
rac tory .. 16~ . In a ny case, in the ncgotiation prior to the pass ing of the 
Directive it was c lear that only a .. compromise agreeme nt of mínimum 
require me nts'· could be approved, so that its compliance ne ither guar-
a ntees thc creatio n of a real European audiovisual market nor the 
s trcng the ning o r the indcpe ndc nt production secto r. 
Thc Europcan aud iov isual sector has been completcd by two other 
li ncs o f actio n: thc cstabli shmcnt of technological standards. such as 
hig h de fini tion tc levis ion and thc 16:9 and d igi tal television stanclards: 
a nti the European d istributi on or audiovisua l contents . aniculatecl 
thro ugh thc MEDIA program mes. 
Thc lega l provis ions rc fcrring to tcchno log ical standards. whosc aim 
was to neutra li se Japa nese and North Amcrican dominance in this 
fic ld. have not achievcd the set ai m 169. In cont ras!. the three MEDIA 
prog rammes - as wc shull see in thc last sectio n of th is chapte r- have 
168 F.uropcan Crnnmi~~inn (:!000). F1111rtl1 tw111111111iinui1111 {mm tite Co111111is.1iu11 tu tlw 
Co1111cil 11111/ 1he E11mpe1111 i'arlit1111t'11t 011 tlw t1p¡1/irnti111; 1fartides ./ami 5of1/Jt' Di-
recti l'C' 891552/EEC ""Telenºsio11 1ritl11111t /iwuiers·· i11 tl1e ¡Jl'l"iod 1997- 1998. E. C. 
(COM :!OOOJ 44:!. Bru~~cl ~. . 
169 Such ha-. hccn thc ra-.c. for instancc. with thc Directi1·e 951./7/EC of t/Je E11m¡>e1111 
f>11di11111e11t 0111/ tllt' Cm111cil 1l( 2.J October 1995 1111 tlie 11se <!f 11om1s J<1r t/Je /Jmad-
rnsti11g of tele1"isio11 sig1111 /s: thc markc1 ha~ hacl grcah.:r force !han 1hc legal nonn for 
!he c'1ahlish111en1 of Icchnological ~tandarcl~ in 1hc >Cclor. 
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been slightly more effective. 
The Commission of the European Uni on has s pent much of the 
nineties exploring the possibility of passing a spec ific Di rective on in-
formation pluralism. In 1992, it published the Green Paper17º, w hich 
attempted to open up debate on that issue . The G reen Paper put for-
ward three possible options: a) No regu latio n, so that the pheno menon 
of concentrat ion would conti nue lo be under the vig ilance of the Mem-
ber States and the Competition Directorate General of rhe EU. b) Es-
tablishment of special measures in order to guarantee the transparency 
of communications companies, above ali in the area of ownershi p. e) 
Passing o f specific legisla ti on on the concentratio n o r communica-
tions media in Europe. 
As Llorens explai ns, the industry agreed on reforming the legal provi-
sions on concentration: " the state regulations. based on the number of 
channels. or on the percentage of shares that the samc owner cou ld 
hold, were becoming obsolete w ith g lobalisation and the new tech-
nolog ies of distribution. Disagreement arose o ut of how the c ha nges 
shou ld be brought about-whe the r on a national or European level and 
along liberalising or harmoni sing lines" 171 • 
In January 1994, the European Parliame nt urged the Commission to 
fo llow the third option, through the passing of a Directi ve whic h would 
increase the Un ion's power to intervene. The Economic a nd Socia l 
Committee agreed with the opinion of the Parliamcn t, but the Com-
mission was reluctant to pass a D irecti ve which d id no t rneet with the 
support of the industry and was viewed w ith misgivings by the Gov-
ernments of severa ) Mernber States. 
170 European Commission ( 1992), Gree11 Paper of the Co111111issirm. P/11rali.rn1 a11d rn11-
ce11tratio11 of the 111ass 111edia in the do111estic 111arke1. El'(1/11mio11 of the 11eed for 
Co1111111111i1y actio11, E. C.. Brussels. 
171 Caries Llorens (200 1 ). Co11ce111ració11 de e111presa.1· de co1111111irnció11 y p/11ralis1110: lo 
acció11 de la VE. Doctoral thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona , Barcelo na. 
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Finally in 1996, the commissioner Mario Monti presented a "Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parli ament and the Council relative to 
the protection of pluralism within the control of the media". The pro-
posal established max imum market shares for "monomedia" concen-
tratio n (the 30% of te levis ion or radio audiences) and other Jevels for 
"multi med ia'· concent ration (thc 10% of the joint audience oí daily 
newspapers, radio and te levision). Mario Monti 's proposal met with 
more dctractors than he expected: in part, the opposition to Montiºs 
text stemmed from the fact that he did not specify the concept of "con-
tror· oí a company. he did not clearly define which was the re levant 
market in cach case. and the application o f market shares in small 
countrics was unfeasible. In a rder to overcome this last difficulty, 
Mo nti proposed a ílex ibility clause, which would al low Member States 
to authorise companies to go beyond the limits established in the Di-
recti ve proposal, as long as those percentages were exceeded in only 
one na tional marke t. But thi s idea did not meet with the necessary con-
sensus e ithe r. 
In 2000, the European market, aware o f the political unviabi lity of 
Monti ·s thesis, d ropped the passing of a specific Directive. A docu-
ment of that year s tates that " the competi tion policy must be a suitable 
and effi c ient instrument for the prevention of the formation of domi-
nant posit io ns both in re lation to the concentration of ownership of 
communications med ia in the new digital environment as well as in re-
lation to the safeguarding of plu rali sm" 172. 
Therefore. the concent rat ion of communications companies in Europe 
continues to be subjcct to the vigi lance of the Competition Directorate 
Genera l -which makes use of the Treaty o f Rome and the Regulation 
o n mc rgers and takeovers of 1989- and the legal framework estab-
lished by the member States. This last issue - the peculiarities and ten-
dencies common to cach country- is analysed in the following section. 
172 Europcan Parliamcnt (2000). Reso/111io11 011 Co1111111111i1y policy i11 1/ie a11diovis110/ sec-
tor in 1/ie digiwl era. DOCE C 14. 16.11.2000. 114. 
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4.3. Regulation in the Member States 
In regulating the concentration of mass media governme nls pursue two 
aims, in sorne respects mutually antagonistic: to pro mole the develop-
ment of companies in the secto r a nd to g uaranlee pluralism or variety 
in differentiated offers . When Lhe firsl of these two goals finds itse lf to 
be particularly under threat, leg islation te nds Lo be more permi ss ive 
with concentral ion operatio ns; if, in contrasl. national companies are 
strong and there are few voices in Lhe market, public powers are usu-
all y more restrictive. 
The aspecl of the legal framework of each country also depe nds on 
other factors: the ideological standpoinl o f the po li lica l pan y in gov-
ernment, legal and cultural tradition, strength of Lhe public rad io and 
te levision system, trade-union pressures and Lhe power o f influe nce of 
large communications groups 17J . 
As occurs in Lhe European Un ion, the Slates can make use o f two types 
of instrurnents to limit concentralion. In the first place. they use gen-
eral legis lation on competition, which they apply 10 me rgers. takeovers 
and join t ventures between compani es of any type; secondl y. they es-
tablish sorne spec ific legal rnechani srns fa r the communicati ons secto r. 
Legislation on free cornpetition in cach country bears a ccrtain paral-
lelisrn to the legal texts on the subjcct in force in the European Union: 
the Mernper States act -with s imilar criteria to those of the Competi-
tion Directorate General of the EU- when the concentrat ion operati ons 
do not reach a "Community d imens ion" . 
In almost every country there are Tri bunals far the Oe fence u f Com-
petition whi ch inform the Ministry of Fina nce or thc Exchequer w he n 
173 One nf the 1110~ 1 well-known ca~es in refcrcncc to this la~l is~ue too!.. place in ltal y in 
1995: in a re ferendum. the majori ty of the c iti zens voted agai n~l thc han on a compa-
ny owning more than one tc lcvision channc l; obvious ly. Be rluM;oni ·\ thrcc e hannc ls 
campaigned against the fl alian governmcn1·s proposal. Sce Giampict ro Mav:nlcni 
and Nicole tta Vitadini (2001), 71ie /1alia11 M edia Lí.111dsrnpe. Europcan Journalis 111 
Centre. www.cjc.n l/jr/emland/ital y. htm l. 
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a takeover or merger might generate abuse of a dominant position; that 
risk may exist because a company has attained a high level of the mar-
ket share, or because vertical integration is produced which hinders the 
entry of other competitors. 
In almost every country, companies are required to inform the Tribunal 
of concentration operations; this occurs, for instance, in Holland, when 
mergers and takeovers .if17ect companies whose joint business figures 
are in excess of 113 million euros; in Germany, the minimum figures 
are of DM 1000 million of joint business figures and DM 50 million in 
more than one of the affected companies 174• 
In sorne countries, the bodies that regulate free competition are very 
technical; in contrast, in other cases, decisions are highly influenced by 
political interests. These opposing elements of technical versus politi-
cal are also reflected, to a certain extent, in geography: the North (with 
a greater tendency towards technical application)/South (where control 
of competition is usually more discretionary)175• 
Specific legislation on mass media clearly distinguishes between the 
print media and audiovisual media. In the former there are no techni-
cal limitations which prevent the existence of as many as the market 
can accept; in contrast to the licensing system, typical of the audiovi-
sual industry, the press sector is completely open to prívate initiative. 
In the regulation of newspapers three options may be distinguished, of 
lesser to greater public interventionism: a) in sorne countries - such as 
Belgium, Spain or Germany, specific legal regulations on newspaper 
ownership do not exist; b) in other cases -such as France, Norway or 
174 Legislation on free competilion and on mass media in Europe is very extensive. In this 
chapter wc will not quote the legal tcxts from each country. except when it is a par-
ticularly significant law. A good compilation can be found in Howard Tumber (ed.) 
(2000). Media Powe1; Pnifessimwls a11d Policies. Routledge. London. See also Em-
manuelle Machet and Serge Robillard ( 1998), Television & C11/tllre: Policies a11d 
Regulatinn in Europe. The European Institute for the Media. Düsseldorf. 
175 Jesús Mota ( 19.111.2000). Control discrecional de Ja competencia, "El País", 20. 
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Swede n-, publ ic intervention is restricted to aid syste ms fo r pub lish-
ing companies, which attempt to promote a degree o f g rcate r pluralism 
than could be guaranteed by market forces; e) fin a lly, sorne Govern-
me nts establish specific measures : rules on crossed ow nershi p be tween 
newspaper companies and audiovisual companies -(Ho ll a ncl . Turkey 
and Great Britain) or on the need of publ ic o rgani sms to intervene to 
approve certa in mergers that affect the dail y press ( lre la nd and, again , 
Great Britain). 
In practice, the ownership of daily press in Europe is a lmos! com-
plete ly subject to general legislation and the market laws. For instanee. 
Great Britain in theory has one of the most interventi onist systems. 
with rules on crossed ownership and the need o f mini sterial approval 
for mergers or takeovers that generate companies w ith sales o f over 
500.000 copies a day (Fair Trading Act of 1973); but that legal frame-
work has nol preventcd News lnternalional from reaching a hi gh dc-
grce of markel concentration - above a li in the London prcss- and be-
coming one of the giant operators of the Briti sh audiovisual industry. 
Legislation o f the audiovisua l industry is the result o f spec ia l hi stori-
cal circumstances: unti l 1975, public telev is ion in Europe was domi-
nated by public monopolies, with the e xception o f F inl and. Luxem-
bourg and Great Britain : in the next fiftcen years a <le regulati on 
process was initiated of a lmost every marke t. w ith the appearance o f 
new prí vate radio stations and television channe ls. Thi s process in-
volved the passing of laws which included limits on the ow nershi p of 
audiovisual media 176 . 
Unti l 1975 it was incumbent on the monopolies o f each country dccl i-
cated to public service to provide plurali sm . With the appearance o f 
radi o stati ons and prí vate te levis ion cha nne ls. leg is lato rs establ ishecl 
the number of channels thal the same ow ne r coulcl acquire ( in al most 
176 A good summary of 1ha1 legislation can be fou ncl in André L ange aml Ad Van Loan 
( J 990). Multimedia Co11ce11tratio11 Reg11/ario11 i11 Eumpe. ID/\TE and I n~1i1u1e far l n-
formation Law, Monlpcll ier-Amsterclam. 
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every country the limit was one, a lthough in Italy three were permit-
ted) and the maximum amount of capital share in each company 
(which ranged fro m 100% to 25% o f each channel). 
The limits on ownership established in the laws of privare radio and 
te levisio n were soon shown to be inadequate, confusing and ineffec-
tive177 and posed the following problems, among others: 
a) The deve lopment of private radio and televis ion co inc ided with the 
e ntry in to force o f the Directi ve on Televis ion without Frontiers in 
1989. w hich attempted to promote the construction of a European 
aud iovisual space. That objecti ve could hardly be achieved if the 
legal framewo rk o f some countries - li ke France and Spain, which 
did nol allow an owner to possess more than 25% of a channel- was 
twelve times more restrictive than others, such as Iraly, where 
Be rlu sconi was the owner o f three pri vare national channels. The 
compe titi ve d ifficulty o f sorne companies as opposed to others was 
c lear. 
b) The limit on shares contemplated o ften did not mean in practice 
"sha red control" but the sharc o f s leeping partners. The only prob-
le m for thc company that managed its channel we ll lay in that it 
on ly obtaincd thc part o f profits corresponding to the ir share in the 
capita l: the refore. s uccessful management meant profitability for 
thc s leeping partne rs. but. often, managers could not amass enough 
resources to be a ble to expon their model o f the radio or te levision 
to o the r marke ts . 
e) Companies in the sector were unused to comply ing w ith trans-
pare ncy requircmcnts; ne ither wcre appropriate ways set up for the 
preve nti on or indircct sharcs, th rough fa mily members or instru-
177 Scc Natascha Ju~ t ami Mic.:hacl Latzcr (2000). EU C11111petitio11 ¡m/i,-y and 111arket 
pml'l'r rnntml in the 111edia111111ics em. ·Tclcco111111unications Policy'". 24, 395-4 11 . 
178 Runar Woldt ( 2000). op. cit..4. 
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mental companies. These facts - together, in sorne cases, with the 
absence of a system of sanctions- hindered the application of the 
laws. 
d) Lastly, the number and variety of stations and channe ls have con-
tinued to grow. In that new context, was ir reasonable, for in stance, 
that a proprietor could not own more than 49% of a te levis ion 
channe l, whose market share did nol reach 5% ? Did a genera l 
channel or news c hanne l o r a music or cartoon c hanne l merit the 
same treatment? 
The proliferati on of radio stations and te lev ision channe ls, wi th the re-
sulting audience fragmentation, has brought about a legal change, 
which sorne authors succinctly describe as the change from the ' ·own-
ership model" to the "audi ence share model" 178 • Great Brita in and Ger-
many from the begi nning of 200 1179 did not impose limits on channe l 
ownership whilst an owner did no t gain "undue power of opinion-mak-
ing" ("vorherrschende Mei nu ngsmacht") . This situation arises when a 
person or owner company achieves o r exceeds 30% o f the audie nce. If 
the degree of control is s lightly less than 30% but the company hold s 
a position of s imilar strength in a ne ighbouring marke t the n its power 
to influence can a lso be considered as excessive . 
When a company cxceeds the limit o f 30 % or holds an equiva le nt in-
fluence, it has three options: a) sell its share of te lev is ion channels un-
til it holds a share of less than 30%; b) it can reduce acti vities in re le-
vant ne ighbouring markets until its overa ll power is regardcd as eq ui v-
alent to an audie nce share be low 30% : e) it can apply measurcs which 
enhance the leve l of diversity in its progra mmes or o rgani sati on (pro-
viding airtime for independe nt thi rd parties or establi shing an inde-
pendent " programme advisory counc il"). 
179 Rundfunkstnutsvcnrag vom 3 1. A ugusl 1999. in der Fassung des fünfJcn Rund-
funkiindcrungss1aa1svcnrags. 
180 Broadca~l ing Act ( 1996), HMSO. London. 
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Leg is lati on on te levis ion in Great Britain 18º does not allow an owner 
w ith more than 15% share of the total audience time to do any of the 
following: a) hold two or more licences for Channels 3 and 5, domes-
tic satel lice. non domestic satellite, licensable programme or digital 
prog ramme services; b) hold one licence and have a 20% interese in 
two or more licensees for such services; e) hold one licence and have 
a 20% inte rest in another such licensee; d) provide a fore ign saee lliee 
service a nd ho ld such a licence or have a 20% interese in such a li-
cence; e) hold a digital programme services licence providi ng two or 
more o f those services . For these purposes, half the audience time 
which counts for a service in which a company has a 20% interese or 
more is attri buted to its primary audience share. 
O ther measures re lati ve to concentration of the audiovisual industry 
refer to the independc ne production quotas. Governments consider chat 
the presence o r production compani es w ith enough size and experi -
ence, and with no links to che broadcasting cornpanies of audiovisual 
programmes are an added e le ment for pluralism. For this reason, sorne 
cou ntries. such as France. establish more stringent quotas for inde-
pende nt produc ti on than the Community ones 181 • 
In any case. quotas have not had che expecced effect: in most European 
countries, prod uctio n companies do not maintain broadcaseing rights 
afte r the fi rs t transmi ssion: also, man y o r the most successful produc-
ti on companies have been bought up by the television companies. If 
the pub lic autho rities studied w ith greate r atteneion the director indi-
rect partic ipation of the te levision compan ies in production cornpanies 
thcy wou ld d iscovcr that often thc independenl production quotas are 
no t compli ed w ith . 
181 A dcnec of 17 .1.1 990 whid1 -.ei- oul 1hc Act of 30.IX.1986 rchning to thc audiovisu-
al indu,try c'lahJi,hc' 1hat lanJ d1anncb 11111-.t dcrntc l 5'7c of thc ncl bu;incs., !i!!urc 
to 1hc acqu i-. i1i on of "indcpcndc111" produc1io11s; thc broadcasting channcl may- not 
havc a dircct \ lf' indircct sharc highcr than 15r¡r of thc capi1al of thosc production rnm-
panie ... AJ'tcr hc1wcc11 .1 and 5 ycars. broadca~ting rights are handccl back to thc pro-
duction comrany·, owncr,hip. 
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The most recent legal texts try to avoid the ex istence o f " bo tt lenecks" 
in the new terrestrial, cable or satell ite dig ital distribution syste ms. The 
mode l of the " must carry" rules is applied to digital techno logy w ith 
the qualification that technology a llows for a much greate r number of 
channels to be di stributed than a decade ago. 
As a basic idea, the public bodies try to prevent whoever controls the 
technology -cable syste ms, satell ites of terrestrial broadcasting net-
works- from arbitrarily dete rmini ng whic h c hanne ls have access to 
those distribution systems. Often the condi tions for approval of sorne 
mergers and takeovers include agreements to that effect so th at com-
petition is not di storted. 
The legal changes over the past decade are expla ined by several polit-
ical, technological and economic factors: a) the need to adapt national 
legislat ion to the new Community framework, increasingly dec isive in 
the regulation of concentration; b) the search for balance between the 
strength of the audiov isual industry and the upho lding of differe nt 
voices in the market 182 ; c) the wish to fin d ano ther type of balance: the 
strengthening of European identity and respect for the plurality of the 
cultures of regions and small countries; d) the liberalisatio n of the reg-
ulation of the United States - introduced by the Te lecommunications 
Act of 1996 - which has allowed North American groups to grow and 
seems to requ ire a s imi lar response from Europe; e) the development 
of new forms of di stribution of radio and te levis ion programmes: e) the 
loss of the specific weight of publ ic radio and te lev ision; f) the g lobal-
isation of markets. 
These factors have meant that the communications markets have be-
come extremely changeable which poses problems for the stab ility of 
legal frameworks. In the fo ll owing section we w ill look at so rne of the 
182 Frcnch communications companies complain that thcy put up with onc uf thc mu~t 
compl icated ancl rcstricti ve legal framcworks in Europe. See e.g. TV lnternatiunal 
( 11. Yl.200 1 ). French free TV gia111 fa ces d1alle11ge.1· as reR11la tio11s /i111i1 room to 111a-
11e11ver. 10-11. 
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EU 's and European countries' decisions which attempt to promote plu-
ralis m witho ut using anti-concentration legal measures. We will also 
take a brief Jook at the main problems and issues still unresolved by 
the legal frameworks -Community and European countries- cun-ently 
in force. 
4.4. Other Measures f or the Promotion of Pluralism 
Besides the regul at ions limiting the concentration of the mass media, 
bo th the EU and -especia ll y- the European countries have put into 
prac tice diffe rent mechani sms for the promotion of pluralism. As we 
ha ve po inted out. the concentration of the market does not directly de-
pend on the growth of groups but on the number of independent offers 
w hich c itizcns havc access to. Therefore , sorne promotional measures 
may fac ilit atc the emergence of new communications companies and 
thc survival of others whilst s imultaneously the most successful com-
pa nies in the market carry on with the ir plans for expansion. 
In that se nse. the main action carried out by the E U has been Lhe ME-
D IA Programme: altho ugh another priority aim was pul forward - the 
develo pment o f the European audiovisual industry- it has promoted 
indepe nde nt produc tio n for te levision and the fi lm industry. 
The firs t vers ion of thc MEDIA Programme1x:i, whi ch was implement-
ed between 199 1 a nd 1995, inc luded, espec ially, aid for the distribu-
Li on o f audiovisua l wo rks . The MEDIA II Programme, in force from 
1996 to 2000 , was a imed mainl y al the pre-production and post-pro-
duc tio n s tages o f audiovisua l works, bccause in that way it created a 
fa vourablc env ironme nt for small and medium-sized companies. M E-
DIA n. as well as funding productio n and di stribut ion - through loans, 
183 MEDIA "'ª' pas,ed by thc IJcci,ion 90/685/EEC of thc Council. 21 Dcccrnbcr 1990. 
rclati vc to the application of a progra111 111c for thc promotion of thc European audio-
vi, ual indu, Jry. 
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re imbursable loans and subsidies- has a lso provided a id for vocatio n-
al tra ining. 
With the conclusion of the MEDIA 11 Program me, MEDIA Plus carne 
into operation, which will be in force until the end o f 2005. Thi s new 
Programme tries to adapt itself to the changes whic h dig ita l technolo-
gy is introducing into the productio n and dis tribution of audiovisual 
works. MEDIA Plus's funds are a llocated to vocati ona l training and 
the production, distribution and promotio n o f audiovisua l contents. 
There is a certain controversy on the effecti veness of the MEDIA pro-
gram mes, to the extent that the last o ne encounte red nurne ro us obsta-
c les for it to be passed. Their lack of impact o n the industry. the ex-
tremely complicated procedures to apply for a id and the grants crite ria 
have been cri tic ised. In any case, a good number of audiovis ual works 
would not have been made if they had not received the he lp of ME-
DIA. 
In European countries, the procedures for pro moting plural is m in thc 
med ia have been numerous and freq uently no less controversia!. 
Among others, the fo llowing are worthy of no te: 
a) The ex istence of public rad io and televis ion, as a counterweight to 
prí vate radio stati ons and channels. Public media do not o nly mean 
there is one more voice in the market, but that -as a recen! s tudy 
by Mc Kinsey shows- they can influence the way the prí vate chan-
ne ls act 1x4 : in thc attentio n given to news programmes. in the type 
of fic tion programmes broadcast, s tandards o f qua lity. etc. 
b) Aid to newspape rs, radio stat io ns, te levision channels and film 
companies. Direct and indirect a id to the press was introduced in 
severa! European countries in the sixties. As Smith writes. " it con-
184 Adrian D. Blakc e l al. ( 1999). Keepi11¡: Bm'll'mcli 01 /Jm·. "The Mc:Ki n~cy Quancrly". 
No. 4. 18-28. . . 
cerns a s trange Robin Hood type of mechanism" 185, by means of 
whic h the taxes on extremely profitable activities go towards keep-
ing newspapers in business and avoiding local press monopolies. 
Direct aid is in force in Finland, Norway and Sweden and - to a 
lesser extent- in Austria, France, Holland, Portugal and Italy. 
A id for the radio is mainly for no n commercial stations or those 
with cultural a ims . In France, for ins tance, the "Fonds de soutien a 
l 'espressio n rad iophonique" (FSER) are still applied which pro-
v ide for subsidies for the setting up and fu nc tioning of associati ve 
rad ios whose advertising revenues are less than the 20% of total 
tu rnover. A si milar Fund exists in Ho lland, with the aim of pro-
mo ting radio and te lev ision productions reflecting Dutch culture. 
ln o ther countries, such as Oenmark, local radios can receive local 
subsidies. 
Occasio na ll y, a id to commercial te levision chan nels is linked to 
the broadcasting o f programmes in minori ty languages: such is the 
case of TG4 in Ire land. which receives a state subsidy for broad-
casting programmes in Gaelic. 
In the film industry, Lhe high market share of North American pro-
ductio ns -which varies from between 64% in France and ltaly to 
90% in Ho ll and'Nr._ has led toan aid policy in ali of the European 
countries. T hose subsidies, compati ble to and complementary wi ú1 
MED IA, have taken on severa! fonns: aid depending on box-offtce 
rc turns. support for projec ts of a cultural nature and tax incent ives. 
The greatcst efforts for the promotion of the film industry have 
come from t.hose countries with a longer-establi shed tradition in 
thi s rie ld: France, Ita ly. Great Britain. Gennany and Spain . 
185 A111hony Smi1h ( 1980). Gootlhye G11re11he1:~. The Ne1rspaper Rern/11rio11 of rl1e 
1980\. Oxford U11ivcr~ i1y Prcss. Ncw York. 44. 
186 Sta1is1ics from Eurostal. rcferring to 1998. In that year thc American cin..:ma·s mar-
kct shar..: in Europc was 82'7~. 
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c) The criteria for che oran tino and renewal o f radio a nd celevision Ii -
º o 
censing, which - in many cases- prevencs compani es w ich the 
greacest presence in the re levant markets fro m acc umul acing me-
dia. In Greece, the audiovisua l Iegislation - both that re ferring to 
commercial radio and te levision, and pay te levision- establishes 
chat concessions must not promote an excessive concentra tion'of 
ownership; in Germany, che federal states usuall y a ward pri vate ra-
dio stati ons to e ntities with Iittl e or scarcely any prese nce in each 
one of those markets; in Spain. the commercial tc lev ision compa-
nies have been unable to take part in the first te rrestria l d ig ital te l-
evision license tendering; and in France and Swede n a licem:e quo-
ta is reserved for non-profit community rad io sta tions. 
d) The councils and authorities charged with ensuring the pluralicy of 
media. Most European countries have one o r severa( regul atory 
bodies with different functions: granting and renew ing frequen-
c ies, issuing reports on concentration operations affecting the me-
dia, dealing with compla ints from the public. etc. 
In sorne countries -such as Norway and Ita ly- counc il s have au-
thority over ali the media. In other cases -such as Francc and Great 
Britain- there are di fferent bodies for the print ancl a ud iovisual 
media187 • ln general, the effecti veness of these regul atory bodies 
depends on their credibil ity, which is usually inversely proporti on-
al to their dependence on poli tical power. Some instituti ons cnj oy 
great prestige: "The Independent Television Commission" and the 
"Radio Authority" (Great Britain), "T he lndependent Radio and 
Television Commission (lreland). the "Alta Autoridade para a Co-
municar;:ao Socia l" (Portugal), the "Conse il Supérieur de J' Audio-
visuel" (France), "Commissariat voor de Media" (Ho ll and) and the 
recent "Kommission zur Erm itt luno der Konzentration im Medi -o -
enbere ich .. (Germany). 
187 Jcns Cavallin ( 11.11 .998). E11ropem1 Po/icies a11d Reg11/ario11s mr Media Cmwe11rra-
ri1111. unpubl ishcd papcr. 
e) 
L EGAL f RAMfl\'ORl1 
º.~ve lopment o f infras truc tures w hich contents suppliers can ben-
e f it from. In sorne countries. suc h a s Ge rmany and Turkey, the o ld 
te le co mm 1 · · t n1cat1o ns mono po li es have taken upon themselves the 
cons truc tio n of the cable ne twork far telev is ion. A similar phe-
nomeno n has occurred w ith the States inte rvenino in the setting up 
o f Inte rne t conncctio ns in homes, schools and u~versities . 
f) The establishme nt of requirements for transpare ncy. Almost a li the 
Euro pean countries, fo llowing the Counci l of Europe and the Eu-
ropean Union·s recomme ndatio ns, apply specific measures for 
favo uring the transparency of communications companies188- In 
somc countries. newspapers are required to publ ish the names of 
the publi she r and the editor, a lthoug h this information may not re-
flec t the po litic a l, ideological or economic interests of the propri-
e tors. In the 0 ra ntino of licences for radio s tati ons and te levis ion o o 
c ha nnel s s tricter require me nts for transpa rency are usually includ-
cd , s uc h as the o b ligation to s tate the name of the shareholders in 
a specifi c registe r. 
Nei ther the legal syste ms nor the o ther measures for the promotion of plu-
ra lism we ha ve described can avoid confli cts of competition of power, the 
failure to comply with some legal provisions and the undesired effects of 
the intervention of public entities. 
One of the most serious problems of concentration regulation refers to _tlie 
re lations be tween communications companies and the regulatory bodies. 
Governments have several systems at their disposal to put party benefi ts 
(f'avourable public opinion) before the public good (pluralism): discre-
ti onary use of public aid; granting radio stations and television channels 
licences based on cri teria of political affinity; and the lack of internal plu-
ralism in the public media. The governments' greater or lesser "orientation 
towards public service" appears to depend more on the historical, pol itical 
and c ultural will and tradition than on the contents of the legal texts. 
r l8R Scc Philippc Mounier and Scrgc Robillard ( 1994), La 1rn11pare11ce dans le nmimle 
des médias. Europcan lnstitule for thc Media, Dllsscldorf (reporl submiued 10 1he Eu-
ropcan Comm ission). 
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A nother difficulty arises from the lack o f transparency and in certain 
cases, of the ineffectiveness or the non-ex istence of a system of sanc-
tions. D espi te the requirements for transparency pointed out, occa-
sionally, the owners of communicatio ns compan ies avoid the estab-
lished limits through instrumental companies. Some laws Iack reg ula-
tions which make them operative; and, in general , the sancti ons stipu-
Iated - except in the case of the EU Commissio n - do not act as a de-
terrent for those who do not even consider ab id ing by the law. 
The conílicts in jurisdiction originate in the c lash between the lega l 
frameworks and the action of Communi ty authorities w ith the legisla-
tion and regu latory bodies of each country. A lso the new technologies 
-such as Internet or satellite channels 189- make it d i fficult to determine 
w ho has regulatory power. Other times the conflicts in jurisdiction 
arise in the country itself; the market 's changeabi 1 i ty has meant that 
sorne laws 'ha ve been g iven preference over o thers. wi thoul there be-
ing a c lear framework covering the whole sector. Ho l land represents an 
extreme case of that problem: the communicati ons sector is regulated 
by Lhree specific laws and superv ised by four contro l bod ies . 
Over the next years, the regulatory bodies o f each country w il l have to 
gain a greater degree o f co-ordinati on w ith the Competition Direc-
torate General in the EU; they w ill also have to mark o ut their rele vant 
markets and the balance w hich they w ish LO ach ieve bel wcen the 
strength o f the communications companies and market plurali sm : and 
Lhey wi ll find themselves forced to give up party interests and improve 
the technical procedures for the appl ication or laws i r they w ish to es-
tabli sh a coherent and efficient regulatory framework. making com-
merc ial obj ectives compatible w ith the public i nterest. 
189 For im.tancc. thc VT4 channcl ¡, broacka~I from Grcat Bri1ai11 fur thc Bclgian markct. 
As thc Belgian lcgi, lation on telcvisiun aclvcrti >ing b more rc,tricti vc than thc 
13riti , h. thc VMM Group, VT4 's co111pc1i1or. consi<lc r' that this channel ha' :111 unfair 
co111pe1i1ivc aclvantagc. 
Cm:cLus10Ns AND RECOMMEN0 ,rno1-:s 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Before listing the conc lusions and recommendations to be inferred 
from this monograph, it would be appropriate to make an evaluation of 
the effects of media concentration. Consumers, political systems, jour-
nalists and the communications companies themselves are passive and 
active subjects of concentration. For sorne writers, this phenomenon 
has predominately negative consequences. as the critica! school's sllld-
ies indicate. For others. concentration is the result of the free play of 
the mark et econom y. where the strongest and the one that better meets 
the public·s demands w ins. as defended by the liberal school. Between 
both extremes can be found a sizeable number of intermediare posi-
tions. 
The mass media 's function is to serve society. But also, as companies. 
they need to manage certain resources. assess supply and demand, ap-
p ly new technologies and improve the quality of their services. Com-
munications companies' grow th, vertical and horizontal integration. 
diversificat ion, internationalisation, segmentation and specialisation 
are appropriate tools far enhancing pro fitability and ensuring their sur-
vi val in highl y dynamic markets. 
Industrial concentration is perceivcd by companies as a way of in-
creasing in size. creat ing scale economies. making savings on produc-
tio n costs ancl competing to advantage w ith the rest of thc companies 
in the sector. Industria l concentration does not necessarily require the 
disappearance of an indcpendent voice from the market, because the 
launching oí new products can generatc growth. From a European 
v iewpoint. i ndustrial concentration favours the consolidation of group. 
competing on an international scale against foreign companies. In the 
European fi lm market, far instance, the consol idation of a vert ically in-
tegratcd incl ustry wi th the presence or strong companies on an interna-
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tiona l leve! would he lp to restore the audiovisua l trade ba lance w ith 
the United States'9º. 
Of the negative aspects, concentrat ion accentuates thc control o f a 
broad nu mber of channels by the same compa ny and . consequently, the 
risk of the loss of pluralism in informatio n. Mass media concentration 
lends force to the opinion of a few to the detrime nt o r the frecdorn of 
expressio n of independen t actors and new co rnmuni catio ns med ia . 
Concentration can be che cause of the appearance of markets in a si tu -
ation of o ligopoly or mono poly. Occasio nally. g lo bal conccntratio n 
processes generate more and more entry barrie rs for new co rnpanies 
with weaker media groups de pri ved of the c hance to dcvelop. a fact 
which can be interpre ted as a threat to freedom of express ion and plu -
ralism191. 
The giant companies enjoy greater independence and havc more re-
sources on hand in a rder to c riticise decisions made by political in sti-
tutions; but, conversely, the democratic qual ity of a country ca n be irn-
pai red when a party or government exerts a dec isivc in flue nce o n com-
munications groups in dominant posi ti ons in the ir markets . 
The levels of po li ti cal partic ipatio n and the public's opi ni o n o n po li ti-
cal ac ti vity depend, to a great ex tent. o n the informatio n trans miued by 
the media. In the last twenty-five years, numerous sc ic ntific swdies 
have been published which allempt to analyse the correlat ions between 
the media's dominant messages, thc issues whic h attract public inter-
ese and thei r poli tical decisions192. lt seems to have been demo nstrated 
that the media influence the agenda of the issues which auract public 
attention and bccome subjects for debate; in contrast. it is not so clear 
that they can substantially modify public o pinion. 
190 See C. Hoskins. S.McFadyen and A. Finn ( 1997). Global te le1•isi1111 mrdfi/111. Oxford 
University Prcss, Oxford. 
191 See My von Eulcr ( 1998). World cm111111111icatir111 report. UNESCO. Paris . 
192 See Noelle-Ncwman ( 1974). Tlie Spiral of Sile11ce, a tlieory of"p11blic opi11io11. Jour-
nal of Communication. (45-5 1 ). 
CO.~CLUSIO:-IS Ar>D R ECO.\IM ENfJ,\TIONS 
l f a h igh number of companies have the ability to " mark lhe agenda". 
g iv ing more importance to sorne news items and undervaluing others. 
certain groups· power is neutrali sed by the activ ity of olhers. In con-
trast. w hen a company dominates the market, it can strike off certain 
relevant issues from the a!!enda and introduce others. lt can also rein-
force its ncgoti ating positi~n w ith the pol itical powers. 
The risk s of an cxcessive accumulation of poli tical power and the 
mechanisms used to avoid th is are well known. ln contrast. when that 
power fall s to the communications companies we do not know what 
the rnaxirnum degree o f reasonable influence is and how to limit ex-
cessi ve concentration. 
In Europe. ovcr the last decade there have been numerous debates on 
plurali sm and mass media concentration 193. Legislation has been mod-
i fiecl in cvcry country and the sharing out of authority between the 
Commissio n and the M ember States is still the cause oí frequent de-
bate. The key issue líes in fincling the balance between the two types 
of interests: the publ ic 's which w ishes to have access to a variety of in-
formati on sources ancl thc companics ' which wish to reach sufficienl 
size to be able to compete on an internat ional scale. 
O ítcn. leg islation has cnsurecl a variety of media available to the pub-
lic but at thc cost of an excess ively fragmentcd inclustry. Other times. 
companics ha ve encountered fcw restrictions to their growth plans, bul 
monopolics and abuses of a clominant posi tion in thc market have aris-
en. 
Thcre are numcrous factors related to thc impact of media concentra-
tion on the public: thc geograph ical situation of the product. if the of-
f'cr can be substitutcd ror another. the company 's composition. the 
journalis1s· degree of indcpendcnce in each company. how the compa-
193 Scc Can;:,. U nrcns Maluqucr (200 1 J. C1111cn11mci<Í11 de 1•111presa5 d1• 1·01111111irncilí11 y 
plrm1/i.m10: /11 nccití11 de la VE. JoclOral lht:>is. Univ.:rsidad Au1ó110111a de Barcelona. 
Barcelona. 
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ny is managed, the public as receptor. the in format io n offer from oth-
er geographical markets, etc. The ri sk of monopol ising in formation is 
inversely proportional to the size o f the market w here the communica-
tions group operates. For example, a greater degree of concentration is 
generated in regional and local markets than in national markets. 
The impact o f concentration can also be dueto the mcrcantili sation of 
the media: contents are increasing ly detennined by owners and man-
agers in detriment to joumalistic criteri a. The excessive market quota 
of a few groups can form an entry barrier for innovati ve media that 
propase a different new s or entertainment model. The sclf-sufficiency 
of leaders can involve a loss of creativity and o f quality in contents. In 
preventing the abuse of a dominant position governments promote d i-
versity, the creat ion of markel niches, f ragmentation and the p lurality 
of information. In another way, competition for audicnccs w ill mean 
that lhe contents w ill become uniform 10 thc detrimenl of qual ity . But 
the homogenization of media contents is more the consequence o f '·im-
itation strategies" than o f the conccntration o f communications com-
panies. 
The criti cs of concentration usually point to negati ve situati ons which 
are not always the direct consequence of thc growth o r companies: the 
absence of a critica! attitude on the parl o í j oumalisls, Lhe homoge-
ni zat ion of the contents, less attention givcn to loca l intcrest issues. the 
Lri vial isat ion of informati on 1 9~. 
As a recen! study shows, che heavy dcpcndcnce on advcrti si ng invest-
ment means that newspapers moderate their political messages w ith 
the aim o f altracting a larger aud ience quota1'>5• Managers· lack of in-
dependence when faced w ith Lhe pressurc of advcrtiscrs can be mili -
194 Scc Davidc Crotcau and William Hoync' (200 1 ). The h11.l'i11e.1.1 of media : mr¡111ra1e 
m edio w1<! 1/ie ¡mh!ic i111eres1. Pinc Forgc Pres,. Thousand Oah. 
195 Scc kan J. Gabszcwicz. Didcr Lausscl and Nathalic Sonnac (2001 ). !'1'<'.l'S atfrerris· 
i1111 a11d1/ie asce111 nf rhe "Pemée U11iq11e". "'Eurnpcan Economic Rcvicw··. No. 45. 
64 1-65 1. 
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gated by s trong groups. which reach high market quoras and are less 
vulnerab le lo pressurcs exerted by advertisers. On rhe other hand, em-
píri ca! s tudies on the re lationship between concentration and pluralism 
do not show that the combined ownership of newspapers implies a less 
crit ica! atl itude lowards pol itical power196: to condemn the effects of 
concentration witho ul e mpirical proofs is an ideological supposition 
but does not achieve the status of a scientific proposa l197• 
The advance of concentration in many countries of Europe around the 
middle o f lhe twentie th century gave rise to numerous studies on the 
c reatio n of newspape r c hains, the disappearance of independent Lirles 
and the c ffects o f thi s struc rure on local marke ts. Bagdikian 's c lass ic 
work on lhe concentralion of media power in the United States estab-
lished lhe basis for rhe •·critica! theory" on the increase in power of the 
giant g ro ups 19x. 
Years later. McQuai l brought together the main hypotheses of the crit-
ica! researc he rs on the situations of the press in monopolistic markets: 
a) The acqu is it io n of a newspaper by a national chain produces a loss 
in local news and opinion services, 
b) The disappearance of a rival newspaper reduces di versity of in for-
rnat io n and opinio n in thal markel and 
e) When an independent newspaper becomes part of a chain its criti-
ca! capacity and editoria l independence are diminished. 
But McQuail is careful to specify thal in spite of the numbers and the 
c rcati ve1H..:!-.!. o f' lile rcscnrch, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the cmpirical studies have been unablc lo identiíy clcar general effects 
196 Scc David Dcmcrs ( 1999). G/obnl media: menace or messiah ?. Hampion Prcss. Ncw 
Jcr~cy. 
197 Scc Pcic r J. Hum phrcys ( 1996). /Wnss media all(/ media po/icy i11 \Vestem Europe. 
Ma11d1cs1er Univcrsi1y Prcss, Manchcslc r. 
198 Scc Be n Bagdikian ( J 990). The Media mo11opoly. Bcacon Prcss. Boston. 
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on the balance of costs and benefits of concentratio n 1''''. In certain mar-
ke ts there can be at the same time a p lurali ty in the owners o f the me-
dia and a Jack of varie ty in the conte nts. The o pposite s itua ti on is a lso 
possible: Jack of plurality in owne rs, but a huge varie ty in politica l 
standpoints. For Nieto, " pluralism is more in what the media commu-
nicate than in who control s the media" 21x1• 
Criticisms against newspaper c hains do no l on ly re fe r Lo conte nts, bul 
a lso to other fac tors: the dominan! position for the establis hme nt o f 
prices, the profit motive as excl us ive crite rion for decision -making. or 
a fall in quality; but these critic is ms can never be proved as uni versal-
ly valid2º1• 
Concentratio n has positive implicatio ns for companies . With merge rs, 
the launching of new products a nd the increase in thc markct quota, 
communications groups ex plo il their hig h fi xed costs to the full. A 
communications market in free competitio n is c haractc rised by the dif-
ferentiation in products and the o ffe r o f differe nl ideas and approach-
es. The very nature of the medi a markel implies the diffc rc nti ation o f 
products to attract audiences . In thi s s ituation - the need to c rcate scalc 
econom ies and lo diffe rentiate the product - some markcts w ill te nd to 
become he terogeneous oligopolies2°2• 
As well as concentration, globalisation , in the o pinio n o f sorne writers. 
is harmful for de mocracy. For Herbert Schille r, the intc rn ati ona li sat ion 
of the communications compani es· capital a ll ows the creati o n o f ··cul-
tural predatory giants". With dercgu lation, conc ludes Schill er. the 
199 Sce Den i~ McQuai l ( 1998). La acl'i1í11 de los nwdios: lo .1 11wdio.1· ,¡,, , ·n1111111icaciá 11 _1· 
el i11terés 1níblico. Amorrotu editore~. Bueno' Aires. 
200 Alfonso Nieto (200 1 ). 1imt' lllld tlll! i11Jomwtio 11 market: tlil' rnsl' o( 5imi11. Media 
Market' Monographs. EUNSA. Pamplona. 
201 Sce R.G. Picard and J.H. Brody ( 1997). Tite Ne 11·spaper i11d11stry. /\l lyn ami Bat.:011 . 
Bo,ton. 
202 Sce J. V. Cuilcnhurg in R.G. Picard (ed. ) (2000). Measuri11~ m edia 1·n111e111. q11ali1y allll 
dii•ersity. Turku School of Economics and Business admin i~t ration . Turku. 
CONCLUSIONS ANO RECmlMENDATIONS 
S tate 's ability to intervene and socially manage the system has dimin-
ished 203 . C oncentration, the construction of macro-conglomerates and 
hiper-commerc ial isation are -from the critical perspective- the great-
est blemishes o n the face of the mass media204, and represent the 
biggest threat to the democratic system205. Many of the ana lys ts who 
de fend these standpoints urgently demand a stricter regulatory policy 
to curb the growth of g lobal multimedia conglomerates206. 
But other researchers continue to have a more optimistic view of the 
s ituation: the free play of supply and demand does not guarantee that 
markets are a lways open to competition, but, in practice, the proli fer-
a tion of media means that there are increasingly fewer cases of a lack 
of plurali sm; for that reason -they add- excessive State intervention 
generates negati ve s ide effects which are more serious than the prob-
le ms they attempt Lo correct. 
As we ha ve a lready shown, the communications market in Europe pos-
es three types of basic problems: 
• The si tuati on o f domination of the leading companies in pay tele-
vis io n, the music industry and film di stribution : in these areas, the 
main companies obtain high market quotas in the greater part of 
the Community countries. In contrast, in other sectors, such as the 
dai ly press, radio or commerc ia l te levision, audience leadership is 
always in the hands of the companies of their own country, with 
the exception of the French-speaking area of Belgium, Austria and 
Un ited Kingclom. The financia! press, magazines and the publish-
203 Cr Howan.1 Tumbcr el al. (2000). Media Pml'e1; pmfessio1wls (111(/ policies. Routlcdge. 
London. 
204 Sce R. W. McChcsncy ( 1999). Rich Media. Pnnr Demncracy. Univcrsily of lllinois 
Press. lll inois. 
205 Sce Robin Andcrsen and Lance Strale (cd.) (2000). Cri1ical s111dies i11 media cnm· 
111erciali.1·111. Oxford Universi ty Prcss. Oxford. 
206 Sec Leo Bogar! (2000). Crm1me1T"ial rn/111re: 1he media syste111 (111(/ 1111' p11b/ic i111er-
es1. Transaction publishers. Ncw Jersey. 
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ing industry are faund to be in an intermed iate pos ition as far as 
the ex istence of large companies with a dom inant positio n on a Eu-
ropean scale are concerned. 
• The dominant presence of North American capital in sorne sectors: 
such is the case in advertis ing (through the European subsidiaries 
of the Iarge multinationals), film di stribution (concentrated in 
companies which are the property of the g reat " majors" of Holly-
wood), pay television (if we consider th at a large part of Vivendi's 
capital is in the hands of pens ion funds in the Un ited States, and 
that Rupert Murdoch, the principal owner of the second largest op-
erator - BSkyB-, has North American citizenship) and the music 
industry. 
• The excessive fragmentation in severa! markets which hinders 
competitiveness of European companies at a worldw ide le vel. The 
sma ll average size of the European companies produces a decisive 
disadvantage, far example, in the production of audiov isual works. 
In thi s repon, after analys ing the quantitati ve statistics of the Europcan 
market and keeping in mind the reflection of each expert from thc 
Member countries, we pul forward severa! recommendati ons wh ic h 
could serve as a guide far the European Uni on 's regulato rs . 
a) Concentration operat ions: the conti nuation of a poli cy favour-
ing the consolidation of big European commu ni cation cornpa-
ni es - li ke the merger o f Vivendi and Uni versal or the alliance 
between Ufa and CLT-, provided th at this docs not produce 
dominant posit ions in the market. 
b) Contro l ovcr mergers and takeovers: rnai ntai n thc "'sing le au-
thority" system in the revie w of these opcrat io ns (the Co m-
mi ssion of the European Union or each country ·s govern-
ment). 
e ) Consicleration of the "Comm unity dimension., to merge rs and 
takeovers: the thresholcl of mínimum turnovcr coulcl be low-
ered to 2000 mi Ilion euros, so as to broaden the Commission ·s 
\ 
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capacity to ban concentration operations. This measure would 
require a re-modification of the Council Regulation 4064/89, 
of 2 1 December, on Control of concentrations. 
d) Rev iew of the laws on prívate radio and television: the prolif-
e ration o f channels recommends the development of the "own-
ership model" (establishing strict limits on the ownership of 
each channel , even though it has a low audience), to the "au-
di ence share model" (limiting the total audience that a compa-
ny can achieve through several channels), as has already been 
done in Great Britain and Germany. 
e) Vertical integration of the audiovisual industry: it is important 
the Commission continue its endeavours to prevent the distri-
bution control systems from interfering with the contents pro-
ducers' access to the public. The "mu st carry" rules of the ca-
ble operators and regulation on compatible decoders are good 
examples of this policy. 
t) C ine ma film di stribution: suggest to the Member States they 
revise the effic iency of protective measures of free trade in the 
a rea of c inema films in order to avoid North American pre-
dominance. For example: 
-prevent block sa les of films, 
- preven! Control of c inemas by large production 
companies. 
g) Transparency in communications markets: legislation would 
be worthwhil e in this a rea in order to facilitate free trade. This 
dec is io n is one of the three proposed in the Green Paper on 
conce ntrat io n and information pluralism published by the 
Commission in 1992. 
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